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A STATISTICAL LOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT'S 2009
TERM





Whether a change in membership occurs or not,
every Supreme Court term presents a unique set of
controversies and decisions for legal scholars to examine.
Herein, we offer a discussion of the Court's recently
completed 2009-2010 term. Rather than analyzing specific
opinions in detail (as many have already done), we generate
a comprehensive statistical analysis of justice voting
behavior for the term. In particular, we examine consensus
and division on the Court, the ideological tenor of the term,
voting alignments among the justices, the production of
opinions, and the Court's overall ideological spectrum
based on individual voting patterns. Ultimately, we also
assess the ramifications of our findings for the future study
of judicial behavior.
Production of Opinions
The Court handed down ninety full-opinion
decisions during the 2009 term. Seventeen of these
decisions came by way of per curiam opinions.4 Ten of
these per curiam opinions came in unanimous decisions,
but the Court issued per curiam opinions in seven non-
' John M. Scheb, II is a Professor of Political Science at the University
of Tennessee, Knoxville.
2 Colin Glennon is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
3 Hemant Kumar Sharma is a Lecturer in Political Science at the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
4 "For the Court," i.e., not attributed to any particular justice.
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unanimous decisions as well. In the seventy-three cases
with signed majority opinions, the workload was evenly
distributed.5 All members of the Court wrote either eight
or nine majority opinions, with the exception of Justice
Stevens, who authored only six majority opinions. Justice
Stevens, however, was the most prolific opinion writer
overall, due predominantly to the fact that he wrote nearly
twice as many dissents as anyone else on the Court. Justice
Sonia Sotomayor opened her freshman term by writing the
initial opinion of the Court, a unanimous decision in
Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter.6 Sotomayor went on to
write an additional seven majority opinions, which put her
at the Court's mean. Half of Justice Sotomayor's opinions
for the Court involved unanimous cases; she also penned
two concurrences, four dissents, and two opinions in which
she concurred in part and dissented in part.
Table 1: Production of Opinions, 2009 Term
Concurring/
Dissenting Total
Majority Concurring Dissenting in Part Opinions
Stevens 6 13 12 2 33
Scalia 8 15 6 0 29
Thomas 8 13 4 1 26
Alito 8 10 7 0 25
Breyer 9 6 7 2 24
Kennedy 9 8 4 0 21
Sotomayor 8 2 4 2 16
Ginsburg 9 3 3 0 15
Roberts 8 3 2 2 15
5 See Table 1: Production of Opinions, 2009 Term.
6 Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
10
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Consensus and Division on the Court
In terms of the political ideology of decisions, much
of the public discussion of the Court's 2009 term centered
around two high-profile cases, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission7 and McDonald v. City of Chicago.8
In Citizens United, the Court struck down a federal law
limiting electioneering communications by corporations
and labor unions.9 In McDonald, the Court struck down a
Chicago ordinance that effectively banned the possession
of handguns. °  Both decisions were widely seen as
conservative; both were enormously controversial; and both
were five-to-four rulings. Because the media, the attentive
public, and the scholarly community focus on cases like
these, where the Court is sharply divided, it seems that
attention is often drawn to ideological divisions on the
Court.
However, it should not be overlooked that,
statistically, during the 2009 term, there was a substantial
degree of consensus on the Court. This is not a new
development. In fact, since 1953, the average number of
unanimous decisions has been 41 percent.1 ' In the 2009
term, 44.0 percent of the Court's decisions were
unanimous. 12
Further, 29.7 percent of all cases saw either a six or
seven vote majority, indicating some controversy among
the justices, but not a division that can be explained strictly
along ideological lines.
13
7 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
8 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
9 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
10 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
" HAROLD J. SPAETH ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK,
available at http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited June 1, 2010).
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Finally, 20.9 percent of the decisions could be
classified as sharply divided-i.e., five-to-four rulings.
Table 2 illustrates the breakdown of decisions by number
of votes in the majority.14
Table 2: Number of Decisions by Voting Margin,
2009-2010 Term







Ideological Tenor of the 2009 Term
In a recent article in the New York Times, Adam
Liptak asserted that the Roberts Court is "the most
conservative one in living memory ...... ,15 According to
Liptak, "In its first five years, the Roberts court issued
conservative decisions 58 percent of the time. And, in the
term ending a year ago, the rate rose to 65 percent, the
highest number in any year since at least 1953. ' '16
Our coding of decisions handed down during the 2009
term,1 7 however, reveals a significant reduction in the
proportion of conservative decisions. As can be seen in
Table 3, when all decisions are considered, including the
14 id.
15 Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decade,




17 HAROLD J. SPAETH ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK,
available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var =
decisionDirection (last visited July 27, 2010).
12
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forty-four cases that are unanimous, the rate of
conservative decisions in the 2009 term is 51.1 percent.
When viewed in its totality, then, the 2009 term
appears to have been a rather moderate one. Whether this
is a single term aberration or the beginning of a shift in the
Court's ideological leanings remains to be seen.
Furthermore, whether this figure is skewed in any way by
the large number of unanimous cases (which are more
prevalent than they have been since 2005) also requires
investigation.
Table 3: Ideological Direction of Decision and Issue Type
by Unanimous/Non-unanimous Decision
Ideological Unanimous Nonunanimous All
Direction Decisions
Conservative 41.0% 59.2% 51.1%
Liberal 59.0% 40.8% 48.9%
Issue Type Unanimous Nonunanimous All
Decisions
Civil 50.0% 56.9% 53.8%
Rights/Liberties
Economic 27.5% 23.5% 25.3%
Other 22.5% 19.6% 20.9%
As shown in Table 3, there is a significant difference in
the ideological direction of the unanimous and non-
unanimous decisions. Fifty-nine percent of the unanimous
decisions were liberal, while only 41.0 percent of the
unanimous decisions were conservative. It is also
interesting to note that 50.0 percent of the Court's
unanimous decisions involved issues of civil rights or
liberties, matters on which we would expect disagreement
along ideological lines. While these findings could be a
13
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one-term anomaly, historical evidence suggests that they
are not, as previous examinations of the Vinson, Warren,
and Burger Courts reveal, among other things, that liberal
outcomes were consistently more likely in unanimous cases
during those eras, as well.18 Whether this reflects a general
liberal tenor in more settled areas of law and constitutional
doctrine is one possibility that is open for debate.
Voting Alignments among the Justices
Beyond examining cases themselves, followers of
the Court have long been interested in "voting blocs" on the
bench.' 9  Political scientists have been particularly
concerned with political phenomena that lead to the
formation of blocs of voters within ideological
parameters. 20  Today, for example, it is common to hear
media commentators refer to the Court's "liberal wing" or
"conservative bloc." The 2009 term certainly provides
support for such characterizations, as clear liberal and
conservative coalitions appear.
However, before delving into an assessment of voting
blocs, we must determine whether to examine all decisions,
or simply non-unanimous ones, in our assessment of voting
behavior. Within the judicial behavior literature, there has
been a longstanding debate as to whether unanimous
decisions should be included in measures of judicial
ideology. Early on in the evolution of the field, C. Herman
Pritchett argued that in cases in which there is no dissent,
"presumably the facts and the law are so clear that no
opportunity is allowed for the autobiographies of the
18 See Saul Brenner and Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision
Making on the U.S. Supreme Court: Case Stimuli and Judicial
Attitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75-86 (1987).
19 Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The Impact of Presidential Appointments
to the U. S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive Voting Within
Presidential Blocs, 53 POL. RES. Q. 4, 795-814 (2000).
20 id.
14
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justices to lead them to opposing conclusions." 21 Pritchett
and others who favor this approach suggest that in
unanimous cases, ideological preferences of the judges are
tempered by non-controversial legal factors that lead to the
nine to zero outcome. 22 As a result, they choose to focus
on non-unanimous cases; that is what Jeffrey Segal and
Harold Spaeth do in offering their "attitudinal model,"
which propounds the notion that justices are motivated
solely by their ideological orientations.
23
The rates at which justices agreed with one another in
all non-unanimous cases during the most recent term are
displayed in Table 4. The rates of agreement are consistent
with the ideological leanings that Court followers would
expect from each of the justices. For example, Justice
Thomas agrees much more often with fellow conservatives
Scalia and Alito, and Justice Stevens more often with the
Court's liberal justices, such as Sotomayor and Breyer.
Table 4: Agreement Scores, 2009 Term
(Non-unanimous decisions only)
44.7% 35.4% 70.8% 79.2% 38.6% 64.6% 29.2% 70.8%
77.1% 50.0% 50.0% 79.5% 31.3% 66.7% 33.3%
61.2% 61.2% 75.6% 38.8% 59.2% 40.8%
79.6% 53.3% 65.3% 44.9% 55.1%




21 C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the
United States Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 5, 890
(1941).
22 See id.
23 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
15
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The mean level of agreement across all justices for the
term is 54.9 percent. The highest level of agreement is
between Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, who voted
together 85.7 percent of the time. The lowest level of
agreement is between Justice Stevens and Justice Thomas,
who agreed only 24.5 percent of the time. Lawrence Baum
stated that "analyses based solely on non-unanimous
decisions may provide an incomplete picture of individual
and collective voting patterns in the Court's full set of
decisions." 24 This suggests that unanimous cases should
also be accounted for in crafting voting scores, as they still
reveal ideological preferences of the justices.
Consistent with the notion that both kinds of cases
should be examined, Table 5 displays agreement figures
that are based on all decisions, including unanimous ones.
The rates of agreement seen in Table 5 are of course higher
across the Court, and for each pairing of justices. Justice
Thomas still agrees much more often with Justice Scalia
than he does with Justice Stevens, but the extremity of the
difference is attenuated. The mean level of agreement for
all cases in the 2009 term is 75.4 percent. The highest level
of agreement is between Justices Scalia and Thomas, who
voted together 92.0 percent of the time. The lowest level of
agreement involves Justices Stevens and Thomas, who
agreed only 57.5 percent of the time.
24 Lawrence Baum, Membership and Collective Voting Change in the
Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 1, 8 (1992).
16
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Table 5: Agreement Scores, 2009 Term (all decisions)









Given these voting alignments, it is easy to discern
two voting blocs on the Court, as show in Table 6. The
liberal bloc, consisting of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Stevens, voted together, on average, 71.5
percent of the time in non-unanimous cases, and 85.0
percent of the time when all decisions are considered. The
conservative bloc, composed of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Kennedy, voted
together, on average, 71.6 percent of the time when there
was division, and 84.3 percent of the time in all cases.
Table 6: Voting Blocs on the Court. 2009 Term




Mean Agreement (all decisions) =
85. 0 percent
Mean Agreement (non-unanimous
only) = 71.5 percent
17
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Justice Kennedy: Swing Voter?
In terms of the Court's voting blocs, Justice
Kennedy has often been characterized as the key "swing
vote," (i.e., the one not primarily aligned with either bloc).
Indeed, some commentators have, in recent years, referred
to the Court as "the Kennedy Court," rather than the
Roberts Court, due to Kennedy's inordinate influence as
the Court's swing voter.25 Specific research indicates that
Kennedy has predominately aligned himself with the
conservatives on the court, but has also had a willingness to
veer from his natural bloc in certain case areas, unlike
previously defined swing voters.
26
Yet, as Linda Greenhouse noted recently in the New
York Times, the characterization of Kennedy as a swing
voter may no longer be apt.27 Certainly, it does not apply
to the Court's most recent term, in which Justice Kennedy
voted approximately 82 percent with the other members of
the conservative bloc in all cases (68 percent in non-
unanimous cases) and an average of 73 percent with the
members of the liberal bloc (52 percent in non-unanimous
cases). However, when the majority consisted of only five
justices, Kennedy voted with the other conservatives
approximately 63 percent of the time, but voted with the
liberals, on average, only 26 percent of the time. The gap
between these rates of agreement belies any depiction of
Kennedy as a "swing voter."
25 Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The "Swing Voter" Revisited:
Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free
Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q. 109, 209-17 (2004).
26 id.
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The Court's Ideological Spectrum
Using the well-established coding rules associated
with the Supreme Court Database, we coded the ideological
direction of each of the Court's 2009-2010 decisions.
28
Three of the decisions could not be coded liberal or
conservative. 29  One of the decisions, Skilling v. United
States,30 contained two holdings cutting in opposite
directions, so we coded this case as two decisions.3' Of the
eighty-eight instances that we could code ideologically,
forty-five (51 percent) were conservative rulings and forty-
three (49 percent) were liberal ones. This ideological
balance may well account for the relatively high esteem in
which the American public continues to hold the Court.
32
Figure 1 arrays the justices according to the
percentage of liberal votes cast. In terms of individual
voting scores, Justice Scalia emerges as the Court's most
conservative justice, with a liberal voting score of only 36.4
percent in all cases, and 18.4 percent in non-unanimous
cases. At the other extreme, Justice Stevens completed his
final term on the Court as the most liberal justice, with a
liberal score of 83.7 percent in all cases, and 72.4 percent in
non-unanimous decisions.
28 HAROLD J. SPAETH ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK,
available at http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited June 1, 2010).
29 Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 599; South Carolina v. North Carolina,
130 S. Ct. 854 (2010); Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295
(2010).
30 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
31 In Skilling, the Court rendered a conservative decision on an issue of
pretrial publicity, but also produced a liberal ruling on the scope of a
federal honest services fraud criminal statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
Skilling v. United States, No. 08-1394, slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. June 24,
2010).
32 LINDA SAAD, HIGH COURT TO START TERM WITH NEAR DECADE-
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Consistent with our voting bloc analysis, we can
easily identify the natural ideological break point between
Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy. As show in Figure 1,
Justice Ginsburg, the least liberal member of the Court's
liberal wing, voted liberal in 63.3 percent of non-
unanimous cases; 61.4 percent in all cases. By contrast,
Justice Kennedy's liberal voting score is identical to that of
Chief Justice Roberts (36.7 percent in non-unanimous
cases; 46.6 percent in all cases). Clearly, in terms of bloc
voting, Justice Kennedy belongs with the Court's
conservatives, at least in the 2009 term.
One should note that the five justices who make up
the Court's conservative bloc all vote liberal at a much
higher rate in unanimous cases than they do in non-
unanimous ones, while the four justices in the liberal bloc
do the opposite; they vote liberal at a higher rate in non-
unanimous cases than unanimous ones. One might wonder
why the Court's conservatives are more likely to vote
liberal than the Court's liberals are likely to vote
conservative. Is it because the conservatives are more
collegial than their liberal colleagues? Was this a one term
anomaly? Or does this merely reflect the liberal
underpinnings of modern American law? The answers to
these questions are beyond the scope of this article, but
provide a rich area of exploration for future scholars of
judicial behavior.
20
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6. Nonunanimous Only 0 All Decisions
Justice Sotomayor's First Term
During the battle over Sonia Sotomayor's
nomination to the Supreme Court, there was widespread
speculation as to where she would fit into the Court's
ideological spectrum. The prevailing view was, of course,
that she would join the liberal wing of the Court-it was
simply a matter of how liberal she would rule.
Her behavior during the 2009 Term is consistent
with previous findings that freshman justices do not differ
from their senior colleagues with respect to joining
established voting blocs-as she seems to have settled into
the more liberal side of the liberal bloc.33 The data reveal
that Justice Sotomayor voted, on average, 87 percent of the
time in all cases with the Court's liberals, and only
33 See Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb, II, Reassessing the "Freshman
Effect": The Voting Bloc Alignment of New Justices on the United
States Supreme Court, 1921-90, 15 POL. BEHAV. 1, 1 (1993) (stating
"[f]reshman justices do not differ from their senior colleagues with
respect to bloc voting").
21
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approximately 70 percent of the time with the
conservatives. When considering all cases in which she
voted, she aligned with the term's most liberal justice,
Justice Stevens, 83.7 percent 34 of the time in all cases, and
72.4 percent 35 of the time in non-unanimous cases.
Conversely, she voted with the term's most
conservative justice, Justice Scalia, only 40.0 percent 36 of
the time in non-unanimous cases.
Overall, her liberal voting score in all cases was
67.5 percent 37 and 73.3 percent 38 in non-unanimous
cases-making her the Court's second-most liberal justice,
behind Stevens.
Conclusion
In summary, our most interesting findings revolve
around the vast differences in individual voting behavior in
unanimous and non-unanimous cases. This indicates that,
even in an era where observers are prone to deriding the
politicization of the judicial branch, data indicate that
ideology is not the only factor driving judicial decision-
making. Certain high-profile cases may be more likely to
lead justices to exhibit specific ideological differences, but
the majority of cases seem to involve the location of some
degree of consensus among ideologically disparate actors.
The implication for scholars of the Court is that non-
ideological factors, such as interaction with other justices
and/or adherence to legal or constitutional doctrine, may be
important avenues for further inquiry. We feel that simply
referring to unanimous cases as the "easy" ones is
inadequate; after all, these cases present legal questions
difficult enough that, in many cases, lower courts do not
34 See Figure 1: % Liberal Voting, 2009 Term.
35 id.
36 See Table 4: Agreement Scores, 2009 Tenn.
37See Figure 1: % Liberal Voting, 2009 Term.
38 id.
22
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achieve consensus. Ultimately, while political scientists
have fixated on non-unanimous cases for many decades-
in the search for the factors that lead justices to differ-it
may be time to offer a more thorough appraisal of
unanimous decisions. Future research may well wish to use
textual analysis to isolate specific legal or constitutional
concepts on which the justices are in agreement in order to
locate the reasons why justices may agree, as they do in
nearly half of the cases in the 2009 term.
23
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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413, 414, AND 415: FIFTEEN
YEARS OF HINDSIGHT AND WHERE THE LAW SHOULD GO
FROM HERE
Bryan C. Hathorn'
Courts that follow the common-law tradition
have almost unanimously come to disallow .
. . evidence of a defendant's evil character
to establish a probability of his guilt.
The inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is
said to weigh too much with the jury and so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with
a bad general record . . .
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
In our system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than
persons.
People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988).
In 1995, Congress added three rules, which
governed the admissibility of "prior sexual misconduct" in
federal trials, to the Federal Rules of Evidence.2  The
procedure by which Congress added the rules was outside
of the normal procedure for the creation of federal rules, it
was highly controversial, and it was done over the
Haverford College, B.A. 1991, California Institute of Technology,
Ph.D. 1999, University of Tennessee, J.D. 2010. Presently a judicial
clerk for the Tennessee Supreme Court. The author thanks Prof.
Maurice Stucke for his helpful comments. Any opinions and any errors
are the responsibility of the author.
2 See FED. R. EvID. 413,414, 415.
24
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objections of the judicial conference. 3  The controversy
surrounding the rules produced a flurry of scholarship on
the rules, which continued for about five years. After this
initial period, the storm quieted with a reduced amount of
scholarship on the subject. It is now fifteen years since the
new rules went into effect and it is possible to look back at
the effect of the rules with perspective and examine the
impact they had on trends and changes in the law of
evidence in the United States.
Section I discusses the history of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and the admission of "other acts" character
evidence under the rules. Section II highlights the
development of law forbidding character evidence and the
limited exceptions to the rule. Section III discusses the
rationalizations behind the character evidence rules and the
rationalization for Rules 413, 414, and 415. Section IV
discusses recidivism of sexual offenders that underlies
many of the rationalizations for the rules. Section V
outlines the impact of Rules 413, 414, and 415 on evidence
law. Section VI concludes with a discussion of what
should be done with character evidence rules for sexual
offenders in the future.
I. "Other Acts" Character Evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the
admissibility of evidence in federal courts. In 1965 Chief
Justice Earl Warren formed an advisory committee to draft
the rules, which were intended as a codification of the
3 See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
See also Report of the Judicial Conference on the Admission of
Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases, 159 F.R.D.
51 (1995) [hereinafter Report of the Judicial Conference].
25
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common law tradition of evidence.4 The codification of the
Rules of Evidence originally took place pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, and ultimately the rules were passed
by Congress and signed by the President as the Act to
Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and
Proceedings.
5
At the most fundamental level, the Federal Rules of
Evidence assume that judges and juries act rationally. For
instance, Rule 105 permits a judge to ask a jury to limit its
consideration of evidence for a particular purpose.6 That
juries can segregate evidence into discrete packages and
apply the evidence for limited purposes assumes that juries
behave rationally. That assumption has been criticized as
unrealistic.7
4See Glen Wissenberger, The Proper Interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Insights from Article VI, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1615
(2009).
5 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
6 "When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. EVID. 105.
7 Courts recognize that limiting instructions do not cure the impact of
prejudicial evidence. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (calling the idea that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by a jury instruction "unmitigated
fiction"); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)
(describing limiting instructions as "a mental gymnastic which is
beyond, not only [the jury's] power, but anybody else's."). See also
Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of
Limiting Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677 (2000).
Interestingly, it may be that judges are able to go through the mental
gymnastic of excluding inadmissible evidence in bench trials better
than has been supposed. The conviction rate in federal bench trials-
where the judges have seen inadmissible evidence-is lower than that
in federal jury trials. Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation
and Data about the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1185-86
(2005). However, some of this effect is probably due to self selection
by defendants with a weak case trying to roll the dice with the jury. Id.
26
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At the same time, however, the Federal Rules of
Evidence recognize that sometimes evidence, while
relevant, 8 is so prejudicial that a jury cannot be exposed to
it, even with a limiting instruction. 9 The commentary
surrounding Rule 403-which excludes evidence where the
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury"' -suggests that "[ulnfair prejudice within [this]
context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.""l  As such, the Rules of Evidence
recognize that jurors, who are presumed to be rational,
suffer from inherent, non-rational tendencies.12 The Rules
of Evidence explicitly recognize that the presumption that
jurors are rational must be balanced against their irrational
decision making, and the rules provide for this balance
through the "balancing test" of Federal Rule of Evidence
403. This balance provides a fundamental protection to the
8 The basis of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that only relevant
evidence should be admitted. See FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Relevant
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); FED.
R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided. . . by these rules . . . ").
9 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... "
FED. R. EvID. 403 (emphasis added).
10 FED. R. EVID. 403. In addition to protecting against non-rational jury
decisions, Rule 403 is also intended to protect against inefficiencies of
trial by excluding evidence which will cause "undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
" FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
12 It is well known that jurors are subject to make decisions based on
emotion. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1609 (2000). The American Bar Association entreats
prosecutors not to "use arguments calculated to inflame the passions..
of the jury." ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice 98 (1974).
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defendant, limiting admission of evidence likely to be
misused by the jury.
The fundamental protections of Rule 403 are found
again in Rule 404, which regulates the admissibility of
"character evidence." 13 The Rules of Evidence recognize
that evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is perhaps
the most prejudicial evidence that could be admitted at
trial 14 and explicitly excludes it from consideration by the
jury: "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith."' 15 The basis for this
rule is not to exclude evidence that is irrelevant; it is to
exclude relevant evidence that is likely to be misused by
13 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) states the general rule that
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion. . . ." Character evidence comes in many forms,
but the focus in this article is on "other acts" character evidence. This
type of evidence is known by many names, including "preponderance
evidence" or "prior bad acts" evidence.
14 The caution against use of other acts character evidence is not only
for criminal cases discussed in the present article. The Advisory
Committee cautioned against the use of such character evidence in civil
cases, stating:
[c]haracter evidence is of slight probative value and
may be very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier
of fact from the main question of what actually
happened on the particular occasion. It subtly
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and
to punish the bad man because of their respective
characters, despite what the evidence in the case
shows actually happened.
FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's note (citing Cal. Law.
Revision Comm'n, Rep. Rec. & Studies, 657-58 (1964)) (emphasis
added).
15 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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the jury.' 6 However, there are exceptions that allow the
evidence to be admitted for the limited purpose 17 of
showing "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."' 8  Even when such character evidence is
admitted for a limited purpose, the rule does not require
that it be admitted; admission is still subject to the
safeguard of Rule 403, preventing admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence. 19 The safeguard against prejudicial
use of "other acts" evidence follows the tradition in
American courts that "a defendant must be tried for what he
did, not who he is."
20
In 1994, the landscape for character evidence in
federal court changed. The United States Congress-over
16 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). Justice Jackson
summarized the reason for excluding character law evidence in his
opinion:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition have
almost unanimously come to disallow. . . evidence
of a defendant's evil character to establish a
probability of his guilt. . . . The inquiry is not
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity.
The overriding policy of excluding such
evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the
practical experience that its disallowance tends to
prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice.
Id. at 475-76 (citations and footnote omitted).
17 See FED. R. EVID. 105.
18 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Character evidence may also be admitted
if it is an "essential element" of the action.
19 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note on 2000
amendments.
20 United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting
United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)).
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the objections of the Judicial Conference 2 1-- enacted
22
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415. Federal
21 The Judicial Conference noted that the rules were opposed by "the
overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law professors, and legal
organizations." Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 52.
That an "overwhelming majority" of legal scholars objected to the rules
is probably an understatement. When the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure voted, there was a
single vote in favor of the rules-from the representative of the
Department of Justice. Id. This result was not surprising, as the senior
counsel of the Department of Justice, David Karp, authored the rules.
See 140 CoNG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) [hereinafter,
Floor Statement of Rep. Molinari] (statement of Rep. Molinari). A
minority of commentators have suggested that the change in the rules
was positive. See, e.g., Mary Katherine Danna, Note, The New Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Prejudice of Politics or Just Plain
Common Sense?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 277, 309 (1996) (arguing that
character evidence of prior bad acts is relevant and that the rules don't
go far enough in relaxing the restrictions on its use).
22 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). The procedure by which the rules
were put into place was different than the rest of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which were developed with the advice of the Judicial
Conference. In the case of Rules 413, 414, and 415, the rules were
forcibly added by a political process. The procedure by which they
were added is in section 320935 of Public Law 103-322:
(b) Implementation. The amendments [enacting the
rules] shall become effective pursuant to subsection
(d).
(c) Recommendations by Judicial Conference. Not later
than 150 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Judicial Conference of the United States shall
transmit to Congress a report containing
recommendations for amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence as they affect the admission of evidence of
a defendant's prior sexual assault or child molestation
crimes in cases involving sexual assault and child
molestation. The Rules Enabling Act shall not apply
to the recommendations made by the Judicial
Conference pursuant to this section.
(d) Congressional Action
30
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Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 explicitly make
evidence of prior sexual offenses admissible in both civil
and criminal trials.23 Essentially, the change in the rules
(1) It the recommendations described in subsection
(c) are the same as the amendment made by
subsection (a) [enacting the rules], then the
amendments made by subsection (a) shall
become effective 30 days after the transmittal of
the recommendations.
(2) If the recommendations described in subsection
(c) are different than the amendments made in
subsection (a), the amendments made by
subsection (a) shall become effective 150 days
after the transmittal of the recommendations...
Id. Thus, the change to the rules took place over any thoughtful
objections of the Judicial Conference, which submitted a report to
Congress objecting to from the proposed rules.
23 The text of the Federal Rules of Evidence follows, in pertinent part:
Rule 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual
Assault Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused
of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant. ...
Rule 414. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child
Molestation Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused
of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter which it is
relevant. . ..
Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases
Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other
relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission
of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or
child molestation, evidence of that party's
31
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"supersede[s] in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of
,24Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)." In one action,
Congress overruled the fundamental protections for the
accused, which had been developed through centuries of
case law and codified into the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The "new rules, which [were] not supported by empirical
evidence, could diminish . . . protections that have
safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases and parties
in civil cases."
25
The addition of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415 added complexity to the usual scheme for
admission of "other acts" character evidence. Ordinarily,
under Rule 404, evidence of other wrongs to prove
conformity therewith is excluded.26 There are a number of
limited exceptions where the evidence may be admitted to
prove some other issue, 27 but even under one of these
limited exceptions, the admissibility was subject to the
protections of Rule 403. The Judicial Conference
suggested that if Congress insisted on the new rules, in
order to protect the accused and maintain the balance of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, an explicit reference to Rule
403 should be added.28 Ultimately Congress declined to
modify the new rules before they went into effect.
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415
reverse the normal procedure. Under these rules, evidence
of another act "is admissible, and may be considered for its
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault or child molestation is admissible and may be
considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of
these Rules. ...
24 Floor Statement of Rep. Molinari, supra note 21.
25 Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 53.
26 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
27 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
28 Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 54.
32
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 31
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." 29 The floor
debate and the comments from the author of the rule
30
indicated that the rule was intended to be subject to the
overall protections of the balancing test of Rule 403;
however, the actual language of the rule is unambiguous-
"evidence . . . is admissible.' The usual method of
statutory construction32 is to investigate the legislative
intent only when the language of the statute is ambiguous.
In this case, however, the plain meaning of the statute
allows broad admissibility. Despite the lack of ambiguity,
courts have generally applied the protections of Rule 403 to
consideration of evidence under Rules 413, 415, and 415.33
A second issue with the application of the rules is
the standard of proof necessary for the admission of
evidence of "other acts." The rules only refer to
"commission" of the other act,34 and contain no statement
as to the burden of proof or the reliability of the evidence.
They do not specify whether the evidence of the other act
requires that the defendant was convicted for the prior
offense, that the defendant was charged for the crime, or
29 This language appears in section (a) of each of the three rules. FED.
R. EVID. 413, 414, 415.
30 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex
Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15 (1994).
31 FED. R. EVID. 413 (emphasis added). See also FED. R. EvID. 414,
415. Given the comments of the author of the rules, this may be a
drafting error. See Karp, supra note 30. The rules appear to be poorly
drafted in other ways. The drafting errors in the statute could probably
be revised, but given the difficulty in passing the law, and the almost
unanimous objection to the rules by scholars and jurists, it is unlikely
that Congress will revisit the debate.
32 Rules of evidence are constructed in the same manner as any other
statute. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
33 See, e.g., Erik D. Ojala, Note, Propensity Evidence under Rule 413.
The Need for Balance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 947, 968 (1999) (reviewing
Eighth and Tenth Circuit cases).
34 "[Elvidence of the defendant's commission of another offense" of
sexual misconduct is all that is required under the rules. FED. R. EVID.
413.
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that there was merely an allegation against the defendant.
Presumably a juror who hears evidence based on a mere
allegation of prior misconduct would discount the charge,
but given the inflammatory nature of the evidence, a mere
allegation could be extremely prejudicial.
A third issue is with the "similar" nature of the
crimes. The title of each of the rules refers to "evidence of
similar crimes," but nowhere in the body of the rule is the
evidence restricted to "similar" crimes.3 5 Under a literal
reading of the rules, a sexual assault against a male child
would be admissible as evidence in a case of a sexual
assault against an adult female, despite the fact that the
crimes are not "similar." 36  While such a case may be
extreme, it demonstrates the all encompassing language of
the rules.
Finally is the issue of the relevance of other acts
that occurred far in the past. The usual application of the
rules sugests that offenses that are decades old are not
relevant. Rules 413, 414, and 415 provide that the
evidence is admissible with no limitations on time.
38
Admission of evidence of a prior bad act which is decades
old may be of limited relevance, but would still be highly
inflammatory .39
35 This may be another drafting error, but as described supra note 31, it
is unlikely that after the controversy when the rules were enacted
Congress will want to revisit the issue.36 See FED. R. EVID. 413(d) (defining "sexual assault").
31 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609 (indicating that a criminal conviction
over ten years old is not relevant for the issue of impeachment of
witnesses).
38 FED. R. EvID. 413,414,415.
39 In Department of Justice statistics, 5.4 percent of sexual offenders
released in 1994 were rearrested for another sexual crime within three
years after their release. However, of this number, 40 percent were
rearrested within the first year. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL.,
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (Nov.
2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
34
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II. The Prohibition of Trial by Character
a. Common Law History
Since the inception of the American judicial system,
courts have generally prohibited the use of character
evidence as evidence that a person's other acts conform to
an alleged crime. 40 The origins of the rule certainly trace
back to English law, where the earliest cases are mixed.4'
The most famous case citing the proposition may be People
v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (1901), which cites numerous
cases dating to the middle of the nineteenth century for the
proposition that character evidence to "show action in
conformity therewith," should be excluded.42 Molineux
famously states the rule and gives the basis for it:
The general rule of evidence applicable to
criminal trials is that the state cannot prove
against a defendant any crime not alleged in
the indictment, either as a foundation for a
separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs
pdf/rsorp94.pdf. This indicates that it is likely that the older the offense
is-or at least the longer since the offender was released from prison
and has had the opportunity to reoffend-the less relevant the evidence
of a prior sexual offense is. This corresponds to the recognition that
"stale" convictions are of little probative value in matters such as the
truthfulness of a witness. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
40 David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition:
Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161,
1162 (1998) [hereinafter Foundations].
4 Leonard cites the case of Duke of Norfolk v. Germaine, 12 How. St.
Tr. 927 (K.B. 1692) for the proposition that evidence of prior bad acts
was admissible, at least in a case for adultery. Foundations, supra note
40 at 1168. However, Leonard cites Rex v. Cole, Mich. Term (1810),
an unpublished case, for the proposition that, by 1810, the rule
excluding character evidence was firmly in place in American
jurisprudence. Id. at 1170.
42 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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that he is guilty of the crime charged. This
rule, so universally recognized and so firmly
established in all English-speaking lands, is
rooted in that jealous regard for the liberty
of the individual which has distinguished
our jurisprudence from all others, at least
from the birth of Magna Charta. It is the
product of that same humane and
enlightened public spirit which, speaking
through our common law, has decreed that
every person charged with the commission
of a crime shall be protected by the
presumption of innocence until he has been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
43
The general common law prohibition against character
evidence is now firmly seated in American jurisprudence. 4
The prohibition is limited in scope, however, in that
the evidence is permitted to the extent that it is offered to
prove that a person has a trait that would make it more
likely that he or she would commit the act in question.
45
Even though "other acts" character evidence is generally
excluded, the Molineux court recognized the existence of a
narrower list of exceptions than the list found in the present
43 People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286,293-94 (1901) (citations omitted).
44 See generally 1 GEORGE E. Dix et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
186 (6th ed. 2006).
45 Foundations, supra note 40, at 1165-66. Other acts evidence is
admissible for legitimate non-character purposes, such as "proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Evidence is
generally admissible when it has a bearing on the truthfulness of the
accused as a witness, or where the prior act is an essential element of
the charge. An example of the latter, relevant to the present discussion
of sex crimes, is found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5404.1(3)(g) (making
prior offenses an element of aggravated sexual abuse of a child as an
enhancement factor).
36
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).46 However, by the time
the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, the rule of
excluding "other acts" evidence to prove "action in
conformity therewith"47 was the law in almost every
jurisdiction.48
As previously noted, the common law did provide
exceptions. One of those exceptions was the "lustful
disposition" doctrine, which allowed admission of prior
46 Molineux, 61 N.E. at 294. ("This rule, and the reasons upon which it
rests, are so familiar to every student of our law that they need be
referred to for no other purpose than to point out the exceptions
thereto.") A curiosity in the Molineux case is that the evidence which
was excluded there of the commission of a prior murder would likely
be admissible under modem rules of evidence. The method of the
murder in Molineux was to mail a bottle of mercuric cyanide disguised
as medicine to the victim. Id. It is arguable that the distinctive method
of the crime is evidence of "preparation, plan, knowledge, [and]
identity," which could render it admissible under an exception to the
character evidence exclusion. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). However, those
exceptions to the rule did not exist at the time of the Molineux court,
which only recognized exceptions for motive, intent, absence of
mistake or accident, or a common plan or scheme. See Molineux, 61
N.E. at 294-300.
47 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
48 Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161,
229 (1969) ("In most jurisdictions today, the circumstantial use of
character is rejected.") In the middle part of the twentieth century,
there was a movement toward uniform laws. In the Preliminary Draft
of the Proposed Rules of Evidence:
[t]he Committee acknowledge[d] its indebtedness to
its predecessors in the field of drafting rules of
evidence. The American Law Institute Model Code
of Evidence, Uniform Rules of Evidence, New Jersey
Rules of Evidence, and California Evidence Code,
with their supporting studies and commentaries, were
invaluable in suggesting general approaches and
organization as well as particular solutions.
Id. at 190.
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criminal acts of sexual offenders. 49 The lustful disposition
doctrine is still recognized in a number of states to admit
prior sexual misconduct evidence. 50 The doctrine is similar
to the motive, identity, intent, or absence of mistake or
accident exceptions to the rule against admissibility of
character evidence. 51 A "lustful disposition" is certainly
relevant to intent and motive to commit a sexual offense.
The means by which the prior offense was committed, if
the modus operendi is sufficiently similar to the presently
accused offense, is certainly probative to identity of the
offender. For example, if a defendant charged with
statutory rape contends that the victim "looked like an
adult," prior charges on the same offense would certainly
be relevant to the absence of mistake.52 Since "other acts"
evidence could be admitted under these ordinary exceptions
in Rule 404(b), there is no need for a special "lustful
disposition" rule admitting prior sexual misconduct.
49 See Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415:
"Laws are like Medicine; They Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser..
* Evil", 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1503, 1527-30 (1999) (reviewing the
lustful disposition doctrine).
50 See, e.g., Danna, supra note 21, at 283-84 (describing the "lustful
disposition" doctrine and collecting cases). But see Kenneth J. Melilli,
The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REv. 1547, 1584
(arguing that in states that have adopted "rules of evidence patterned
after Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the 'lustful disposition'
exception has arguably been abandoned").
51 Evidence "may. . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. . . . " FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
52 A critical difference is that the evidence which would be admitted
against the defendant who raises the "mistake" defense is that the
evidence would be admitted to rebut a defense that the defendant put at
issue. If the defendant opens the door by raising the defense, in
fairness the prosecution should be allowed to rebut it. Thus, the
defendant would have an opportunity to exclude the evidence by not
taking the stand. The issue here is that the defendant, in effect, chooses
to admit the evidence by raising the mistake defense.
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b. Reasons for the Prohibition
The Molineux court stated the philosophical reasons
behind forbidding character evidence in terms of the
jurisprudence of a presumption of innocence. However,
there are several other grounds, both legal and practical,
which suggest that character evidence should be excluded.
1. Legal Rationales
a) Due Process
Courts have found in the past that admission of
character evidence violates the Due Process rights of the
accused.53 In considering Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415, which are targeted toward a specific group of
offenders, there is an immediate concern over possible
infringement on constitutionally protected Due Process
rights.
54
Courts and commentators have applied several tests
to determine what constitutes Due Process, among them are
the concepts of a historical basis, rational basis, and a
fundamental fairness basis for Due Process.5 5  First,
53 See, e.g., McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
admission of character evidence in murder case violates Due Process
and is not harmless error). But see Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681, 686-87 (1988) (refusing to hold Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) unconstitutional despite the fact that the jury could misuse other
acts character evidence).
54 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
Due Process rights. However, as described below, one of the major
effects of the changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence is the parallel
modification of the state rules of evidence that has happened over the
past fifteen years. See infra Section V.b. Application of the Bill of
Rights to the States occurs by incorporation thru the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 405 (1962).
55 See Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to
Arraign His Whole Life? ": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates
the Due Process Clause, 28 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 23-34 (1996); Mark A.
Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 57, 77-82 (1995).
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commentators have contended that Rules 413, 414, and 415
violate the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
,,56justice, because American jurisprudence has a long
history of excluding character evidence that is "firmly
embedded in the Constitution." 57 Second, jurors can draw
inferences from the evidence that does not logically lead to
the result,58 and admitting evidence permits the jury to
make irrational and arbitrary inferences. 59  Due Process
requires that the rules of evidence in a criminal case
prohibit admission of evidence which does not pass the
"more likely than not" test.60 Finally, the admission of the
evidence violates the fundamental right to a fair trial,
because trial by character denies the defendant the "fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge. ' 61 In
addition, there is the issue that Due Process may be
violated by an ex post facto law which changes the burden
of proof for crimes that have already happened.62 Despite
56 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990)
(finding that "the continuing traditions of our legal system [] define the
Due Process standard of traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 See Natali & Stigall, supra note 55, at 23-24.
58 For a discussion of the failure of prior bad acts to demonstrate
recidivism for sexual offenses, see infra Section IV.
59 See Natali & Stigall, supra note 55, at 24-28.
60 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) ("[A] criminal statutory
presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact on which it is made to depend.") (citations omitted).
61 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948); Natali &
Stigall, supra note 55, at 24 (citing Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76).
See also Jason L. McCandless, Note, Prior Bad Acts and Two Bad
Rules: The Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of Evidence 413
and 414, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (1997).
62 See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 552-53 (2000) (finding
that a Texas sexual offender law changed the evidentiary burden of
proof for the crimes, and thus application to crimes which occurred
40
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the concerns of commentators shortly after the new rules
were passed,63 fifteen years later no courts have yet
determined that the additions to the Federal Rules of
Evidence violate the Due Process Clause.
64
b) Equal Protection for Sexual Offenders
65
The intent of Rules 413, 414, and 415 is to treat
sexual offenders differently than other types of criminals.
When legislation seeks to treat different classes of persons
differently, it immediately triggers Equal Protection
concerns. 66 Even proponents of Rules 413, 414, and 415
concede that they may violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution.67 When a statute distinguishes between
different classes of individuals, the issue is whether strict
scrutiny,68 intermediate scrutiny,69 or ordinary rational
before the law was passed violated the ex post facto law provision of
the United States Constitution).
63 Natali & Stigall, supra note 55; McCandless, supra note 61.
64 See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Sandoval, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. N.M. 2005).
65 Nobody likes a sexual offender, and the author does not suggest that
sexual offenders deserve any kind of special treatment. But "special
treatment" refers both to treatment with positive and negative
consequences. The reasons for prohibition against character evidence
in this section refer explicitly to prohibition of character evidence
targeted toward a specific group. Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415 specifically target sex offenders.
66 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the
American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting
the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 303
(1995) [hereinafter Reforming]; Sheft, supra note 55, at 82-86.
67 Danna, supra note 21, at 309.
68 The Court has typically limited strict scrutiny to racial classifications
or fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). The Court has been reticent to add new classifications
where strict scrutiny applies.
69 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The rules would
survive heightened scrutiny if there is an important state interest and
the rule is substantially related to the state interest.
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basis scrutiny70 should apply. Although the rules pass
rational basis scrutiny,71 because the state interest of
keeping sexual offenders from repeating their offenses, the
rules could fail under intermediate scrutiny. In particular,
in Craig,72 the Court found that use of statistical evidence
to establish that a group had a higher probability to offend
was not substantially related to the rule and violated the
Equal Protection Clause.73 Presumably, Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 could be attacked on the same
basis, although it appears that no successful attack on the
rules using Equal Protection grounds has yet been made.
74
2. Juror Prejudice
Ultimately, trials depend on the jurors making
rational decisions to come to a proper outcome. 75 At the
70 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949). The rules would survive rational basis scrutiny if there is a
legitimate state interest that was rationally related to the rule.
71 See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432-33 (10th Cir.
1998) (applying rational basis scrutiny to Rules 413, 414, and 415).
See also United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding that rational basis test satisfied because of the government's
"need for corroborating evidence in cases of sexual abuse of a child
because of the highly secretive nature of these sex crimes and because
often the only available proof is the child's testimony.").
72 Craig, 429 U.S. at 190. In Craig, the Supreme Court declined to
allow the state of Oklahoma to treat boys differently than girls for the
purchase of alcohol when the state argued that statistically boys were
more likely than girls to drink and drive. Id. at 200-04.
73 Using this reasoning, arguments based on recidivism would fall into
intermediate scrutiny. Because the majority of the arguments for the
rules depend on statistical recidivism of criminals, theoretically they
should face an uphill battle on this front.
74 See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding no Equal Protection violation); United States v. Castillo, 140
F.3d 874, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Enjady, 134
F.3d 1427, 1432-33 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Sandoval,
410 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (D. N.M. 2005) (same).
75 If jurors behaved perfectly rationally, the rules of evidence, save,
perhaps Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides for "limiting
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same time, it is well known that jurors do not always act
rationally.76 The law has adopted protections to overcome
this problem. For example, to prevent juror misuse of
evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence require that
evidence be excluded if the "probative value is
substantially outweighed" by, among other things, "the
danger of unfair prejudice. 77
In the context of balancing prejudice against
probativeness, it is necessary to consider the susceptibility
of jurors to common cognitive biases78 that can cause
erroneous decisions. If the admitted evidence is susceptible
to misuse, it should be excluded.
Jurors are human and are susceptible cognitive
biases. Before discussing the types of bounded rationality
79
to which jurors are susceptible, it is useful to consider when
people are most susceptible to decisions that show aspects
instructions," would be unnecessary. All evidence would be given to
the jury, and the judge could tell the jury which evidence should be
excluded or given little weight ex post. See generally Charles L.
Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957 (2008)
(arguing that rules of weight may be a better system of evidence than
rules based on admissibility). Such a model would be similar to
appellate courts reviewing decisions of bench trials. For appellate
cases, the presumption is that, after hearing the evidence, the judge
gave no weight to evidence to which an objection was made.
76 See, e.g., Donald C. Langvoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
77 FED. R. EVID. 403. For examples of cases with excluded propensity
evidence, see generally 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5239
(3d ed.) (collecting cases).
78 Arguably, cognitive biases give rise to irrational choices. For a list
of common cognitive biases and their application to economic choices,
see Matthew Rabin, Psychology & Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11-46
(1998).
79 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-1102 (2000).
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of cognitive biases. People tend to use simplifying
heuristics when the decision involves choices between
complex options. Trials with two sides presenting
alternate theories are inherently complex, and jurors are
typically not familiar with the issues involved. Frequently,
the jury instructions are confusing to legal scholars-
suggesting that jurors will have great difficulty arriving at a
proper conclusion. 8 1 One would expect that, given their
difficult task, jurors would employ heuristic shortcuts to
help in their decision making.
In addition, people make irrational choices when
they are subject to highly emotional decisions.8 2  While
litigators should try not to inflame the passions of the jury,
in some situations it is unavoidable. Evidence that is
simply so inflammatory that it will inspire a jury to convict
based on unfair prejudice should be excluded.
There are two ways that jurors may misuse prior
acts character evidence. Juror prejudices have been termed
"inferential prejudice," 83  where the trier of fact
overestimates the value of the evidence and comes to the
wrong conclusion, and "nullification prejudice," 84 where
the trier of fact convicts a person simply for being a bad
80 1d. at 1076-84.
81 See generally Peter Tiersma, Asking Jurors to do the Impossible, 5:2
TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 105 (2009) (symposium issue) (discussing the
difficult tasks asked of thejury during trial and deliberation).
82 Criminal trials are inherently highly emotional, and trials involving
sexual misconduct are even more so. In a survey that asked which
crimes were the most serious, rape and child abuse trailed only murder
in "seriousness." Joseph A. Aluise, Note, Evidence of Prior Sexual
Misconduct in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Proceedings: Did
Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and
415?, 14 J. L. & POL. 153, 190-91 (1998). As such, one might expect
that jurors will fall prey to emotional decision making, particularly in
sexual offender trials.
83 Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717,
720 (1998). See also Reforming, supra note 66, at 296-98.
84 Park, supra note 83, at 720.
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individual. While the mechanism by which the trier of fact
reaches an improper conclusion is different, when jurors
misuse evidence the outcome is the same-an incorrect
verdict based on misuse of prejudicial evidence.
a) Attribution Error and Base Rate Fallacy
"[A]ttribution error causes human decision-makers
to attribute too much importance to dispositions, and to
overlook situational influences." 85 Essentially, attribution
error means that people naturally gravitate toward a "trait
theory" rather than a "situational" approach when
predicting people's behavior.86  However, experiments
have shown that a perceived natural trait toward altruism
can be overcome by simple situational pressures.
87
Not only do people tend to rely more on
dispositions, but they fall prey to "Base Rate Fallacy" 88 and
give more weight to a trait than it merits. 89 For instance,
Kahneman and Tversky showed that a sample of
psychology students asked to predict what field a person
85 Id. at 738.
86Trait theory suggests that people have natural dispositions, or traits,
which control their behavior. See infra Section III.d.
87 This fallibility of "trait theory" in a "situational" setting was
demonstrated in the classic "good Samaritan" study. When
seminarians were confronted with a person in need of assistance, the
fact that they were in a hurry dominated the trait of altruism. See John
M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 100 (1973).
88 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of
Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237-38 (1973).
89 Park, supra note 83, at 740. Park describes this as the "interview
illusion" after experiments conducted by Ross and Nisbett. When
asked about the capabilities of a prospective employee, interviewers
gave more weight to the personality information that they got in a short
interview than other information that might be more relevant-the
student's grades in school. Id. at 740. See also Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 79, at 1087 (applying base rate fallacy and
representativeness heuristic to character evidence).
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studied in graduate school based their predictions on a
description of the "personality sketch" that suggested a
person was studying computer science, despite the fact that
such an outcome was much less probable than other
outcomes, such as the person being a graduate student in
education.90 A person's intuition "violates the statistical
rules of prediction."
91
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize the
importance of correcting for these cognitive errors
implicitly, if not explicitly. For instance, in the case of
hearsay evidence, a liberally applied Rule 40292 would
classify as relevant almost all statements made out of court
and "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted., 93  However, the Rules of Evidence explicitly
declare that hearsay is "not admissible" 94 without an
exception. The exclusion of hearsay evidence follows
because it is generally recognized that "juries might accord
it more weight than it deserves." 95 The exceptions to the
general exclusion of hearsay evidence exist because there is
some other factor which gives the evidence some indicia of
reliability,9 6 or would give the defendant an opportunity to
90 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 88, at 237. The total number of
graduate students in education greatly exceeds the number in computer
science.
91 Id. at 238.
92 "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided.
. bythese rules." FED. R. EvID. 402.
93 FED. R. EVID. 801.
94 FED. R. EVID. 802.
95 Barzun, supra note 75, at 1994.
96 See FED. R. EvID. 803, 804. The rule "proceeds upon the theory that
under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803
advisory committee's note. For example, the hearsay rules assume that
a patient has no incentive to lie to his doctor in making statements for
medical diagnosis or treatment, and thus such statements would be
reliable. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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contest the accuracy of the statements.
97
In the context of evidence classified as "other acts,"
presenting a juror with a list of prior offenses plays to the
juror's natural tendency to accept this evidence of a bad
character "trait" as being indicative of the likelihood that
the accused is a sexual predator, even though the "base
rate" of sexual offenders is very low. In addition, jurors are
likely to assess more weight to this highly prejudicial
evidence than other, perhaps more relevant, situational
evidence. In essence, cognitive error leads jurors to rely on
their intuition that criminals are naturally recidivist, and
jurors may accept evidence of "other acts" character
evidence acts as more valuable than it really is.
9 8
b) Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is a heuristic whereby people
examine the evidence but attribute more weight to the
evidence which confirms their beliefs. The tendency to
believe data that supports a desired (or sought after)
conclusion has been known for hundreds of years,99 but the
mechanism by which it occurs has only been more recently
investigated. Sometimes confirmation bias simply results
97 For instance, in the case of an admissible "admission by party
opponent," FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), the defendant has the opportunity
to demonstrate that the hearsay is untruthful through the adversarial
system. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
98 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 79, at 1087.
99 In 1620, Francis Bacon wrote,
The human understanding when it has once adopted
an opinion. . . draws all things else to support and
agree with it. And though there be a greater number
and weight of instances to be found on the other side,
yet these it either neglects or despises, or else by
some distinction sets aside or rejects[.]
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
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from "wishful thinking."100  In other cases, confirmation
bias results from a "representativeness" or "availability"
heuristic. 10 1  In this latter instance, individuals may
subconsciously choose an option based on "known patterns
without questioning whether the previous pattern has
relevance in predicting future events," or by assuming facts
that are readily memorable are more reliable. 102 Regardless
of the source of the bias, when an individual thinks that a
decision should come out with a particular outcome,
evidence which supports that conclusion may be adopted
and given greater weight than it merits.
10 3
In the context of "other acts" character evidence, it
is clear how this mechanism can prejudice the jury. The
prosecution is typically the first to present its case 10 4 and
has the opportunity to set a "goal,"10 5 for which the jury can
then collect and assess evidence. After establishing the
goal, a prosecutor can then present "other acts" evidence
which will have a greater chance to be accepted by a juror
who is looking for reasons to convict a defendant. With the
idea of conviction in mind, other acts will present a juror
100 Essentially, this means that a person believes the result that the
individual wants to see. See, e.g. id.
101 John E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort
Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their Effects Without Changing the
World, 85 NEB. L. REv. 15, 23 (2006).
102 Id.
103 Confirmation bias is present in all populations. Even scientists (of
which the author is one), a group who on the whole are supposed to be
rigorous, analytic, rational, and mathematical thinkers are susceptible to
the effects of confirmation bias. See Monwhea Jeng, A Selected
History of Expectation Bias in Physics, 74 AM. J. PHYSICS 578, 578
(2006).
104 This is also an example of "primacy" where the first thing that a
person hears is more likely to be remembered. See James Deese &
Roger A. Kaufinan, Serial Effects in Recall of Unorganized and
Sequentially Organized Verbal Material, 54 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 180 (1957).
'05 In the context of a criminal trial, the "goal" for the prosecution is
naturally the adjudication of guilt of the defendant.
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with a ready catalogue of easily remembered evidence that
supports the guilt of the defendant.
III. Rationalizations for Federal Rules 413, 414 and 415
Even though there are compelling reasons why
"other acts" character evidence should be excluded, there
are a number of reasons why commentators have suggested
it should be admitted. The fundamental premise behind
these reasons is that the evidence is relevant, accurate, and
most importantly, it serves the interest of justice because it
prevents a guilty individual from getting away with a
crime.
a. Political Expedience
It is safe to say that nobody likes a sex offender.
10 6
In particular, nobody likes a repeat sexual offender.
Politicians, who need the approval of the voting population
to keep their jobs, have a strong incentive to vote for acts
that punish groups who are disliked. In the months leading
up to the passage of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415, the news was full of stories about the acquittal of
William Kennedy Smith after evidence of prior sexual
offenses was excluded from his state trial. 10 7 In the floor
debate for the passage of the rules, senators and
representatives played to the public passions surrounding
the inadmissibility of "other acts" character evidence.
106 See Aluise, supra note 82, at 190-91 (describing a poll where rape
and child abuse were ranked only behind murder in "heinousness").
107 See Karp, supra note 30, at 15-17. This article is instructive in
pointing out a number of prominent cases where acquittals followed
exclusion of propensity evidence. It is also instructive to note that this
article was written by the author of Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415.
See also Aluise, supra note 82, at 190-93 (recounting numerous
examples of repeat sexual offenders).
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Cases cited included People v. Hansen,10 8 Getz v. State,10 9
State v. Pace,"l0 the case of Megan Kanka,"' l and Susan
Harrison. 112  All of these cases involved repeat sexual
offenders, and the floor debate was framed in a way that
inflamed the passions of the public against the judiciary."l
3
Given the public backlash against the judiciary, it is
not surprising that Congress would act to gather popular
support. When the rules were passed, the Clinton
Presidency was "floundering" and "the Democratic
leadership in Congress desperately sought to enhance their
public standing." 1  The public backlash against the
judiciary gave Congress a perfect opportunity to gather
108 People v. Hansen, 708 P.2d 468, 471 (Colo. App. 1985) (finding
admission of prior telephone calls to minor girls was reversible error in
trial of defendant accused of child prostitution).
109 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 735 (Del. 1988) (reversing conviction
of defendant for rape of his eleven year old daughter because testimony
about prior sexual contact with daughter was inadmissible).
110 State v. Pace, 275 S.E.2d 254, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (ordering
new trial for Pace, who had been convicted of rape and murder,
because admission of testimony by another woman who had claimed
that the defendant raped her was reversible error).
... State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 172 (N.J. 1999) (defendant, a
repeat child sex offender, was convicted of raping and murdering
Megan Kanka). This is the case that led to passage of "Megan's Law"
which requires convicted sex offenders to register. See Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994). The law required
all states to pass sexual offender registration legislation at the risk of
losing federal funding. Since the passage of the act, every state has
complied with the federal mandate. Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender
Registration and Community Notification Laws: Will these Laws
Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1245 (2003).
112 Susan Harrison was murdered by a two time convicted rapist, Jerry
Walter McFadden. Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing
Congressional Involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 58 CATH.
U. L. REv. 153, 180 (2008).
113 For discussion of the politics surrounding the passage of the rules,
see id.
114 See id. at 179.
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public backing to change the rules of evidence to punish a
particularly despised group. In the words of David J. Karp,
who drafted the rules, "statements supporting the legislative
proposal have pointed to the strength of the public interest
in admitting all significant evidence of guilt in sex offense
cases."I 15
The political goal was evidenced by the way the
rules went into effect. Typically, rules are promulgated
through a five-step process: "proposal by the Advisory
Committee, a period of public debate and comment,
Supreme Court adoption, and finally Congressional review
and approval." ' 1 6 At the time of passage, the rules were
opposed by the "overwhelming majority" of legal
scholars. 117 Nonetheless, rather than following the usual
procedure for deliberation and consideration, the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 bypassed
the procedure of input from the Judicial Conference."' In
their rush"19 to gather public support, Congress instituted
115 Karp, supra note 30, at 20.
116 Aluise, supra note 82, at 159-60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
117 Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 52.
"1 Some might argue that there was input from the Judicial Conference
because the text of the act permitted the Judicial Conference to
comment on the rules. However, the rules also provided that they
would go into effect regardless of what the Judicial Conference said.
As a result, the ability of the Judicial Conference to comment had no
teeth. See, supra note 22.
119 The normal procedure for amendment of the rules has five levels of
review. Aluise, supra note 82, at 159-60. However, in the case of
Rules 413,414, and 415:
a practice that often takes three years or more and
inspires serious comment and debate within the legal
community was completed after twenty minutes of
floor debate in the United States Senate, after one
exhaustive marathon weekend in the House of
Representatives, with no public hearings held on the
matter, and with no serious consideration of the
potential ramifications of the changes.
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new rules that bypassed the basic protections put into place
by Rule 404 and set up rules designed to apply exclusively
to a targeted group.
It has also been suggested that Congress acted with
the goal of promoting "justice" and "achieving [increased]
consistency in the law."' 20 While these public policy goals
are laudable, the circumstances surrounding the passage of
the new rules suggest that Congress was looking to
something other than public policy when they passed the
rules. Congress declined to take the advice of the Advisory
Committee-the group that was the best equipped to
interpret and modify the rules-and passed the rules to
support its own political agenda. The proponents of the bill
openly spoke of their agenda-to put a thumb on the scales
of justice and tip the balance in favor of the prosecution:
"there is a problem with the rules of evidence with regard
to the ability to get the kind of background necessary to get
convictions ,121 The proponents of the rules were
relying on the belief that convictions in sexual assault cases
are more difficult to obtain than other types of crimes.
However, the statistical evidence does not support this
premise.
122
Teter, supra note 112, at 180.
120 See Karen M. Fingar, And Justice For All: The Admissibility of
Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
501, 508 (1996).
121 Representative Bill McCullum, quoted in Teter, supra note 112, at
186.
122 See infra Figures 1-3 and Section V.c on the effect of the rules on
conviction and plea rates.
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b. Protection of Victims Unwilling or Unable to
Testify
Commentators have suggested that victims of
sexual crimes are unable or unwilling to testify. 123 Studies
have shown that the majority of rapes go unreported.
12 4
Part of the reason for the low rate of reports of rate is an
apparent "chilling effect" based on the perceived
unresponsiveness of the judicial system. 125 Moreover, rape
is a clandestine crime where the victims "endure greater
physical and emotional trauma than do victims of most
other crimes." 126 Thus, proponents argue that because of
the "unique nature of sex crimes" allowing prior sexual
misconduct evidence "insure[s] . . . greater justice will be
done for victims of sex crimes.
' 127
In addition to a providing a measure of justice for
victims of sexual offenses, the drafter of the rules suggested
that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 is particularly important
because it deals with sex offenses against children. 128 The
additional justification for this rule is that child molestation
"cases regularly present the need to rely on the testimony of
a child victim-witness whose credibility can readily be
123 See, e.g. Fingar, supra note 120. But see Reforming, supra note 66,
at 299 ("[I]n prosecutions for sexual misconduct or child molestation,
there is usually a victim capable of testifying at trial.").
124 See Fingar, supra note 120, at 503-04 (citing statistics on reports of
rapes).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 537. Of course, if it was the trauma to the victims that
mattered, one might frame the rules of evidence according to the value
of the crime, and the admissibility of character evidence would differ
for shoplifting and car theft because of the different costs of the crimes.
However, another author points out Rules 413, 414, and 415 have no
applicability to murder which, judged by the fact that it can carry the
death penalty, is judged the most serious of all crimes. See Reforming,
supra note 66, at 299 (1995).
127 Fingar, supra note 120, at 537.
128 Karp, supra note 30, at 21.
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attacked in the absence of substantial corroboration.'
129
This rationale suggests that it should be unnecessary for the
accuser to testify, and instead the prosecution should be
able to put on more credible witnesses who can serve as
proxies. Such a strategy violates the fundamental right of
the accused to confront his accuser, one of the hallmarks of
American jurisprudence.
3 0
c. Law and Economics Rationale
The "Law and Economics" analytic method is the
quintessential rational choice model. The method is
founded on neoclassical economics and assumes that actors
compare among the various options and rationally make the
best possible choice.' 31 This assumption can be applied to
character evidence as either an incentive model or a cost
minimization model, described below.
1. Incentive Model
Sanchiro has considered the law and economics
approach for prohibition of using character evidence. 3 2 He
argues that the result of the prohibition is that it creates a
disincentive toward refraining from the undesirable
behavior. 133  This objective intent is independent of the
effect on the finders of fact. 134  Curiously, Sanchiro's
analysis holds that even if character evidence does, in fact,
have predictive value, the actual predictive value of the
evidence is irrelevant when considering a disincentive for
1 2 9 
id.
130 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
131 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW (5th ed. 1998). However, citing behavioral psychology results,
not all commentators agree with the approach of treating actors as
perfectly rational. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 79.
132 Chris William Sanchiro, Character Evidence and the Object of
Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 (2001).
"' Id. at 1265.
134 Id.
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bad behavior. Under Sanchiro's disincentive model, a
person who has a prior instance of bad character which
would be admissible would be in a "damned if you do,
damned if you don't" situation, and there is no disincentive
to commit a crime.
135
However, this analysis fails to take into account that
there is an incentive for the person with prior "bad"
character to stay out of any situation where they might be
arrested, because the individual knows that an arrest will
bring in the "other acts" character evidence and increase
the chance of conviction. 136  As a result, there is an
incentive to avoid situations which could lead to arrest.
The Sanchiro incentive theory can equally well be applied
to either deter or promote bad acts by a person with a prior
record.
Under either of these approaches, the model
assumes that the actor is making a rational choice. The
assumption is that the actor has an understanding of the
relevant rules of evidence, or at least a sufficient
knowledge to make a rational and informed decision.
However, it is unlikely that most offenders have a thorough
understanding of the rules of evidence. Even if they did,
when deciding on a course of action it is unlikely that
offenders take into account the possible admissibility of
their other acts.
2. Cost Minimization Model
Posner has approached the character evidence ban
from the perspective of cost minimization. Posner
135Id. at 1266.
136 One can consider this in the context of an alleged child molester. If
a person has been previously accused of child molestation, he or she
may consider the costs and benefits of being alone with children in a
suspicious situation. Here, the cost of a long prison term could be
thought of as outweighing the benefits, assuming the purported
offender has adequate self control.
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calculates the benefit as probability of an error 37 as a
function of the evidence admitted, p(x) times the "stakes"
of a trial, S, which should be independent of the
evidence. 138 The overall societal benefit is then B(x) = p(x)
S + c(x), where c is the cost of error avoidance. 39 The
object would then be to optimize the benefit, B(x), as a
function of the evidence admitted, x. The optimum value is
then obtained 140 when px S = -cx, where the subscripts
represent the derivatives with respect to the evidence, x.14
Posner asserts that prior criminal conduct is
probative of whether or not a person has committed a new
crime, and suggests that because the stakes, S, go up for a
repeat offender, if the increased cost to the offender is
sufficient, "the propensity to commit a subsequent offense
may be reduced to the same level as the propensity to
commit a first offense."' 42  This effect is essentially the
same as the Sanchiro incentive theory, and again relies on
the fact that the offender is fully apprised of the
admissibility of the evidence.
At the same time, Posner recognizes that even
without the effect on the actor, there is a problem with a
jury misusing the "other acts" character evidence to arrive
137 An "erroneous rather than a correct outcome." Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1484 (1999).
13 8 /d. at 1481.
139 Id. at 1484.
140 There are several mathematical assumptions on which the model
depends. The most important is that the second derivative of B with
respect to x is negative, and Posner assumes that it remains so over the
full range of the evidence admitted, x. Otherwise, B(x) would not have
a maximum.
141 Id. at 1484-85. In actuality, the optimization would normally take
place with respect to all of the other variables in the system, so the
derivatives are best considered as partial derivatives holding all other
variables constant. However, in a model system such as the Posner
model, a true multivariate analysis is unnecessary.
142 Posner, supra note 137, at 1525.
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at an incorrect outcome. Posner suggests that one must
minimize the cost of a trial error. 143 If the cost of a new
trial is T, and the probability that the evidence will lead to a
wrongful conviction with admission of evidence x is p(x),
the expected benefit, the reduced cost, is C= p(x) T + c(x),
where c(x) is the error avoidance cost. The object of the
cost minimization model is to minimize the total cost,
which occurs where Tpx = -cx. Such a calculation amounts
to minimizing the cost associated to admission of evidence
which causes the jury to make a poor decision. 144 Posner's
analysis suggests 45 that evidence should be admitted up to
the point where the cost of error avoidance for the
admission exceeds the trial costs times the probability of an
error.
Posner rationalizes Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415 because using the "other acts" character
evidence in sexual offender cases is more reliable than not
using it, 146 whereas for a thief, he contends that the
evidence is not reliable:'
47
143 Posner focuses on the procedural costs. There are, of course, other
costs unrelated to the trial. The cost to the wrongfully convicted
individual stands out. There are other costs, as well, such as
compensation paid to the wrongfully convicted individual. Twenty five
states have statutes which compensate people who have been wrongly
convicted. See Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory
Remedies for the Wrongly Convicted: What Works, What Doesn 't, and
Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 409 (2009).
'"Again, there are certain assumptions in the model, such as that the
second derivative of the total cost with respect to the admission of the
evidence is positive.
141 Posner makes an assumption here that increasing evidence, x,
results in a decreasing probability of error, p(x), and that the cost of
error avoidance is not decreasing.
146 Essentially, this means that the probability of error, p(x), decreases
with the admission of the evidence.
147 Or, in the context of the probability of error, p(x) does not
decrease--or at least does not increase.
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Unlike a molester, a thief, unless he is a
kleptomaniac, does not have an
overwhelming desire to steal. Theft is
merely instrumental to his desire for money,
and there are many substitute instruments.
Committing a prior theft does not show that
a defendant "likes" theft and so does not
furnish a motive for his committing the
current theft with which he is charged.
148
The premise of Posner's analysis can be extended
beyond the realm of sexual crimes. The logical conclusion
is that if reliability and predictive value was the premise for
the special prior sexual conduct rules, we should allow
propensity evidence for any crime influenced by a person's
needs, likes, or desires. Thus, we would presumably allow
evidence of prior drug abuse in a case involving heroin
possession, or perhaps evidence of prior public intoxication
in the case of a person charged with driving under the
influence. 149  Posner's argument for Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 implicitly relies on the
accuracy of the past conduct of predicting future conduct.
Or, simply put, persons who have committed sexual
misconduct are more likely to be recidivists than those who
148 Posner, supra note 137, at 1525-26. It is interesting that Posner falls
back to the language of "motive." If motive was the reason for the
admission of the forbidden evidence, the evidence permitted by Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 would be permitted as motive
evidence under Rule 404(b).
149 Here, the analogy may be a bit strained, because it is necessary to
compare evidence of prior public intoxication with driving under the
influence. In an actual DUI case, many states have laws which make a
later DUI conviction a different, and more serious, offense than a first.
As a result, the conviction of a prior DUI offense would be admissible
as an element of the crime, and would not necessarily be admitted to
prove "action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404.
58
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 57
have committed other crimes. In the following sections, we
will see how this fundamental assumption is flawed.
150
Using the Posner cost minimization model, one
could also posit that the reason the evidence should be
admitted is that the cost of allowing a sexual predator go
free is extraordinary high. In this case, even a small
probability, p, would be multiplied by a very large T (where
T includes the societal burden) and thus the shift would be
to admitting evidence with a very small probability of error,
because the product could overcome the error avoidance
cost. However, if this were the case, one would expect
similar exceptional rules allowing "other acts" character
evidence for other "high cost" crimes, such as murder.
Given that the drafters of the rules chose only to weigh the
reliability of the evidence, and not the societal cost, it is
unlikely that the drafters considered this rationalization ex
ante.
d. Prior Conduct is Predictive of Future Behavior
Perhaps the most widely used reason that prior
sexual misconduct character evidence should be admitted is
that it is relevant to predict conduct. Courts have accepted
that propensity evidence is relevant.151 For example, one of
the indicators of whether a person is likely to commit a
crime in the future is whether that individual has committed
a crime in the past: "he did it once, therefore he did it
again."'152 The question is not whether the evidence sought
is relevant, the question is whether it is too relevant.
153
150 See infra Section IV.
151 See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948);
United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1978); Edward J.
Irmwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed
Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex
Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1125, 1129 (1993).
152 Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the
Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character
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Of course, this premise is nonspecific and does not
indicate a probability to commit a specific act or type of
act, but more likely a general disregard for societal norms.
Additionally, a person's general bad character in the past
has not been shown to predict future lawlessness on a
specific occasion.154 For instance, if a person has been
accused of adultery in the past, is it predictive of a desire
for immoral conduct in general, a desire to commit
adultery, or is it perhaps simply a desire for a relationship
with another person-who just happens to be married to
someone else? While a past offense may be a reliable
predictor of commission of future offenses, it may have
little probative value for a specific offense and is not
probative of the result.
The reasoning behind the predictive accuracy in the
case of sexual misconduct, as stated by Posner and those
who subscribe to the "lustful disposition" theory,' 1 5 is that
the nature of a sexual offender is such that they are bound
to repeatedly commit sexual offenses. This reasoning is the
basis by which evidence of prior acts is considered more
reliable in the case of a sex offense than in the case of some
other type of offense.
The idea that sex offenders are incurable predators
has found its way into the popular media, 156 and has been
Theory of Logical Relevance, The Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L.
REV. 419, 426 (2006) [hereinafter Doctrine of Chances].
153 Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76.
154 See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE § 2:19, at 2-118 n.28 (Thompson West 2006) (collecting
studies showing that there is little correlation between a person's
general character and his behavior on a specific occasion).
155 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
156 For instance, one of the highest rated television dramas on the
National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") network for the last ten
years has been Law & Order, SVU, which relates the workings of the
sex crimes unit of a fictional New York police precinct. Many of the
episodes are based on real life cases which have been in the news,
reinforcing the idea that sex crimes have a high base rate and that the
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widely cited-particularly in the civil commitments of
"sexual predators."' 157 This reasoning has been justified on
the basis of psychological studies. Those who subscribe to
the psychological "trait theory" approach suggest that
persons have "stable internal elements" which influence
their behavior over a wide range of situations.158 However,
research shows that trait theory is incapable of predicting
behavior. For example, the theory could not be used to
correctly predict when school children would cheat.
159
Trait theory, treated in the most basic sense, is essentially a
probabilistic theory-it does not speak to whether a person
actually committed the specific act in question, but rather
shows the likelihood that a person committed the act.
Other researchers have suggested that
"situationalism" dominates behavior. 16  This approach
suggests that behavior is highly situation dependent, and
small changes in the situation can result in dramatic
changes in behavior. 161  Thus, past behavior is a poor




157 See generally Aman Abluwalia, Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 489 (2006).
158 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the "Grotesque" Doctrine
of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent
Psychological Research, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 741, 747-50 (2008)
[hereinafter Grotesque]. See also Waller, supra note 49, at 1511-13
(discussing application of trait theory to reliability of evidence).
159 See Grotesque, supra note 158, at 748 (2008). In the context of the
current discussion, situationalism would suggest that sexual misconduct
in the past is not suggestive of sexual misconduct in the future. See
also Waller, supra note 49, at 1511-13. Note that Rules 413, 414, and
415 do not explicitly require that the prior act be "similar." Evidence
of an adult rape could be used in a child rape case, and vice versa.
160 Grotesque, supra note 158, at 749-51. See also Waller, supra note
49, at 1513-15.
161 See Grotesque, supra note 158, at 749-51.
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predictor of future behavior when the situation surrounding
the events is different. For instance, a college student may
be arrested for driving home drunk from a fraternity party.
However, drunk driving after attending a fraternity party is
hardly predictive of drunk driving after taking an exam in
philosophy. The facts and circumstances surrounding the
situation matter. 62 The situationalism approach appears to
be what the drafters of the original Federal Rules of
Evidence subscribed to when they excluded "other acts"
character evidence in Rule 404, before the addition of
Rules 413, 414, and 415.163
The current psychological literature suggests that
"interactionism," a blend between the two extremes, is
probably the best theory. Interactionism suggests that
people have a "psychic structure" that interacts with the
situation to produce results.' 64 Nonetheless, even using this
more modem approach, behavior is far from "predictable,"
because the theory depends on a "learned" response to a
stimuli or situation.1 65 If the learned stimulus is absent, the
individual would not be expected to perform in the
predicted fashion.
e. Doctrine of Chances
With the failure of psychological theories to predict
behavior, commentators have begun to rely on alternative
162 Which is not, of course, to excuse the behavior of the drunk driver.
The offender should be punished according to the law. The point here
is that an act committed under one set of circumstances may have little
probative value in a future case.
163 Of course, "situationalism" could also be spun in favor of the new
rules. For instance, situationalism hinges on people performing
similarly in similar situations. Under this theory, a child molester left
alone with a victim might be expected to take the opportunity to molest
the child, if he had done so in a similar situation in the past.
164 See Grotesque, supra note 158, at 747-52. See also Waller, supra
note 49, at 1515-17.
165 See Waller, supra note 49, at 1515-17.
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methods to justify admission of past conduct character
evidence based on the traditional exceptions to the prior
acts character evidence ban. The "doctrine of chances"'
166
argues that it is implausible that a person would
accidentally commit a sexual offense on several occasions,
or be so unlucky to be falsely accused of the same sexual
offense on a later occasion. 167  However, this same
treatment could just as easily be applied to other crimes, so
it does not necessarily justify a distinction in the admission
of "other acts" evidence for sexual crimes as compared to
other types of crimes.
Moreover, the doctrine of chances is not properly
considered as admission of prior acts to show character in
conformity therewith, but rather as an absence of mistake
or accident,' 68 a longstanding exception to the prohibition
against "other acts" character evidence. For instance, when
a person is accused of statutory rape, a common defense is
that the offender did not know that the victim was
underage. 169 Such a scenario is a classic example of the
"mistake" defense. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit
the admission of evidence to prove an "absence of
mistake."' 70 An offender who claims "I didn't know how
old she was" on repeat occasions will find no solace in the
rule excluding character evidence to prove conformity, as
the evidence will be admitted to prove absence of mistake.
There is no need for a special rule to admit evidence of the
166 See, e.g., Doctrine of Chances, supra note 152. The concept of the
"doctrine of chances" appears in the "absence of mistake or accident"
language of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
167 See Fingar, supra note 120, at 531. Of course, this is a probabilistic
argument that flies in the face of the protections of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404, which limits the possibility of any probabilistic
determination of guilt by a finder of fact.
'6 8 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
169 In many states, mistake is not a defense to statutory rape because
statutory rape is a strict liability offense requiring no sceinter.
170 FED R. EvID. 404(b).
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prior accusations of sexual offenders in "doctrine of
chances" cases, because the Federal Rules of Evidence
already provide an exception to provide for admission of
relevant evidence in this case.
IV. Recidivism of Sexual Offenders
The common themes running between the various
rationalizations for allowing prior sexual misconduct
evidence is that victims of sex crimes need special
protection and that sexual offenders are natural born
recidivists. The assumption is that, in the case of sexual
offenders, past behavior is predictive of future behavior.
As described above, jurors are subject to cognitive
biases, and they attribute greater reliability to recidivism
than it actually deserves. 171 In particular, because Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 are special rules of
admissibility of evidence against sexual offenders and do
not apply to other types of criminal offenses, the rules have
a built-in assumption that sexual offenders are more likely
to be repeat offenders than people who commit other types
of crimes. This assumption merits additional
investigation.172
Before considering the data on recidivism, which is
in itself controversial, 1 7 3 it is necessary to point out some of
the flaws pertaining to statistics on repeat offenders. To
begin, there are concerns with the accuracy of the data.'
74
Different studies measure different statistics. For instance,
171 See supra Section II.b.2
172 The idea that sexual offenders are "predators" appears to be a
relatively new invention. As late as the mid 1980s, the consensus was
that sexual offenders were not more likely to reoffend than other
criminals. See Aluise, supra note 82, at 173-74.
173 See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE § 2:19, at 2-118 n.28 (Thompson West 2006).
174 See Park, supra note 83, at 768.
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some studies examine re-arrest rates,' 75 whereas others may
only look at convictions. 176 Another problem is the number
of offenses which go undetected. 177 As one commentator
has noted, "the true recidivism rate may be practically
unknowable."'
' 78
Even when data is available, the statistics may be
irrelevant to evaluate whether "other acts" character
evidence has any bearing on a trial for a new offense. For
instance, in order to properly use recidivism data to
demonstrate a likelihood for future misconduct, the person
would have to have an opportunity to commit additional
crimes,1 79 and the new crime would need to be similar to
the prior crime. 18 A widely reported statistic on recidivism
175 In addition to the problem that a person who is arrested for a new
crime may actually be innocent of it, using rearrest rates causes
problems in interpreting the data because the police frequently
"round[s] up the usual suspects" when a crime is committed. The arrest
of a suspect for a crime may be more likely because he was convicted
of a prior similar crime. Park, supra note 83, at 772.
176Id. at 770.
1
77 Id. at 769.
1781d. at 770.
179 It is frequently said that the recidivism rate for murder is among the
lowest of all crimes because murderers serving long prison sentences
do not have an opportunity to commit another crime. This may be
partly true, but a more accurate measure is to look at the recidivism rate
for those who have been released from prison. For murderers, this rate
is also extremely low. Of course, there may be other reasons for this,
such as the advanced age of a person released from prison following a
long prison sentence. As one commentator put it, "[i]t is not surprising
to find the recidivism rate for convicted murderers to be low, if only
because their productivity as murderers is likely to be impaired by age
by the time they are released." Id. at 771.
180 If one is examining the admissibility of prior similar acts, it only
makes sense to examine whether a prior act is likely to cause a person
to commit the same act in the future. In some jurisdictions, a traffic
offense is a criminal matter. But traffic violations are likely poor
indicators of a crime such as an assault. They might, however, be
relevant to a crime such as vehicular homicide, which contains a traffic
component.
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for sexual offenders is that it approaches 50 percent.
However, this rate is lower than almost all other types of
crimes, and the reported recidivism rate is nonspecific in
that it is the rate that the offender was rearrested for any
crime.' 81 Thus, the result does not indicate the validity of
assumptions behind Rules 413, 414, and 415, that a sexual
offender is likely to commit a future sexual offense.
Numerous authors 182 have argued that past behavior
is predictive of future behavior. One of the predictors of
criminal activity is whether the person has committed a
crime-any crime-in the past. However, the question is:
how should one define a "crime" for the purpose of
determining if it is predictive? Certainly a student who has
accumulated a hundred parking tickets during his four years
of college has demonstrated that he or she is a scofflaw, but
would a demonstrated low threshold for breaking the law
be predictive of a later charge of armed robbery? Clearly,
some discretion must be demonstrated when considering
how a past crime relates to the probability of a future crime.
Recognizing this fact, the original authors of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, who subscribed to the situational
approach, rather than the trait theory approach, excluded
this type of evidence.1
8 3
Even with the large uncertainties in the recidivism
statistics, there are some results that are probative to the
admission of evidence of similar prior acts. In a 1989
study, researchers looked at 100,000 prisoners for three
181 J. Comparet-Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually
Violent Predator, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1057, 1072 n.80 (2000).
182 See supra Section ll.d.
183 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The titles of Federal Rules of Evidence
413, 414, and 415 seem to require that the prior bad act be "similar,"
but the text of the rules does not require factual similarity between the
cases. In cases with significant factual similarity, the evidence allowed
by these rules would likely be admissible under the exception for
evidence of "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
66
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 65
years after release and measured the re-arrest rate for the
same type of crime. From lowest to highest recidivism rate
for the same type of crime, the researchers found murderers
(2.8 percent), rapists (7.7 percent), violent robbers (19.6
percent), drug offenders (24.8 percent), and burglars (31.9
percent). 184  Thus, even with a substantial amount of
underreporting of new offenses for rapists, the statistics
"suggest precisely the opposite of what the rules assume"-
that prior sexual offenses are less useful in predicting future
similar offenses than other crimes, such as drug offenses
and burglaries.
185
Politicians and the public media have convinced the
American public that "sex offenders are a class of offenders
with unusually high rates of recidivism."' 86 However, this
assumption is unfounded and has "little empirical
substantiation."' 187 Even proponents of adopting state rules
similar to the federal rules concede that "that no conclusive
data proves that most sex offenders are exceptional
recidivists, i.e. that they are more likely to commit another
184 See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 339 (1995) [hereinafter
Political Process] at note 157 (citing Bryden & Park, "Other Crimes"
Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529 (1994)). In 1992
another study was conducted, which showed a three year re-arrest rate
for rapists of only 2.9 percent. Waller, supra note 49, at 1517. In more
recent Department of Justice statistics, the three year re-arrest rate of
sex offenders released in 1994 was 5.3 percent, 40 percent of which
committed the new crime within a year of release. In addition, the
Department of Justice study showed that, when looking at the rate of
recidivism for any crime, the recidivism rate for sexual offenders (43
percent) was lower than that of the convict rate as a whole (68 percent).
PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED
FROM PRISON IN 1994 (Nov. 2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. Unfortunately, it appears that the
Department of Justice discontinued the recidivism study shortly after
Rules 413, 414, and 415 were passed.
185 Political Process, supra note 184, at 339.
186 Ahluwalia, supra note 157, at 494.
187 fd-
67
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 66
sex offense than a murderer is to commit another
murder."' 88  The public bias against sex offenders and
assumption that sexual offenders represent a class of
incurable deviants plays directly to the misuse of "other
acts" character evidence by jurors.
V. Impact of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415
a. Burden Shifting
One of the curious aspects of Rules 413, 414, and
415 is that some of their rationalizations are actually
encompassed as exceptions in Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). Commentators have argued that the "defendant's
desire for . . . sexual gratification is essentially akin to
proof of motive." 189 Proof of motive is an exception to the
exclusion of character evidence of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). Similarly, the evidence could be
admitted to contest lack of consent, but "absence of
mistake" 190 is already included as an exception to the
rule.' 91 It is at least arguable that very little has changed by
the admission of the rules, because they only allow
evidence which was already admissible under
exceptions, 192 and the rules are unnecessary.
188 Joyce R. Lombardi, Comment, Because Sex Crimes Are Different:
Why Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules
of Evidence 413 and 414 That Permit Propensity Evidence of a
Criminal Defendant's Other Sex Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REv. 103,
119 (2004).
189 Melilli, supra note 50, at 1585.
190 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
'9' Melilli, supra note 50, at 1586.
192 See generally David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes"
Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529 (1994)
(reviewing pre Federal Rule of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 admission
of prior sex offenses under exceptions for motive, identity, plan, intent,
absence of mistake, and for impeachment).
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However, even if the rules are unnecessary for the
purpose of determining admissibility of the evidence, the
rules shift the burden to a presumption of admissibility,
because Federal Rules of Evidence declare that "other acts"
character evidence "is admissible."'93  Even with the
subsequent application of Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
the burden is now on the defense to keep the evidence out,
rather than the burden being on the prosecution (or plaintiff
in a civil trial) to convince the judge that the evidence
should be allowed in under a Rule 404(b) exception.
b. Adoption of similar rules by the states
Given the numerous reasons why "other acts"
character evidence should be excluded, one should consider
why Congress forced the rules on the judiciary. 194  For
instance, the majority of sex crimes are tried in state, rather
than federal court. 95  Because the vast majority of sex
crimes are charged in state courts, one might ask if a
change of the Federal Rules of Evidence really matters.
Because the majority of sex crimes are prosecuted
in state courts, 196 one might question if there was any real
impact of the law of evidence when Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 were adopted. Arguably, these
193 FED. R. EVID. 413,414, 415 (emphasis added).
94 See supra Section III.a, notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
195 For example, in 2007, there were 428 cases brought with federal
criminal charges of sexual assaults. Judicial Business of the United
States Courts, Judicial Business 2007, Table D-4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness20
07.aspx. In the same year, there were 23,207 arrests in state courts for
charges of forcible rape. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE, available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/.
196 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence 413-415, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 288 (1995). See also
Fingar, supra note 120, at 504-05; Political Process, supra note 184, at
340; Sheft, supra note 55, at 58.
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rules impact a small minority of sexual assault cases1 97 and
thus their impact should be quite small.
However, the effect of the new rules is not solely on
the federal evidence law. When they were originally
passed in 1975,198 the Federal Rules of Evidence had a
profound impact on state evidence law. The Federal Rules
of Evidence are taught at most law schools in the country.
At the time of the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence
413, 414, and 415, the majority of states had adopted rules
of evidence which were similar to the existing Federal
Rules of Evidence. 199 At the time of the passage of the new
rules, there had already been a movement in states to have
laws consistent, for the most part, with the federal rules,
and one might have expected that states would move to
adopt rules similar to Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415.2°°
In essence, the new Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415
were frontrunners in a new movement in evidence law.
20 '
197 The federal rules come into play in less than 2 percent of all sex
assault cases. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
198 Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and
Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
199 In 1995, thirty eight states had adopted rules similar to the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Political Process, supra note 184, at 340. In the
following decade, four more states adopted versions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5009
(3d ed.).
200 The actual procedure by which rules of evidence are adopted in the
states is beyond the scope of this article. In some states the rules of
evidence are codified in statutes, in others, they are judicially adopted
rules of evidence. In others, the legislature and the judiciary share the
authority. For the purposes of this article, the author has conducted a
survey of the codified statutes and rules of evidence for the states.
201 Shortly after the passage of the rules, some authors suggested this
revolution in state codes of evidence. See, e.g., Fingar, supra note 120,
at 510 ("every state in the United States should incorporate the recent
legislation into its evidence code in order to achieve increased
70
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 69
Time has shown that the change in the Federal Rules had
the predicted effect on state rules. At the time of the
passage Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415, only two states
had statutes governing admissibility of "other acts"
character evidence in sex crimes. 20 2 Fifteen years later, the
list has grown to a substantial minority of states 203 with one
state with a new law soon to go into effect204 and proposed
legislation in another.
20 5
The histories of these laws and rules show that
many states were using the same justification for passing
the laws as the Federal Government. The advisory
committee for the Alaska Rules of Evidence noted that the
equivalent rule in Alaska was "adopted for the sole reason
consistency and intellectual honesty in the law regarding the
admissibility of uncharged sexual misconduct evidence").
202 IND. CODE § 35-37-4-15 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.025 (1995).
Both of these laws have now been overturned by state courts. See infra
notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
203 The following list includes both statutes and rules of evidence, by
the date they went into effect. The laws and rules cover sexual assault
cases, but some are restricted to crimes against minors, while others are
broader in scope. California: CAL.EVID.CODE § 1108 (West)
(passed in 1995); Texas: TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. §
38.37 (Vernon) (effective 1995); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
10-301 (effective 1996); Arizona: ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c)) (effective
1997); Alaska: ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)-(3) (effective 1998);
Illinois: 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7.3 (effective 1998); Florida:
FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (effective 2001); Louisiana: LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. 412.2 (passed 2001); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 701.11 (passed in
2003); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 768.27a (effective 2006);
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-124 (effective 2006) (admitting
evidence of prior sex crimes in cases of sex crimes against children
under the age of 13); Oklahoma: 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2413 and 2414
(passed 2007); Utah: UTAH R. EVID. 404(c) (effective 2008);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090 (effective 2008).
204 Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-413 to -415 (effective January 1,
2010).
205 Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455 (prior acts evidence not
admissible). But see 2009 Kan. Laws Ch. 103 (S.B. 44) (proposed
amendments to allow for admission of evidence of prior sexual crimes).
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that the legislature has mandated the amendment." 20 6 The
legislative record of the California statute admitting "other
acts" character evidence in sex offense cases2 07 justified the
statute on the basis of the comments in the congressional
record for the passage of Federal Rules of Evidence and an
article 20 8 written by the author of the Federal Rules. 20 9 The
Colorado legislature wrote its justification-based on the
notions of underreported crimes, lack of credible witness
testimony, and sexual offender recidivism-directly into
the statute. 210  The Florida legislature passed a statute
206 ALASKA R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
207 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2008).
208 Karp, supra note 30.
209 See The Assembly Journal for the 1995-96 Regular Session, 3277.
210 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-301. The text of the statute includes a
preamble outlining the reasons for the passage of the law:
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that
sexual offenses are a matter of grave statewide
concern. These frequently occurring offenses are
aggressive and assaultive violations of the well-
being, privacy, and security of the victims, are
severely contrary to common notions of proper
behavior between people, and result in serious and
long-lasting harm to individuals and society. These
offenses often are not reported or are reported long
after the offense for many reasons, including: The
frequency with which the victims are vulnerable,
such as young children who may be related to the
perpetrator; the personal indignity, humiliation, and
embarrassment involved in the offenses themselves;
and the fear of further personal indignity,
humiliation, and embarrassment in connection with
investigation and prosecution. These offenses usually
occur under circumstances in which there are no
witnesses except for the accused and the victim, and,
because of this and the frequent delays in reporting,
there is often no evidence except for the conflicting
testimony. Moreover, there is frequently a reluctance
on the part of others to believe that the offenses
occurred because of the inequality between the victim
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instituting the admission of prior acts evidence, and it was
adopted by the Florida Supreme Court over the
recommendation of the advisory committee. 211  In
Washington, where the state legislature has co-extensive
authority with the judiciary to pass rules of evidence, the
legislature adopted the exception "to ensure that juries
receive the necessary evidence to reach a just and fair
verdict."21 2 None of the authors of these rules and statutes
presented anything beyond the conclusory statements and
justifications offered in the passage of the Federal Rules.
and the perpetrator, such as between the child victim
and the adult accused, or because of the deviant and
distasteful nature of the charges. In addition, it is
recognized that some sex offenders cannot or will not
respond to treatment or otherwise resist the impulses
which motivate such conduct and that sex offenders
are extremely habituated. As a result, such offenders
often commit numerous offenses involving sexual
deviance over many years, with the same or different
victims, and often, but not necessarily, through
similar methods or by common design. The general
assembly reaffirms and reemphasizes that, in the
prosecution of sexual offenses, including in proving
the corpus delicti of such offenses, there is a greater
need and propriety for consideration by the fact
finder of evidence of other relevant acts of the
accused, including any actions, crimes, wrongs, or
transactions, whether isolated acts or ongoing actions
and whether occurring prior to or after the charged
offense. The general assembly finds that such
evidence of other sexual acts is typically relevant and
highly probative, and it is expected that normally the
probative value of such evidence will outweigh any
danger of unfair prejudice, even when incidents are
remote from one another in time.
Id.
211 In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 825 So.2d 339
(Fla. 2002).
212 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 90 (S.S.B. 6933) (West).
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Remarkably, in the two states that had statutes
admitting "other acts" evidence before the adoption of
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, the statutes
have been overturned by the courts. In Missouri, the state
supreme court found that the law violated the state
constitution. 213 In Indiana, the statute was passed in May
1993, to go into effect the following year.2 14 The Indiana
statute was declared a nullity before it went into effect,
because it conflicted with the common law rules of
evidence.215  It is ironic that the frontrunner states have
reversed course through judicial decisions and ruled that
prior sexual misconduct evidence is not admissible.
216
c. Conviction and Plea Bargain Rates
One of the premises in support of passage of the
rules was that prosecution of sex offenders was difficult
because of lack of credible testimony of the victims or
underreporting of crimes. 217 The changes in the rules were
supposed to tip the scales toward the prosecution by
213 State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 607-08 (2007) (finding Mo. REV.
STAT. § 566.025 violates the state constitution). See also William E.
Marcantel, Note, Protecting the Predator or the Prey? The Missouri
Supreme Court's Refusal to Allow Past Sexual Misconduct as
Propensity Evidence, 74 Mo. L. REv. 211, 229 (2009).
214 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 232-1993 (H.E.A. 1342) (West).
215 Brim v. State, 624 N.E.2d 27, 33 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). This case
was decided on November 23, 1993. The statement by the Brim court
was dicta, but was later reinforced in Day v. State, 643 N.E. 2d I (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994). The statement by the Day court is also dicta, because
the crime in that case happened before the law went into effect, but the
statements in the two cases suggest that the courts will not permit
admission of "other acts" character evidence based on the statute.
216 The legislative mandate for the rules of evidence may violate at
least one other state constitution. The Tennessee Supreme Court has
ruled in another context that the judiciary is not bound by rules of
procedure adopted by the legislature. See State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d
473 (2001).
217 See supra Section Ill.b.
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shifting the burden to the defense to keep evidence out.
This burden shifting was a sea change in the evidence
landscape surrounding trials of sexual offenders.
The trial landscape for sexual misconduct could
change in a number of ways. For instance, one might
expect that with the evidence being presumptively
admissible, defendants might seek a plea bargain rather
than the risk of a trial. Defendants might prefer a bench
trial rather than a jury trial, because the judge would,
presumably, be willing to give character evidence less
weight. Defendants might try to take the stand in their own
defense. Whereas a defendant may previously have
refrained from taking the stand under the old rules because
the evidence may have been admissible for impeachment
evidence if they claimed "mistake," 218 under the new rules,
with a flood of "other acts" character evidence coming in, a
defendant may be left with no choice but to testify on his
own behalf to try to "remove the sting."
219
It is difficult to assess whether all of these results
have come to pass. However, from the statistical
220evidence, it appears that at least some of these outcomes
have occurred. Both the total number of federal sexual
assault charges and the conviction rate for federal sexual
assault cases have gone up substantially in the past thirty
years. Figure 1 shows that the number of federal sex
assault cases has gone from fewer than 100 in 1980 to over
218 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
219 Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 (2000).
220 Statistical evidence in this section from 1980-1996 is found in The
Reports of the Judicial Conference. Data from 1997-2008 is found in
the Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the
Director, 1997-2008, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx.
221 Here, we only investigate the change in conviction rates and plea
bargain rates. Because of the low number of trials and the even smaller
number of bench trials, the small sample size makes statistical analysis
for other outcomes difficult.
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400 in the last three decades. Examination of the statistics
shows that the defendants in the overwhelming majority of
these cases plead guilty, and most of the increase in cases
resulted in guilty pleas.
The conviction rate for federal sexual assault cases
has risen dramatically over the last thirty years. In an
eleven year period from 1980-1990, before the sexual
offender rules were passed, the average conviction rate of
sexual assaults in federal court was about 72 percent. 222 In
the most recent eleven-year period, from 1998-2008, after
the rules were passed, the conviction rate was 87 percent.
The change in conviction rates for sexual assaults may not
entirely be a result of the new rules of evidence during that
period, as the conviction rate for all crimes in federal court
also rose from about 81 percent to 90 percent.
222 This number is calculated by dividing the total number of pleas,
nolo contendre, and convictions by the total number of sexual assault
cases filed. In order to examine the effect of Rules 413 and 414, the
cases have been limited to sexual assault cases which would qualify
under those rules. Cases for other sex crimes, such as sex trafficking
and distribution, sex offender registry violations, and sexually explicit
material have not been included. Naturally, the statistics for the total
number of cases filed does not include cases where accusations were
made but no charge was brought against the defendant.
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Figure 1.
Total Federal Sexual Assault Cases by Disposition. 223
The data for conviction rates appear in Figure 2, and
it is immediately apparent that in the 1980s the conviction
rate for sexual assaults was lower than the overall
conviction rate for federal crimes. After the turn of the
century, the conviction rate for sexual assaults was nearly
the same as the conviction rate for federal crimes. In 1995,
223 Statistics for guilty pleas includes no contest pleas, because statistics
for no contest and guilty pleas are not available for all years. However,
the total number of nolo contendre pleas for sex abuse cases is
generally quite small. Between 2001 and 2004, there were a total of
1370 cases where the defendant was found guilty. Of this total number,
only two were nolo contendre pleas, or less than 0.2 percent of the
total.
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the year in which the new rules went into effect, the rate of
convictions for sexual assaults was actually higher than the
rate for conviction on all federal crimes. This statistic
immediately calls into question one of the premises behind
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415-that
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Figure 2. Conviction Rates of Federal Sexual Offenders.
The vertical lines represent the passage of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (1984), the introduction of DNA
evidence in federal courts (1992), and the passage of
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 (1995).
The implementation of the rules in 1995 may not be
the cause of the change in conviction rates. The greatest
change in the rate occurred between 1980 and 1990, with a
78
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 77
slower trend afterwards. As a result, it is apparent that the
rule changes were not effective in delivering the promised
result: the changes in the rules were likely not responsible
for any substantive increase in conviction rates.
A similar effect appears in the rate of plea bargains.
In the 1980s, approximately 54 percent of federal sexual
assault charges resulted in either a guilty plea or reached a
conviction nolo contendre. In the most recent eleven-year
period, the rate jumped to 79 percent. Figure 3 shows that
the rate of plea deals in sexual assault cases rose by
approximately 30 percent between 1980 and 2009, with the
highest year being 1995, the year that the new rules went
into effect. However, the majority of the rise does not
appear to be a result of rule changes in 1995, but rather
other effects in the 1980s. After the change in rules, the
rate of pleas in sexual assault cases is approximately the
same. Again, the proponents of the rule changes used the
premise of difficulty in obtaining convictions to effect their
passage, but the data shows that, at the time the rules were
passed, a greater proportion of sexual assault defendants
plead guilty than defendants in other federal crimes, and
after the rules were passed the plea rate did not increase
significantly for sexual assault cases.
79
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Figure 3. Plea Rates (including nolo contendre) of Federal
Sexual Offenders. The vertical lines represent the passage
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (1984), the
introduction of DNA evidence in federal courts (1992), and
the passage of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415
(1995).
The large increase in conviction rates and rates of
plea bargains is likely due to factors other than the change
in the rules of evidence in 1995. The changes could result
from other factors, such as exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to only bring the strongest cases (which would
decrease the number of charges brought), introduction of
the federal sentencing guidelines, which created an
80
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incentive for defendants to plead charges down in 1984,224
or improved forensic techniques. For example, in the early
1990s, DNA evidence was first allowed in federal court.
225
Since that time DNA evidence has become a valuable tool
for prosecutions. DNA evidence is particularly useful in
prosecutions of sex offenders, as DNA evidence left on the
victim would be nearly conclusive and results in a very
high conviction rate. 226  The largest jump in the plea
bargain rate was shortly after the introduction of DNA
evidence in federal courts.
The promise that the addition of the rules would
change the landscape of federal sexual assault trials by
increasing conviction rates remains unfulfilled. The
statistics do not support that the new rules actually
dramatically increased conviction rates or plea bargain
rates over a trend that was already occurring for federal
crimes as a whole. While the conviction rate for sexual
assaults has gone up faster than the general conviction rate
for federal crimes, most of the disparity was made up
224 See The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Chapter II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1837 (creating the United States Sentencing Commission). The
Sentencing Reform Act made all federal sentences determinate. See
also PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650
(restricting grounds where a federal judge could make a downward
departure from sentencing guidelines in sex abuse cases). But see
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (finding mandatory
federal sentencing guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution).
225 See United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990)
(finding DNA evidence admissible under the Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
226 Such evidence is unlikely to be used in many other crimes where
physical forensic evidence is unnecessary. DNA evidence would not
be in issue in cases where the defendant claimed consent of the victim.
However, reliable data on the "consent" defense is not widely
available.
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before the rules went into effect, and the change is likely a
result of numerous other factors.
VI. Conclusion
In 1994, when Congress passed legislation
implementing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and
415, they put in place a process to erode the character
evidence exclusionary rule that had developed over two
centuries of common law in the United States. The stated
intent was to make it easier to convict sex offenders, and
the unstated intent was to influence the development of
evidence law in the several states. These objectives have
been accomplished with mixed results.
The statistical evidence shows that the conviction
rates for sex offenders have changed little since the change
in the rules of evidence went into effect. While conviction
rates for sex offenses have increased over the last three
decades, the majority of the increase paralleled increases in
the overall federal conviction rate. Additionally, the
majority of increase occurred before the changes in the
rules of evidence and was likely a result of other factors.
The second intent, although not express, was to
influence the laws of the states. While the Federal System
sets up two distinct legal systems, one in the federal
government and one in the several states, there is a
significant amount of "cross pollination" between the two
systems. Many states have adopted rules of evidence that
are either based on the Federal Rules of Evidence or are
strongly influenced by them.227  While it was never
explicitly stated as a goal for the passage of the Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, scholars predicted the
227 Forty-two of the fifty states now have rules of evidence that parallel
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
EVIDENCE § 5009 (2d ed. 2005).
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trend toward similarity in state and federal evidence laws
the laws would continue. 228 Despite the controversy when
Congress originally passed the rules, this second goal has
also been largely successful.
229
With the success of at least some of these goals, it is
also an appropriate time to assess the cost of the changes.
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 have come at
a significant cost to fairness to criminal defendants. The
rules are designed to admit evidence that will appeal to the
basest emotions of jurors in a way that begs jurors to
misuse it. The rules admit "other acts" character evidence,
which is statistically less relevant than character evidence
in many other crimes. In their rush to punish sexual
offenders, Congress pushed to admit evidence that was the
least probative and the most prejudicial, in contrast to the
fundamental protections of Federal Rule of Evidence
403. 230 Essentially, Rules 413, 414, and 415 are designed
to take advantage of juror prejudice and to include evidence
that is of questionable probative value. Congress tipped the
scales in favor of conviction.
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 are
also a cumbersome addition to the rules. The rules have
started to make the 400 series of Federal Rules of Evidence
look like the 800 series of Federal Rules for hearsay
evidence. 231 The hearsay rule states that hearsay statements
228 See, e.g., Fingar, supra note 120, at 510 ("every state in the United
States should incorporate the recent legislation into its evidence code in
order to achieve increased consistency and intellectual honesty in the
law regarding the admissibility of sexual misconduct evidence").
229 The list of states which have adopted similar rules are listed supra
notes 202-205. The number is now a substantial minority of states,
but in two of these states the courts have ruled the laws either
unconstitutional (Missouri) or a nullity (Indiana).
230 In a survey of 60,000 adults, the Department of Justice found that
following homicide, rape and child abuse were considered the next two
most serious crimes. Aluise, supra note 82, at 190-91.
231 With special admissibility or exceptions to character evidence
provided by Federal Rules of Evidence 406-415, there are now ten
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are not admissible.232 After declaring that hearsay is not
admissible, the next two rules carve out nearly three dozen
exceptions where the evidence is deemed to be sufficiently
reliable to be admitted. 33 When exceptions are combined
with case law defining the constitutional overlay of the
rules,2 3 4 what remains is a complex series of rules. 235 The
addition of new rules for different kinds of "other acts"
character evidence, that is deemed reliable,23 6 could give
the character evidence rules the same complexity of the
hearsay rules-with the possible complication that this type
of evidence is likely to be more prejudicial to the jury than
all but the most damning hearsay evidence.
Justice Brandeis once described the Federal System
as one where "a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social .
rules that provide overlays on top of the basic rule of character
evidence admission, Federal Rule of Evidence 404.
232 FED. R. EVID. 802.
233 FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
234 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (finding
admission of most hearsay evidence without production of the declarant
violates the Confrontation Clause). See also Robert P. Mosteller,
Crawford's Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in DUKE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 127 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/dukefs/127.
235 The complexity of the hearsay rules has been debated for decades.
See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth
About Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. REV. 1, 100 (1992) ("[Tlhe hearsay rule
is, in fact, overly cumbersome, unnecessarily difficult, roundly
misunderstood and misapplied, gingerly avoided as the most feared of
all of the rules of evidence, and not worth the trees that die in its
defense and its explanation."). Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern
Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV.
367, 376 (1992) (noting "no one who studies or teaches evidence
doubts that the hearsay doctrine is hard to apply and administer" and
calling for hearsay reform).
236 As noted above, supra Section IV, the "reliability" of other acts
character evidence is certainly questionable.
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experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 237 This
happened in the case of evidence of prior bad acts evidence
in sexual assault cases, when Indiana and Missouri passed
statutes which admitted character evidence in sexual
offense cases.23 8 Perhaps Congress, acting with political
motives, was too quick to act when it responded by passing
legislation which instituted Rules 413, 414, and 415.
The addition of Rules 413, 414, and 415 to the
Federal Rules of Evidence was an experiment that
succeeded in its goals of stigmatizing a despised group and
influencing changes in laws of the several states. However,
the success of the experiment came at a tremendous cost to
the principles of fairness in admission of evidence that
dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 deliberately play to
the passions of the jury and deliberately put evidence in
front of a jury that has prejudicial value that exceeds its
probative value. Fifteen years after the experiment began,
it is time for others to follow the lead of courts in Missouri
and Indiana 39-the two states that began the experiment.
The time has come to restore the Federal Rules of Evidence
to their form before the addition of the special "other acts"
character evidence rules for alleged sexual offenders.
237 New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis
J., dissenting).
238 IND. CODE § 35-37-4-15 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT § 566.025 (1995).
239 State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603 (2007) (finding MO. REV. STAT §
566.025, which admitted sexual misconduct evidence, violates the state
constitution); Brim v. State, 624 N.E.2d 27, 33 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(declaring the Indiana law admitting other acts character evidence a
nullity).
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FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM: RECONCILING
STATE FORECLOSURE LAW WITH ECONOMIC REALITIES
Yianni D. Lagos1
INTRODUCTION
The housing crisis ignited a chain reaction of events
that resulted in the U.S. economy cascading to the worst
contraction since the Great Depression.2 In response, not
only has the Federal Government proposed and
implemented various legislation,3 but the financial industry
has also joined in the effort to find a solution.4 However,
large-scale mortgage restructurings already show signs of
failing. 5 These results should not be surprising, because
1 Candidate for JD/MBA, June 2011, The Ohio State University.
2 S&P 500, a measure of the 500 largest U.S. corporations, fell below
700 points on March 2, 2009, the lowest level since 1996. See Google
Finance, S&P 500 Index,
http://www.google.com/finance?q=INDEXSP:.INX.
3 See Michael Corkery, Mortgage 'Cram-Downs' Loom as
Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at CI (allowing
bankruptcy judges to cram-down first mortgages); Laura Meckler,
Housing Bailout at $275 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at Al
(providing funds to refmance and modify loans); Nick Timiraos, Real-
Estate Sector Cheers Tax Credit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A4
(giving tax rebates for first-time home buyers).
4See Ruth Simon, Citi to Allow Jobless to Pay Less on Loans, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 3, 2009, at A4 (temporarily reducing mortgage payments
for unemployed borrowers); Ruth Simon, Investors Hit BofA Loan
Modification, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2008, at Cl (engaging in massive
restructuring of loans); Meena Thiruvengadam, Banks Agree to
Foreclosure Moratoriums, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123454524404184109.html
(participating in voluntary mortgage moratoriums).
5 Loan Modifications Get Reviewed as Borrowers Miss Paying Again:
Is Aid Dragging Out the Pain?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 19,
2008, at A6 (during QI and Q2, half of the restructured mortgages were
already back in default).
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general loan modifications suffer from the problems that
created the housing crisis. Namely, mortgage originators
did not examine whether the borrower could afford the
monthly payments.
6
The fact that the banking industry largely
overlooked what should be the primary consideration
before lending-i.e., the ability of the borrower to repay-
can be explained by the securitization of loans. 7 David
Wiechel,8 a distinguished practitioner working in the area
of foreclosure prevention, explained the complex process of
securitization as follows. General Motors Automobile
Corporation ("GMAC") makes loans until it runs out of
funds. In order to increase profits, GMAC needs to make
more loans. To raise the necessary capital to make more
loans, GMAC sells off its existing loans in a securitized
package. After consistently engaging in this process,
GMAC knows a market exists for its loans. Therefore,
GMAC lacks the incentive to examine the ability of the
borrower to repay.
9
The consequences of GMAC, along with the
majority of lenders, overlooking such risk led to the
6 Letter from Warren Buffett to Shareholders (Feb. 27, 2009), at 11,
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20081tr.pdf.
7 See generally Richard J. Rosen, The Role of Securitization in
Mortgage Lending, CHICAGO FED. LETTrER, No. 244, Nov. 2007
available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflnovember2007_24
4.pdf (discussing the procedures and major participants in the mortgage
securitization process).
' Interview with David Wiechel, former Legal Aid Attorney
specializing in foreclosure prevention, in Springfield, OH (Jan. 9,
2009).
9 Evidence of GMAC's poor loan quality is the recent capital infusion.
See Brian Wingfield, GMAC Gets Bailout Funds: The U.S. Government
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housing crisis.' 0 By the end of 2008, home prices had
fallen 23.4 percent from their peak." This burst of the
housing bubble took the economy with it, as unemployment
has increased. 12 Rising unemployment engenders increased
foreclosures. 13 In addition to the unemployment problem,
falling property values have pushed more homes
underwater. 14  Combining the effect of mortgages being
underwater with the fact that many borrowers contributed
little or nothing in the way of a down payment significantly
reduces a borrower's incentive to pay the mortgage.' 5 With
less incentive to pay, increased foreclosures have followed.
Foreclosures hurt not only the individuals losing their
homes but also the community as a whole. 16 For example,
10 Alexandra Basak Russell, What Gave Rise to the Global Financial
Crisis? The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and
Development (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part5-I.shtml.
11 Sudeep Reddy, Home Prices Declined at Record Pace in October:
S&P/Case-Shiller Data Show Return to 2004 Levels as Tight Credit,
Consumers' Wariness Weigh on Sector, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at
A2.
12 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data-tool=latest_
numbers&series id=LNS 14000000.
13 Buffett, supra note 6, at 11.
14 "Underwater" refers to home values below what is left due on the
mortgage. See John D. Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Matters of
Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A31 (chart showing that
mortgagors' chance of default increases as the amount owed goes
above the value of the home).
15 See Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Payback Time: A Quiet
Exchange of Funds Lets a Family Buy a New House and Helps the
Seller Get a Good Price. So Why Is It Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(June 10, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/magazine/lOwwln-freakonomics-
t.html (discussing how many homeowners were able to avoid paying a
down payment by using cash-back transactions).
16 Editorial, Foreclosures Still Destroying Neighborhoods,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS- SUN, Nov. 30, 2008, at A10.
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with this increase in foreclosures, vacancies have been on
the rise. 17 Increased vacancies lead to community blight,
which affects everyone in the neighborhood through lower
housing prices and an increased tax burden.18
Despite the devastating effects that foreclosures are
inflicting across the country, hope exists for those
individuals trying to save their homes. Agnes Spriggs saw
her mortgage payments balloon from $800 to $2,300.19
Her first efforts to refinance were thwarted, as she could
not work out a partial payment schedule with the lender.
2 0
However, with diligent effort and advice from a local
housing agency, she worked out an agreement with Chase
Bank and reduced her monthly payments to $855.1 With
banks incurring substantial losses when properties are sold
at foreclosure auctions and government agencies at all
levels providing significant aid, homeowners facing the
prospect of foreclosure should not concede to foreclosure
sale.
The securitization of loans created another problem
that directly affects the adjudication of foreclosures. As
explained by David Wiechel,23 many mortgages lack a
lawful mortgagee.24  During the securitization process,
17 See generally Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, No One Home:
Record 1 in 9 Housing Units Empty. Vacancies Have Ripple Effect,
USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2009, at Al (discussing increases in vacancies
throughout the country).
18 Editorial, supra note 16, at A10.
'9 Elaine Morris Roberts, A Foreclosure Story with a Happy Ending:
Help is Available from Agencies, Lawyers and Banks, as Agnes
Spriggs'Saga Shows, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-SuN, Nov. 9, 2008, at DI.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 See Kathleen Pender, Help is Out There for Homeowners Facing
Foreclosure, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2008, at D6.
23 Interview with David Wiechel, supra note 8.
24 See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (N.D. Ohio
2007) (the Court made it clear that failure to repeatedly comply with
General Order 07-03 will result in immediate dismissal. One
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mortgages normally are not transferred directly from the
originator to the sponsor of the trust.25  Instead, the
mortgage passes to many intermediate holders, such as an
arranger and then a warehouse lender, before finally
reaching the sponsor of the trust.26 The many steps create a
trade-off. During each step, the parties can go to the
recordation office and endorse the new mortgagee or skip
the documentation and forego the expense.
With multiple steps along the way, the expense in
filing fees with the recorder's office, as well as paying
lawyer's fees, can become material. Hypothetically, if a
securitization contains 2,000 loans and costs $500 to
legally change title for each loan, the cost reaches
$1,000,000 for each transaction. This example illustrates
why a mortgage company would choose not to assign
mortgagees using the proper procedure. Then, when the
sponsor of the trust containing a mortgage forecloses on a
property, the sponsor lacks a claim, because no legal
mortgagee ownership exists. 27 Even if the sponsor records
a transfer after the default with the loan originator, the lien
is still unenforceable, because all transactions must be
recorded properly. 2 An attorney defending a mortgagor
requirement of General Order 07-03 is that "the named plaintiff is the
owner and holder of the note and mortgage.").
25 See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the
Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, Dec. 17, 2007, at 8,
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/economists/ashcraft/subprime.pdf (The
arranger aggregates mortgages from different loan originators and then
sells those packaged mortgages to a warehouse lender, who proceeds to
sell the mortgages in securitized form.).
26 Id.
27 See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 653 ("To show
standing, then, in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is
the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was
filed.").
28 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3204 (West Supp. 2010) ("If the
party foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement is not the original
mortgagee, a record chain of title shall exist prior to the date of sale
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can prove this flaw by examining the pooling agreement,
which is publicly available for all securitizations that would
show the sponsor of the trust received the mortgage from
another party.29  Therefore, a significant number of
securitized mortgages that make up a large percentage of
all mortgages are improper.
30
Lastly, securitization of mortgages increases the
difficulty for borrowers to work out an agreement with
lenders for two reasons. First, the party with power to
negotiate cannot always be located.31 Due to the fact that
servicing rights to securitized mortgages trade between
banks as if they were stocks, the borrower may not know
the loan servicer.32 Second, even if an agreement between
the borrower and loan servicer can be reached, the workout
agreement must be approved by all the investors.
33
under section 3216 evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the
party foreclosing the mortgage.").
29 See Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1399057/00008823770700168
8/d676234_ex4-1.htm (example where the originators are listed but the
originators are not a party to the transfers taking place in the pooling
agreement).
30 See generally Liz Rappaport & Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Moves to Free
Up Credit for Consumers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2009, at A1-A2
(reporting that forty percent of mortgages were securitized before the
crisis); Moe Bedard, The Mers Fifty Million Mortgage Meltdown, Dec.
30, 2008,
http://loanworkout.org/2008/06/the-mers-fifty-million-mortgage-
meltdown/ (one example of a shell corporation that securitized a large
number of mortgages and then sold those mortgages to trusts that lack
proper identification of ownership).
3' Roberts, supra note 19 (one estimate places the number of people in
foreclosure who have never talked with their lender at 60 percent).
32 This author was surprised to see that JP Morgan Chase Bank in
Columbus, OH, housed a mortgage-servicing trading room where rights
to servicing loans were traded as if they were stocks. In an
environment where servicing rights can trade daily, a borrower may not
know who is servicing his or her loan.
33 Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond A Subprime
Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
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Because ownership of the cash flows paid from securitized
mortgages is separated into multiple tranches, convincing
all investors to agree on a workout agreement can be
difficult.
34
Keeping in mind the present environment of
securitized mortgages, this note will examine state
foreclosure law. Part I will develop the public policy
framework for examining state foreclosure law. Part II will
introduce a basic economic cost-benefit analysis of general
foreclosure laws. Part III will examine different state
foreclosure laws and compare those laws to state
foreclosure rates. Part IV will examine recent legislation
passed by various states. Part V will discuss two scholarly
solutions proposed to improve state foreclosure law. Part
VI will summarize many of the proposed solutions and
present new ideas by looking at foreclosures from the
policy perspective favoring foreclosure prevention and
increased participation in foreclosure sale by potential
homeowners.
I. POLICY PERSPECTIVE
Foreclosure laws differ from state to state in many
respects. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"
all attempts to unify state law have proven unsuccessful.
35
Many of these differences can be characterized as
defaulter-friendly or lender-friendly, as the foreclosure
2261, 2291 (2008); see also Ruth Simon, Mortgage Investors Call for
Changes in Housing Rescue Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at A3
(despite the severity of the foreclosure crisis, investors cling to their
right to reject mortgage modifications).
34 Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2291.
35 See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure:
The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1399
(2004) (explaining the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act whose
framers attempted to unify state foreclosure law).
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debate has centered on the trade-off between protecting
homeowners and bank investments. 36 Both seem to be of
equal concern in today's economy, with foreclosures
occurring at a rapid pace and billions of dollars of
government bail-out money flowing to the banking
industry. 37 Although the traditional debate may be useful,
many scholars have recognized the inadequacies of
examining foreclosure from such a narrow perspective.
38
A general policy approach should be used when
examining state foreclosure law, but exactly what policies
should be used is a difficult question. Public policy
regarding foreclosures involves protecting the defaulting
homeowner. 39 Home ownership is a worthy goal in and of
itself, and in many instances homeowners will best
maintain the property.40  Yet homeowners should be
protected only when their interests coincide with the
interests of the community. The community cares about
avoiding the dilapidation of properties. When a
36 See Brian M. Heaton, Hoosier Inhospitality: Examining Excessive
Foreclosure Rates in Indiana, 39 IND. L. REv. 87, 92 (2005)
(classifying states as either "creditor-friendly" or "lender-friendly");
Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and
Mortgage Credit, 88.1 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS, 177, 177 (2006)
(characterizing some states as "defaulter-friendly").37 Show Me the TARP Money, ProPublica,
http://www.propublica.org/special/show-me-the-tarp-money
(listing 455 institutions that have received TARP funds).
38 Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil:
A Public Purpose Approach, 45 Hous. L. REv. 683, 723 (promoting the
use of a housing policy approach to examine state foreclosure laws);
Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2263 (emphasizing the importance of
mortgage-delinquency management by looking at multiple policy
perspectives, but not altogether abandoning the lender-borrower
model).
39 Cox, supra note 38, at 723-24.
40 Id. at 727 (properties will be better maintained by a defaulting
homeowner than if left vacant).
4' Home ownership provides many community benefits, but all of the
benefits of home ownership assume that the homeowner is not in
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defaulting borrower wishes to remain in his home and is
willing to pay all he can afford to remain in the home, state
laws should increase the chances for homeowners to
maintain ownership. However, in many instances, a long
period between the initial default and a foreclosure sale can
lead to property deterioration. A property owner whose
home was just foreclosed lacks the incentive to reinvest in
the property. Therefore, the community deteriorates with
the property, as the defaulting homeowner's interest no
longer coincides with the community's interest of property
maintenance.
In addition to home ownership and property
maintenance, general policy should be concerned with who
purchases the property at a foreclosure sale. Three
potential buyers exist for a foreclosed property: an
investor, a new resident, or a lender.42 Public policy favors
a new resident. A new resident provides the best source of
maintenance for the property, because a new homeowner
would likely spend time and money to improve his or her
property. 43  Along with property maintenance, home
ownership is an important justification underlying a public
policy favoring the residential purchaser.44  Since
foreclosed properties are typically purchased at depressed
prices, home ownership originating from foreclosure sales
would be sustainable home ownership.
45
Bringing potential homeowners to the foreclosure
bidding will also create higher prices at foreclosure sales.
default. Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2277 (listing the community benefits
of home ownership).
42 Cox, supra note 38, at 729
43 See Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2277.
44 Id. at 2276-77 (describing three benefits to home ownership:
household wealth-building, positive social-psychological states, and
neighborhood and community benefits).
45 "Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn't be our
country's primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be
the ambition." Buffett, supra note 6, at 12.
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In times of decreasing real estate value, an investor will
only buy a property at below-market prices in order to
make a profit from the property, and many lenders lack the
expertise to effectively manage real estate. 4 6 Consequently,
a potential homeowner provides the only source of a fair
market bid. These increases in foreclosure prices will
alleviate the threat of delinquency judgments and may
provide equity to the original homeowner.
47
Most importantly, increased resident bidder
participation will speed the recovery of the economy.
Many banks are financially and administratively unable to
take on more real estate owned ("REO") because their
balance sheets have suffered substantially over the last year
and a half.4 8 This problem is accelerating as the number of
defaulting borrowers increases. Additionally, with the
inflow of foreclosures collapsing home prices, the need for
foreclosed properties to quickly find their way to
homeowners has never been stronger. Thus, business as
usual with lenders acquiring the foreclosed properties at
uncontested foreclosure auctions may no longer be feasible.
Lastly, banks benefit from the increased foreclosure
sale prices. Banks acquiring the foreclosed property take
the risk of re-selling at prices below what would have been
received at a foreclosure auction and face significant
transaction costs associated with the resale of the
foreclosed property. For example, WesBanco recently lost
substantial sums of money by buying three foreclosed
properties and then selling them later at a commercial
auction.49  These properties (which are located at 542 N.
46 See infra pp. 93-94 (WesBanco selling property at a large loss
illustrates their inability to effectively manage real estate).
47 See Cox, supra note 38.
48 Through the FDIC website (www.fdic.gov), one can search
thousands of banks and view the non-accrual loans on any bank's
balance sheet.
49 U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development Settlement
Statement on file with the author (hereinafter "Settlement Statement").
95
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 94
Murray Street, 1741 Kentucky Ave., and 329 Fair Streetin
Springfield, Ohio) were bought recently from WesBanco at
a commercial auction for the gross price of $18,000.50 The
three properties in question were purchased at the
foreclosure auction by WesBanco for $15,000, $12,000,
and $20,000 for a loss of $19,000. 51 In a foreclosure, the
lender does not pay cash for the property. Because the
Springfield properties mentioned above were purchased
above the minimum bid, it is likely that another bidder was
willing to pay close to the final bid.52
Along with losing money on the resale of the three
properties, WesBanco paid significant transaction costs.
First, they owed a total of $1,641.67 in county taxes for the
entire year.53 Second, the broker conducting the auction
received a fee of $6,000.5' Third, the city charged
WesBanco $125.19 for a delinquent water bill. Finally,
WesBanco owed settlement charges of $72.56 These
transaction costs, combined with the low resale price,
resulted in a loss of almost $30,000 for the three
properties. 57 If the three properties had sold to another
bidder at the foreclosure sale, WesBanco would have
avoided this large loss.
5 0 
id.








57 Before the foreclosure crisis, banks were concerned with not writing
off losses. This author personally witnessed lenders bidding far above
the closest bid to reach the mortgage amount. By bidding the mortgage
amount, the bank avoided taking the paper loss. It seems banks have
been slow to recognizing the severe economic condition. Banks
purchasing foreclosed property below minimum bids is a losing
strategy that banks may stop doing in the future.
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With lenders, neighborhoods, and economists in
agreement, public policy favors a foreclosure policy that
creates more potential resident bidders. 58 Thus, foreclosure
policy should be focused primarily on homeowners. First,
public policy demands protection of the original
homeowner. Second, after it is clear that a homeowner
does not wish to work out an agreement to remain in the
home, public policy should favor laws making it easier for
a new homeowner to purchase the property out of
foreclosure.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STATE FORECLOSURE LAW
Foreclosure law is so intertwined with the economy
that a solid foundation in the economic issues surrounding
foreclosure law is necessary before an in-depth analysis can
be undertaken. To understand how foreclosure laws affect
the economy, one only needs to drive through one of the
thousands of streets that have been decimated by
foreclosures. Although this section only begins to examine
the many effects of foreclosure laws, understanding the
basic economic costs and benefits of foreclosure laws is a
necessary starting point.
Foreclosure laws can be broken down into three
generic groups. The first group of laws lengthens the
foreclosure process.59 A longer period of time between
58 Bankers across the country are concerned about changes in
foreclosure law, because they fear the lengthening of the foreclosure
process. See Rick Adamczak, Ohio Bankers Concerned About
Possibility of New Foreclosure Laws, THE DAILY REPORTER (Franklin
County), Feb. 3, 2009, at Al. This concern by bankers is warranted, as
they fear policy makers will focus exclusively on borrowers' interest.
However, by taking into account the whole community, public policy
may favor policies that aid lenders, such as shortening the foreclosure
process in many situations.
59 Both judicial foreclosure and notice statutes, discussed in detail in
Part III of this note, lengthen the foreclosure process.
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default and sale increases the probability that a borrower
will avoid foreclosure sales for three reasons. First, a
lengthened foreclosure period provides the borrower with
the opportunity to engage in negotiations with the lender
and to seek alternatives. Given the current state of
securitized mortgages, workouts have become increasingly
difficult.61 Not only is it difficult to find the party with
authority to negotiate, but mortgage modification takes
time, because the parties must reach an agreement that is
"commercially reasonable and sustainable. ' 62 In essence,
the obligation bankers failed to carry out-that is, making
sure people had the ability to repay-must be done by the
borrower and lender in any workout. Second, a longer
foreclosure period increases the costs of foreclosure,
making it more likely that lenders will pursue negotiation
before initiating foreclosure. 63  By decreasing the cash
received from foreclosing on properties, longer
foreclosures create an increased incentive for lenders to
agree to lower payment terms with the borrower.64 Third,
many individuals lose their homes because of
unemployment; more time means an increased chance of
finding new employment. With employment, the borrower
can resume making mortgage payments and save his home.
60 See Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2272. One alternative to a foreclosure
sale is short selling, where the defaulting borrower sells the property
below the amount owed on the mortgage with the lender's permission.
Id.6 1 Id. at 2291.
62 Interview with David Wiechel, supra note 8.
63 Cox, supra note 38, at 724 (citing Michael H. Schill, An Economic
Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 496
(1991)).
The average rule of thumb in the banking industry is a 30 percent
loss on the mortgage when the mortgagor defaults and the property is
foreclosed. Interview with Sandeep Mawalkar, Risk Management JP
Morgan Chase in Columbus, OH (Mar. 6, 2009). By increasing those
costs further, a lender would be willing to accept low monthly
payments for an extended period of time to avoid such large losses. Id.
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If a borrower can reach a workout agreement with
the lender, the benefits include a homeowner not losing her
home, a bank minimizing its losses, one less house on the
market, and a reduction in the number of vacant homes.
65
Even if a workout agreement cannot be reached, the
borrower can still save his home by taking advantage of
various statutory protections and can protect the equity in
his home by finding a buyer in the market. 66  Thus, the
lengthened foreclosure process increases the probability
that borrowers will remain in their homes and that
borrowers will protect their interest in the property. If the
homeowner avoids foreclosure, the benefits extend to all of
the parties concerned.67
65 The benefit to the homeowner of maintaining ownership is obvious,
but the other three benefits may need to be clarified. Lender losses are
large in a foreclosure sale. First, because a lender is normally the
successful bidder at a foreclosure auction, the costs include time and
investment to maintain the property. After many foreclosure sales, the
property needs significant repairs just to comply with housing codes.
Second, transaction costs associated with buying and selling the
property can be high. See supra Part I (discussing the losses on three
properties sold by WesBanco). Third, another benefit is that there is
one less house on the market, which may not appear significant.
However, given the present saturation of houses for sale, decreasing the
inflow of foreclosed houses on the market will lead to a faster recovery
in the housing market. Lastly, vacant buildings have destroyed
neighborhoods across the country. See Nasser, supra note 17.
6 6See infra Part III.B (discussing the different forms of redemption
rights).
67 To quantify the benefits of prolonging the foreclosure process, one
would multiply the increased probability of a homeowner saving his or
her home by the benefits of a homeowner maintaining ownership
(individual benefit of maintaining home ownership + neighborhood
benefit of reduced chances of a vacant building + community benefit of
more homeowners to share the tax burden + lender benefit of reducing
losses associated with foreclosure). However, the benefits have not
been quantified by empirical studies, which provide an excellent
opportunity for economic statisticians to benefit legislatures by
engaging in detailed foreclosure research.
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However, the benefits of lengthened foreclosure
must be weighed against the costs in order to discover the
efficient outcome. Although the benefits of a lengthened
foreclosure process have not been quantified, there has
been substantial research on the costs.6 8  The costs that
have been measured include the increased expense of the
foreclosure process and lower loan amounts for the state as
a whole. 69 In addition to these costs, a longer foreclosure
period increases the chance for deterioration of the
property. 70 Therefore, the costs of a longer foreclosure
process include the increased costs to lenders, the reduced
access to mortgage lending, and the increased probability
of property deterioration.
Unfortunately, weighing the costs with the benefits
of a longer foreclosure period is a difficult task. Yet when
examining foreclosure laws that lengthen the process, these
trade-offs must be at the forefront of the discussion. The
efficient foreclosure length occurs when the benefits of a
prolonged foreclosure process equal the costs associated
with a longer foreclosure process. Given the lack of
empirical data, assigning numbers to the benefits and costs
would yield unsupported results. However, by looking into
different foreclosure laws and their effects, policy makers
can strike a fair balance with foreclosure laws.
The second group of foreclosure laws provides the
borrower with protection. These "mortgagor protection
68 This inability to accurately measure the benefits of lengthened
foreclosure may be the cause of a shift to less costly foreclosure
procedures. See Donald L. Schwartz, Comment, Power of Sale
Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 206, 209 (1972).
69 Id. See generally Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The
Effect of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence from the
Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 221,
231 (1990) (judicial procedure increases foreclosure costs); Pence,
supra note 36, at 177 (2006) (defaulter-friendly states have loan sizes
that are 3 percent to 7 percent smaller).
70 See Cox, supra note 38, at 726.
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laws" provide the borrower with statutory protections
beyond that of the mortgage contract. 71 These protections
take the form of rights to redeem ownership of the property
and shield the borrower from personal liability. 72 Although
there are many forms of redemption rights, the economic
analysis for each should remain the same. Similar to a
lengthened foreclosure process, redemption rights increase
the probability that borrowers will be able to remain in their
homes. From the previous discussion, the benefits of that
outcome are large. However, not all redemption statutes
are equal, and the benefits of different types of redemption
statutes should be compared based on the marginal benefits
and costs associated with each type of redemption statute.
73
The costs associated with redemption rights also depend on
the type, but the general type of costs are consistent.
Although some debate exists, redemption rights provide a
disincentive to bid at foreclosure auctions.74 In addition,
redemption rights could increase the chance of the property
deteriorating, because the defaulting homeowner or the new
purchaser delays making improvements to the property.
75
Along with redemption rights, delinquency rights
aim to protect the borrower.76 Delinquency rights take
many forms, but the basic idea is protecting the borrower
from personal liability. This protection of the borrower
provides the emotional benefit of aiding an individual in
71 Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection
Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 489 (1991).
72 See infra Part lII.B & Part III.D.
71 See infra Part III.B.
74 James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different
View of Mortgage Anti-Deficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 117, 134 (1997) ("The mere possibility of redemption
discourages bidders at the foreclosure sale because there is no finality
attached to the purchase.").
75 Id. ("[A] potential purchaser would face a disincentive to bid for the
property because, for a period, she could not maximize the value of the
property by making further investment in it ... .
76 See infra Part III.D.
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need; however, no economic justification is available for
providing such protection. Conversely, there is a "moral
hazard" cost associated with prohibiting deficiency
judgments.7 7  In addition, due to falling property values
across the country, many homeowners have lost all the
equity in their homes.78 With no equity in the home and no
concern for a deficiency judgment, a borrower would have
no incentive to make her mortgage payments or maintain
her property. 79 Thus, the social justification must outweigh
the economic costs for delinquency laws to be beneficial.
Finally, the third group of foreclosure laws involves
disclosure. Disclosure includes informing both the
defaulting borrower during the foreclosure process and
potential bidders before the foreclosure sale. 80  More
information allows defaulting borrowers to better
understand their options. 81  For example, a defaulting
homeowner has little hope of maintaining ownership when
she does not even communicate with her lender.82  In
addition to aiding borrowers, more disclosure also will
improve the foreclosure sale process. Low bidder
information negatively impacts participation and sale price
77 Schill, supra note 71, at 534.
78 Geanakoplos & Koniak, supra note 14.
79 Schill, supra note 71, at 534 ("Once a borrower's equity evaporates
because of falling houses prices or accrued, but unpaid, interests and
penalties, he no longer has any incentive to maintain the value of the
property securing the loan or protect it from waste if he is insulated
from personal liability.").
'0 See infra Part IV.B. 1.
81 A defaulting borrower will be unable to make life-changing decisions
without knowing all of the different options. See Avoiding Foreclosure
Toolkit, Doing Business with Freddie Mac, available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/service/msp/avoid foreclosurekit.html.
The easiest way for states to improve the foreclosure process is through
forcing lenders to provide crucial information to defaulting
homeowners.
82 Roberts, supra note 19 (One estimate places the number of people in
foreclosure who have never talked with their lender at 60 percent.).
102
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 1 01
at foreclosure auctions.8 3 Therefore, any increase in bidder
information will improve participation and increase sale
prices at foreclosure auctions. 84 Both forms of disclosure
increase the chance of home ownership, and the costs of
such disclosure are minimal. With such a large benefit at
almost no cost, increased disclosure provides a positive
economic outcome.
III. STATE FORECLOSURE LAWS
The differences in state foreclosure laws
demonstrate different ideological preferences. Many of
these foreclosure laws can be explained under the
traditional policy preferences of lender-friendly or
defaulter-friendly. 85 Judicial foreclosure, long redemption
periods, lengthy mandatory delays before foreclosure sale,
and delinquency restrictions can be classified as defaulter-
friendly. The other foreclosure laws can be classified as
lender-friendly. However, those preferences mistake the
real policy concerns regarding foreclosure laws that are
discussed above. Thus, when examining foreclosure law,
this note examines the effect of foreclosure laws on
reducing foreclosure rates (i.e., keeping borrowers in their
homes), and the effect of foreclosure laws on the resale of
the property (i.e., putting a subsequent homeowner in
foreclosed property).
A. Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure
The first major difference in state foreclosure laws
is judicial vs. non-judicial foreclosure. 86  A judicial
93 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1421 ("[l]t is essential that buyers have
adequate information about the property being sold if market price is to
be achieved.").
84 id.
85 Pence, supra note 36, at 177; Heaton, supra note 36, at 92.
86 Clauretie & Herzog, supra note 69, at 223.
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foreclosure involves the court, while a non-judicial
foreclosure, commonly referred to as power of sale, does
not involve the court.87  Since judicial foreclosures
typically end in default judgments or with no defense made,
the practical consequence of a state having judicial versus
non-judicial foreclosures is that judicial foreclosures are
generally more costly and take longer to complete.
88
However, characterizing states as either a judicial or non-
judicial state can prove difficult. Many state laws that
allow non-judicial foreclosure contain rights and incentives
that make it more likely for lenders to choose judicial
foreclosure over non-judicial foreclosure. For example,
South Dakota allows for power by advertisement (non-
judicial foreclosure), but gives the borrower the ability to
request a foreclosure by action (judicial foreclosure).89
New York allows for non-judicial foreclosure, but
foreclosures are almost exclusively done by civil action
(judicial foreclosure). 90 Past studies have ignored these
intricacies, but in order to discover any correlation between
foreclosure rates and judicial versus non-judicial
foreclosure, these unique laws must be categorized in their
own group. 91 Therefore, states that permit non-judicial
87 Heaton, supra note 36, at 91 ("Judicial foreclosure entails court
adjudication of a lender-mortgagee initiated foreclosure action. In
contrast, non-judicial foreclosure gives the mortgagee the power to sell
the mortgaged property to the general public, without court supervision,
by placing advertisements.")
88 A judicial foreclosure proceeding can last just twenty seconds with
only two questions posed by the judge: "Are you current on your
mortgage and are you living in the home." Michael Corkery, A Florida
Court's 'Rocket Docket' Blasts Through Foreclosure Cases: 2
Questions, 15 Seconds, 45 Days to Get Out; 'What's to Talk About?'
Says a Judge, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at Al.
89 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-9 (1993).
90 RML-SRNE NY § 2:19.
9' Failing to properly identify all states can lead to unsupported
assumptions. By only taking into account a handful of states, Heaton
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foreclosure but maintain significant exceptions that cause
many foreclosures to be performed through the judicial
process are classified as mixed foreclosure states.
With mixed foreclosure as a classification, twenty-
nine states are classified as non-judicial foreclosure states.
92
Eleven states are judicial foreclosure states.93 Nine states
are not classified as either a judicial or a non-judicial
foreclosure state; thus, those states are classified as mixed
foreclosure states. 94 Lastly, Vermont is the only state that
generally allows strict foreclosures.
95
came to the conclusion that non-judicial foreclosures lowered
foreclosure rates. Heaton, supra note 36, at 97.
92 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Alabama: RML-SRSE AL § 2:19; Alaska: RML-SRW
AK § 2:19; Arkansas: RML-SRSCN AR § 2:19; Arizona: RML-
SRSCN AZ § 2:19; California: RML-SRW CA § 2:19; Colorado:
RML-SRSCN CO § 2:19; Georgia: RML-SRSE GA § 2:19; Hawaii:
RML-SRW HI § 2:19; Idaho: RML-SRW ID § 2:19; Maryland: RML-
SRATL MD § 2:19; Massachusetts: RML-SRNE MA § 2:19;
Michigan: RML-SRNCN MI § 2:19; Minnesota: RML-SRNCN MN §
2:19; Mississippi: RML-SRSE MS § 2:19; Missouri: RML-SRSCN
MO § 2:19; Montana: RML-SRW MT § 2:19; Nevada: RML-SRW
NV § 2:19; New Hampshire: RML-SRNE NH §2:19; North Carolina:
RML-SRSE NC § 2:19; Oregon: RML-SRW OR § 2:19; Rhode
Island: RML-SRNE RI § 2:19; South Carolina: RML-SRSE SC §
2:19; Tennessee: RML-SRSE TN § 2:19; Texas: RML-SRSCN TX §
2:19; Utah: RML-SRW UT § 2:19; Virginia: RML-SRATL VA §
2:19; Washington: RML-SRW WA § 2:19; West Virginia: RML-
SRSE WV § 2:19; Wyoming: RML-SRW WY § 2:19..
9' Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Connecticut: RML-SRNE CT § 2:19; Delaware: RML-
SRATL DE § 2:19; Florida: RML-SRSE FL § 2:19; Illiniois: RML-
SRNCN IL § 2:19; Indiana: RML-SRNCN IN § 2:19; Kansas: RML-
SRSCN KS § 2:19; Kentucky: RML-SRSE KY § 2:19; Louisiana:
RML-SRSCN LA § 2:19; Ohio: RML-SRNCN OH § 2:19;
Pennsylvania: RML-SRATL PA § 2:19; Wisconsin: RML-SRNCN
WI §2:19.
94 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Iowa: RML-SRNCN IA § 2:19; Maine: RML-SRNE
ME § 2:19; Nebraska: RML-SRNCN NE § 2:19; New Jersey: RML-
STRATL NJ § 2:19; New Mexico: RML-SRSCN NM § 2:19; New
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By classifying foreclosure laws into two clear
groups of judicial versus non-judicial foreclosure states,
comparisons can be made between the effects of these laws
on foreclosure rates. As discussed earlier, one of the
arguments in favor of lengthening the foreclosure process is
to deter lenders from initiating foreclosures. 96 However, a
regression analysis shows almost no evidence that the
longer judicial foreclosure process decreases the
foreclosure rate.97  When comparing the effects of judicial
York: RML-SRNE NY § 2:19; North Dakota: RML-SRNCN ND §
2:19; Oklahoma: RML-SRSCN OK § 2:19; South Dakota: RML-
SRNCN SD § 2:19.
95 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Vermont: RML-SRNE VT § 2:19. Strict foreclosure
allows the lender to directly take possession of the property through the
foreclosure process. James Geoffrey Durham, In Defense of Strict
Foreclosure: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 36 S. C. L. REV. 461,
472 (1984031985). Although historically foreclosures first used this
process, strict foreclosure is rarely used today. Id. at 4720E73.
However, contract law allows lenders to gain direct possession of the
property through a deal made with the borrower. John D. Hastie,
Conveyances in lieu of Foreclosure, C516 ALI-ABA 263 (1990).
96 See supra at Part 1.
97 Author applied regression analysis to data of foreclosure rates per
household for all fifty states during the last three years. RealtyTrac
Staff, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 percent in 2008, RealtyTrac,
available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity-
increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551; RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure
Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007, RealtyTrac, available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-
activity-increases-75-percent-in-2007-3604; RealtyTrac, More than 1.2
Million Foreclosure Filings Reported in 2006, RealtyTrac, available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/more-than- 12-
million-foreclosure-filings-reported-in-2006-2234. This author then
compared those rates to whether the state was a judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure through use of a dummy variable. A dummy variable just
uses 1 or 0 to denote whether a state is a certain type of foreclosure
state. To test the validity of the regression model, this author compared
unemployment rates with foreclosure rates. Press Release, U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by State
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versus non-judicial foreclosure on foreclosure rates for
each state during the last three years, the regression model
yields a correlation coefficient of less than negative
0.00066,98 which means that the effect of judicial
foreclosures on foreclosure rates is negligible.99 Although
regression analysis did not indicate any significant
correlation between judicial foreclosures and foreclosure
rates, judicial foreclosures may increase a borrower's
ability to avoid a foreclosure sale. 00 Unfortunately, little
data are available for rates of foreclosure workouts, but the
increased opportunity for negotiations in judicial
foreclosures makes it likely that judicial foreclosures
and Selected Area, Seasonally Adjusted (2008), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/laus_01 272009.pdf; Press
Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force and
Unemployment by State and Selected Area, Seasonally Adjusted (2008),
available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/laus_01182008.pdf. The
results showed with over 99 percent confidence that unemployment
rates affect foreclosure rates. In fact, for each 1 percent increase in
unemployment, foreclosure rates on average increase almost 0.25
percent. With this evidence of the accuracy of the regression model,
the model could be used to test whether judicial foreclosures really
decrease foreclosure rates.
98 A coefficient of negative 0.00066 shows that states with judicial
foreclosure compared with a non-judicial foreclosure have 0.00066
percent lower foreclosure rates.
99 Given the simplicity of this regression model, no firm conclusion on
whether judicial foreclosures actually decrease foreclosure rates can be
reached. However, by looking at foreclosure rates for each state during
the last three years, which translated into 150 samples, one would
expect to see more evidence of judicial foreclosures decreasing
foreclosure rates if such a relationship existed.
100 Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An
Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV.
229, 242-43 (1998) (Empirical studies showed that in Illinois two-
thirds of borrowers were able to prevent foreclosure sale by using
reinstatement rights, redemption rights, workout, or bankruptcy).
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positively influence foreclosure workout rates after the
foreclosure process begins.'
l0
In addition, the regression model showed almost no
evidence that mixed foreclosures caused lower foreclosure
rates than pure non-judicial foreclosures.' 0 2 Although the
results do not provide evidence that mixed foreclosure
states are preferred over pure non-judicial states, some
mixed foreclosure states provide interesting solutions that
benefit from the use of both judicial and non-judicial
foreclosure. A law that allows for a power of sale
foreclosure to occur, unless a homeowner requests a
judicial foreclosure, could lower foreclosure rates.
10 3
When a borrower files with the court requesting judicial
foreclosure, the borrower signals his or her desire to stay in
the home. This signal ensures that the borrower is
interested in remaining in her home, either through
negotiation or prolonging the foreclosure process. With
this knowledge, a lender is more likely to be willing to go
through the expense of a loan workout. 104
B. Redemption Rights
Another divergence among state foreclosure laws
involves redemption rights. Redemption rights provide the
borrower with an opportunity to save his property from
foreclosure. 10 5 Redemption rights may be classified into
101 Id.
102 The regression model showed that mixed foreclosures compared
with judicial foreclosures showed a negative coefficient of 0.003
percent, which means that a state having a mixed foreclosure state
instead of a pure non-judicial state causes foreclosure rates to decrease
by 0.003 percent.
103 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 43 (West 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
21-48-9 (1993).
104 Expenses that occur during a loan workout include the time to
negotiate and the costs of reinitiating the foreclosure process if the
borrower falls back into default. See Loan Modifications Get
Reviewed, supra note 5, at A6.
105 Heaton, supra note 36, at 92.
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three separate rights. One form of redemption right
(hereinafter referred to as "cure") provides the borrower
with the ability to save her property from foreclosure by
paying all past missed payments, plus interest and
expenses, but not including any accelerated payments.
10 6
Another form of redemption right (hereinafter referred to as
"equitable redemption") allows recovery of the borrower's
property by paying the full amount of the judgment (i.e.,
the total amount outstanding on the mortgage) or the total
amount of past due payments plus acceleration. °7 The last
106 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (2008). "(1) At any time
prior to the eleventh day before the date set by the trustee for the sale in
the recorded notice of sale, or in the event the trustee continues the sale
pursuant to RCW 61.24.040(6), at any time prior to the eleventh day
before the actual sale, the borrower, grantor, any guarantor, any
beneficiary under a subordinate deed of trust, or any person having a
subordinate lien or encumbrance of record on the trust property or any
part thereof, shall be entitled to cause a discontinuance of the sale
proceedings by curing the default or defaults set forth in the notice,
which in the case of a default by failure to pay, shall be by paying to
the trustee: (a) The entire amount then due under the terms of the deed
of trust and the obligation secured thereby, other than such portion of
the principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and (b)
The expenses actually incurred by the trustee enforcing the terms of the
note and deed of trust, including a reasonable trustee's fee, together
with the trustee's reasonable attorney's fees, together with costs of
recording the notice of discontinuance of notice of trustee's sale." Id.
(emphasis added)
107 See, e.g., FLA STAT. § 45.0315 (West 2006). "At any time before
the later of the filing of a certificate of sale by the clerk of the court or
time specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure, the
mortgagor or the holder of any subordinate interest may cure the
mortgagor's indebtedness and prevent a foreclosure sale by paying the
amount of moneys specified in the judgment, order, or decree of
foreclosure, or if no judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure has been
rendered, by tendering the performance due under the security
agreement, including any amounts due because of the exercise of a
right to accelerate, plus the reasonable expenses of proceeding to
foreclosure incurred to the time of tender, including reasonable
attorney's fees. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
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form of redemption right (hereinafter referred to as "post-
sale redemption") provides the borrower with the right to
recover the property after the foreclosure sale. 10 8 In many
states, this post-sale redemption right permits the borrower
to remain on the property 109 and can last from ten days to
two years. 110 With these classifications in mind, one can
compare the benefits of cure rights to those of equitable
redemption, and the benefits of equitable redemption to
those of post-sale redemption.
The primary difference between cure redemption
and equitable redemption is that equitable redemption
imposes more costs on the borrower in order to recover his
or her property. Despite this burden, some states allow
redemption only by paying the full amount of the judgment
or paying late payments plus acceleration."' By forcing
the borrower to pay the full amount of the mortgage instead
of simply curing the past unpaid payments, these states
significantly decrease the chances for a borrower to avert
foreclosure sale. 112 This clearly detrimental policy to the
homeowner finds no justification from any policy
perspective. The lender is not substantially disadvantaged
from allowing cure rights, 1 3 and the quality of the property
will not suffer from giving a borrower the right to cure
instead of the right of equitable redemption. In fact, a
borrower will more likely take care of the property until the
foreclosure sale if there is a greater chance that she will be
able to remove her property from the foreclosure process.
Hence, cure rights should be preferred over equitable
redemption.
108 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-8-101 (2004) ("Real estate sold for
debt shall be redeemable at any time within two (2) years after such
sale.").
109 Cox, supra note 38, at 702.
110 Id.
.. See, e.g., FLA STAT. § 45.0315 (2006).
112 Cox, supra note 38, at 732.
113 Id.
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The difference between equitable redemption and
post-sale redemption rights is that equitable redemption
applies only to pre-foreclosure. 114 The benefits associated
with post-sale redemption rights include giving the
borrower another chance at saving his or her home and
increasing the cost of foreclosure, which might decrease
foreclosure rates. 115 However, there is evidence that very
few borrowers take advantage of post-sale redemption
rights.116 In addition, a regression analysis study compared
nine states offering lengthy post-sale redemption rights of
over six months with all other states; this study showed that
long redemption rights decreased foreclosure rates only
slightly.1 17  Conversely, the possible negative effects of
redemption rights include lower foreclosure sale prices and
the inability of potential homeowners to bid on the
property. 118 A potential homeowner would be unlikely to
bid on a home with the knowledge that he or she could not
inhabit the home for an extended period of time or that the
home could be taken from the purchaser for up to two years
after the purchase. 119 The successful bidder would be
reluctant to invest in the property until the redemption
114 Post-sale redemption rights are only available through statute.
Hughes, supra note 74, at 1290 130.
115 Hughes, supra note 74, at 133.
116 Id. at 135.
117 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Manual Database
updated January 2009: Alabama: RML-SRSE AL § 2:19; Iowa:
RML-SRNCN IA § 2:19; Kansas: RML-SRSCN KS § 2:19; Michigan:
RML-SRNCN MI § 2:19; Minnesota: RML-SRNCN MN § 2:19;
Missouri: RML-SRSCN MO § 2:19; New Mexico: RML-SRSCN NM
§ 2:19; Tennessee: RML-SRSE TN §2:19; Vermont: RML-SRNCN
VT § 2:19.. Similar to the regression model used to analyze judicial for
non-judicial foreclosure, this author used dummy variables. When
comparing long-redemption states to all other states, the results yield a
negative coefficient of 0.0026, which indicates that long-redemption
states have a lower foreclosure rate on average by 0.0026 percent.
'18 Hughes, supra note 74, at 134.
119 Nelson & Whitman, supra note 35, at 1439.
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period ceased. 120 Despite the high cost associated with a
long redemption period, long redemption periods only
marginally affect the foreclosure rate compared to other
states.' 2 1 Therefore, the benefit of slightly higher prospects
for home retention seems inadequate to compensate for the
costs associated with long post-sale redemption periods.
C. Notice and Delay Statutes
State foreclosure laws also differ with respect to
notice and delay requirements. These requirements take
many different forms and provide borrowers with different
protections. As one example of a longer time delay,
Maryland forces the lender to wait the later of ninety days
after default or forty-five days after notice of intent to
foreclose before initiating an action to foreclose.
122
Washington requires that a foreclosure under power of sale
take place only after 190 days from default. 123 In addition
to a long notice period, Washington requires the lender to
provide information to borrowers of their options while in
foreclosure. 124 If a lender pursues foreclosure by power of
sale in Vermont, there exists a seven-month protection
period from service of the complaint; however, the period
is shortened with evidence of waste of property.
125
Examples of states with shorter time restraints include
Texas, which requires notice of only twenty-one days
before the sale of the property, 126 and New Hampshire,
which requires notice to be sent to the mortgagor twenty-
five days before the sale.'
27
120 id.
121 Clauretie & Herzog, supra note 69, at 23 1.
122 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (LexisNexis 2010).
123 WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040 (2008).
124 id.
125 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (2002).
126 TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 2007).
127 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 479:25 (2001).
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Finding the point where benefits of an increased
delay equal the costs of increased delay is an inexact
calculation as every homeowner is different. As a means to
better differentiate between homeowners, Pennsylvania
increases the notice period for homeowners most likely to
benefit. Pennsylvania gives borrowers the right to meet
with the lender by providing a sixty-day stay on the
foreclosure proceedings. 128 By requiring the borrower to
request the meeting, the court only imposes the sixty-day
stay when the borrower is genuinely interested in working
out the loan. Once the borrower signals his or her interest
in retaining the home, the sixty-day stay gives the borrower
additional time to negotiate a workout.
Pennsylvania's solution reflects the same goals of
the states that allow both judicial and non-judicial
foreclosure. 29 By forcing the borrower to act to receive
certain protections, these laws separate those homeowners
interested in saving their home from those not willing to
put forth the effort. As discussed earlier, borrowers are not
equal. 130  Therefore, any law that separates borrowers
allows state legislatures to set up efficient laws by
providing different foreclosure delays. Although this note
does not try to calculate the optimal level of foreclosure
delay that state legislatures should seek, 13 1 bifurcating the
foreclosure process makes choosing foreclosure periods
much easier on legislators.
128 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009, RML-SRATL PA § 2:19.
129 See sources cited supra note 103. By allowing for accelerated
foreclosures, unless the borrower complies with a simple requirement,
these states streamline the foreclosure process for those not interested
in maintaining ownership.
130See supra Part I (pointing out that the borrower's interest may not
coincide with the community's interests).
13' This is an important question worthy of in-depth research on the
empirical benefits and costs of delaying foreclosures.
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D. Deficiency Judgments
Finally, state foreclosure laws diverge with respect
to prohibiting or limiting deficiency judgments. Deficiency
judgments occur when the foreclosure sale fails to cover
the amount owed on the mortgage. 32 Many states allow
for the full amount of deficiency judgments. 133 Other states
restrict deficiency judgments to when judicial foreclosure is
used, 134 while other states restrict deficiency judgments to
the difference between the price sold and the fair market
value of the property. 135 A few states completely forbid
deficiency judgments when dealing with residential
property.136 These different deficiency judgment
limitations do not affect lender incentives to foreclosure or
lender losses, because lenders typically do not collect
deficiency judgments in the states that do allow them. 137
Although deficiency judgments may not deter or
encourage lenders from foreclosing, deficiency judgments
create a perverse incentive to borrowers. 138 As previously
discussed, anti-deficiency judgment laws encourage
homeowners to walk away from their homes when property
132 Cox, supra note 38, at 703.
133 See Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Cummings, 735 P.2d 1110 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that a creditor cannot be denied a deficiency
judgment if the sale is confirmed).
134 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.990 (2009)
135 UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (2010) ("The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including
trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale.").
136 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database, RML-
SRW CA § 2:19 (California).
137 Cox, supra note 38, at 703. It seems self-evident that a borrower
who cannot afford to pay a monthly mortgage payment would also be
judgment proof with regards to a lender collecting on the outstanding
amount of a deficiency judgment.
138 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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values drop below mortgage amounts. 139  Along with
enticing homeowners to default, anti-deficiency laws take
away an important bargaining chip that could be used by
lenders. For example, the prospect of a deficiency
judgment could persuade a defaulting borrower to turn over
ownership of the property to the lender. 140  Even the
supposed benefit of protecting the borrower by prohibiting
deficiency judgments lacks merit, as lenders rarely pursue
deficiencies. 141 Thus, no rationale exists for prohibiting
deficiency judgments, while allowing deficiency judgments
provides multiple benefits.
IV. RECENT FORECLOSURE LAW CHANGES
Given the severity of the housing crisis, state
legislatures have begun to reform state foreclosure law.
These reforms fall into two separate categories. First, some
states have enacted mortgage moratoriums and other
foreclosure delays for a specified period. 42 Second, other
states have enacted foreclosure statutes changing
substantive aspects of foreclosure law. 1
43
A. Mortgage Moratoriums and Foreclosure Delays
A mortgage moratorium delays all foreclosures for
a specified period. This delay can be the result of two
different types of laws. One type of law consists of a true
mortgage moratorium, where a state government prohibits
139 See Geanakoplos & Koniak, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
140 Other uses of the prospect of deficiency judgments as bargaining
tools are discussed later. See infra Part VI.
141 See Cox, supra note 38, at 703.
142 REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. §
38-38-108(1)(a) (2010); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1
(LexisNexis 2010).
143 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a)(1) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-
162.2 (2010); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009); 2007
OH H.B. 138.
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foreclosure proceedings from commencing for a certain
period. 144 No state has undertaken this option, but some are
considering it. 14 5  The other type delay is when a state
government increases the length of time to complete the
foreclosure process. The technical effect of lengthening the
foreclosure process is a delay of all foreclosures. Many
states have chosen this option.
1. State Law Enactments of Foreclosure Delays
One state that recently increased the length of the
foreclosure process is New York. The New York
legislature recently passed a statute stating that foreclosure
proceedings cannot commence until ninety days after
notice is given to the borrower. 146 Since the enactment of
this statute in August, New York has seen a significant
reduction in the number of foreclosures. From October to
November 2008, foreclosures in New York decreased 31
percent, and foreclosures were down 55 percent for the
year.147  This large decrease is not surprising as many
foreclosure proceedings could not be commenced due to
the enactment of the statute. Given the temporary effect of
the statute, there is a high likelihood that foreclosures will
increase in the coming months. 1
48
Another state that has lengthened the foreclosure
process is Colorado. In order to lengthen the foreclosure
144 New York legislators are considering passing a one-year mortgage
moratorium. New York State Legislature to Discuss 1-Year
Foreclosure Moratorium, BANK FORECLOSURES SALES (Mar. 5, 2008),
http://www.bankforeclosuressale.com/wp/article-0305156.html.
145 Id.
146 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009).
147 RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Decreases 7 Percent in November,
REALTYTRAC (Dec. 11, 2008),
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?Cha
nnellD=9&ItemID=5543&accnt=64847.
148 However, the New York statute's purpose goes beyond just creating
a mortgage moratorium, as the law permanently delays the foreclosure
process. See supra Part II1.c.
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process, Colorado increased the cure period before the
foreclosure sale and eliminated the right to redeem after the
sale.149  Before this legislative change, the right to cure
lasted between forty-five to sixty days.'50  However, the
new statute specifically requires 110 to 125 days between
notice and sale.' 51 This statute increases the cure time from
110 to 125 days, because the borrower has up until the day
before the sale to redeem the property. 152  This trade-off
increases the borrower's chances to recover the property by
curing, while also giving cleaner title to the buyer of the
foreclosed property. 153  The change may have caused a
decrease in foreclosures. The bill became effective on July
1, 2007, and from November 2007 to November 2008,
Colorado saw a seventeen percent decrease in
foreclosures.' 
5 4
Maryland's approach to fixing the foreclosure issue
is similar to Colorado's approach. Maryland recently
passed an emergency bill to increase the length of the
foreclosure process. 55 Maryland increased the length of
time after default before a sale can be made to the later of
ninety days after the default or forty-five days after notice
of intent to foreclose. 56 Because borrowers maintain the
149 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010).
150 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-103(1)(a)(1I) (2007), amended by 2007
Colo. Sess. Laws p. 1832.
151 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010).
152 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010) (giving the borrower
until noon on the day before the sale to cure the mortgage).
153 The successful bidder at foreclosure auctions no longer needs to
worry about losing ownership through use of a post-sale redemption
right. See Hughes, supra note 74, at 134.




155 Emergency Bill: Environmental Matters/Judicial Proceedings, Md.
H.B. 365.
156 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (LexisNexis 2010).
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right to cure until one day before the sale, increasing the
length of time before a foreclosure sale increases the time
to cure. 157 As discussed before, this increase in time could
increase the number of borrowers who eventually cure the
mortgage and maintain possession of their home.'
58
However, Maryland's foreclosure rate has increased year to
date as of November 2008.
2. Policy Analysis of Foreclosure Delays
A true mortgage moratorium and the effects of
creating delays of foreclosure law create both negative and
positive consequences. The positive consequences include
allowing more time for the borrower to explore alternatives
to foreclosure and reduce losses to lenders as more
borrowers are able to negotiate mortgage loan
modifications. 159  The negative consequences include
exacerbating the losses in the banking industry, slowing the
recapitalization of the banking system, and delaying the
correction of the housing market. 160 The problems of the
banking industry should not be underestimated, but the
possible effects to the housing market show a particular
cause for concern. As emphasized in a congressional
research report, "evidence from the Great Depression
suggests that states that enacted moratoriums provided
relief to some homeowners but saw higher costs of credit
and fewer loans compared with states that did not."161 This
environment creates a trade-off of temporarily keeping
borrowers in their home with the hope that those borrowers
can work out a permanent solution versus making it more
157 Id.
158 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
159 Edward Vincent Murphy, CRS Report for Congress, Economic
Analysis of a Mortgage Foreclosure Moratorium, updated September
12,2008,
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difficult for new potential homeowners to buy a house. By
making access to credit more difficult, states could slow the
recovery of the housing market. Therefore, enacting a
mortgage moratorium requires careful consideration before
implementing. 1
62
Similar to the mortgage moratorium, the effects of
permanently lengthening the foreclosure process creates
benefits and costs. The benefits associated with a longer
foreclosure process are increased time for a mortgagor to
negotiate with the lender or to seek other alternatives, while
the costs include increased mortgage costs and dilapidation
of property. 163  This trade-off occurs often in the
foreclosure process, but the decision of the Colorado
legislature seems particularly well thought out.1 64 Colorado
traded post-sale redemption rights for a longer cure period
before foreclosure sale.' 65  This statute created an
environment where the borrower's opportunity to maintain
ownership is increased, while simultaneously making it
easier for a potential homeowner to buy the foreclosed
property. Curing the missed payments is easier for a
homeowner than paying the full cost of the foreclosure
sale. 166  Therefore, by giving the homeowner the
opportunity to cure the mortgage instead of post-sale
redemption, the Colorado legislature increased the chance
of a borrower being able to save her home. 1
67
Moreover, eliminating post-sale redemption rights
promotes increased bidder participation. The discouraging
162 This note does not argue for or against a mortgage moratorium.
However, as the economy worsens, many states may become increasing
interested in a mortgage moratorium to stop the foreclosure problem.
Before any legislature considers this option, research should be done on
the effect on the banking industry and the economy as a whole.
163 See supra Part II.
164 See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010).
165 See id.
166 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
167 See id.
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effects of post-sale redemption rights on a potential
homeowner bidding are greater than the effects of
increasing the time between default and foreclosure sale.
For example, a potential homeowner will be reluctant to bid
on a house to live in when there is a chance that the home
could be taken away from him in the next six months.
With regard to a longer cure period, the only detriment to a
potential homeowner bidding would be the dilapidation of
the property, but that problem is just as prevalent with post-
sale redemption rights where the original borrower remains
in possession.1 68 Even without the original borrower living
in the home, it seems logical that a potential homeowner
will be more reluctant to buy a house when the house could
be taken away.169
B. Substantive Changes to State Foreclosure Laws
In an effort to curb the effects of the foreclosure
crisis, state legislatures have also made substantive changes
to foreclosure laws. States have passed legislation that
aims to improve the knowledge of the defaulting borrower
and provide the borrower with a chance to confront the
lender, ensure proper mortgage title, increase bidder
information, and improve post-foreclosure sale use of the
property. Even though changes to foreclosure law were
implemented with good intentions, some of these changes
have created perverse incentives.
1. Improving Borrower Knowledge
In addition to the ninety days provision discussed
earlier, the New York legislature passed numerous
provisions to aid borrowers and to help prevent future
168 See Hughes, supra note 74, at 134.
169 Post-sale redemption rights also discourage the new owner from
investing in the home until the post-sale redemption period has passed.
Id.
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foreclosures. 170 For example, a notice of foreclosure to a
defaulting borrower requires specific language giving the
homeowner a list of options, including telephone numbers
that borrowers can call for further assistance. 171  By
increasing the length of time for initiating foreclosures to
ninety days and by ensuring that mortgagors know all of
their options, the New York legislature created a legal
landscape more conducive for borrowers to retain
ownership. In addition, the statute created preventative
measures requiring no negative amortization and a good
faith showing that the mortgagor has the ability to repay.
172
The goal of this provision is to ensure that borrowers will
not lose their homes by regulating the making of the
mortgage.
Similar to the New York law mandating disclosure
of options, a new California law requires lenders to
illuminate the borrower's options. The law requires the
lender to make contact with the borrower thirty days before
filing a default notice in order to explore possible options
for avoiding foreclosure, including the right to request a
subsequent meeting with the lender that can be by
telephone. 173 The statute's goal is to put the borrower and
lender in contact. By giving the borrower the power to set
up a subsequent meeting, the law gives the homeowner,
who has the most to lose in this situation, the opportunity to
force a meeting with the lender. Since meeting the lender
precedes any negotiations, it is critical for the borrower to
have that opportunity.
New York and California are not alone in
revamping state foreclosure law. The Ohio General
Assembly recently passed a foreclosure bill with three
170 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009).
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a)(1) (2010).
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provisions affecting pre-foreclosure sale. 174 First, the bill
provides Ohio courts with the power to require the
mortgagor and mortgagee to appear in person and to
participate in mediation.1 75  Given the fact that many
borrowers do not know who owns their mortgage, this
requirement gives borrowers a chance to explain their
situation and possibly save their homes through a workout
program. 176  A similar statute was recently passed in
Georgia that requires that the borrower be notified of the
name and contact information of the individual who has
full authority to negotiate and modify the loan at issue.
1 77
These statutory changes are in direct response to the
mortgage securitization problem, which makes it difficult
to know who really owns the mortgage and who has the
power to modify the mortgage.'
78
2. Mortgage Title Requirements
Along with the mediation provision, the Ohio
legislature passed a bill requiring that a judicial report be
prepared and issued by a title insurance company that
174 See generally 2007 OH H.B. 138.
175 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2323.06 (2010). "In an action for the
foreclosure of a mortgage, the court may at any stage in the action
require the mortgagor and the mortgagee to participate in mediation as
the court considers appropriate and may include a stipulation that
requires the mortgagor and the mortgagee to appear at the mediation in
person." Id. (emphasis added). Forcing the actual mortgagee to meet
with the borrower ensures that a person with the power to negotiate is
present. Many defaulting homeowners may never speak to an
individual that has the authority to alter the mortgage, which greatly
decreases the borrower's chances of avoiding foreclosure sale.
Roberts, supra note 19.
176 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
177 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.2 (2010) (requiring the notice to
"include the name, address, and telephone number of the individual or
entity who shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all
terms of the mortgage with the debtor").
178 See supra Introduction.
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contains detailed information on the property, the owner,
and any lien holders.' 79 The effect of this provision is to
weed out all lenders without proper identification of their
lien. As stated in the introduction of this note, many
securitized mortgages lack proper title. Without proper
title, foreclosures cannot be executed due to this provision.
Not surprisingly, Ohio is not the only state to pass this type
of statute. Georgia recently passed a statute that requires
foreclosures to be conducted by the holder of the mortgage
on public record. 180 Although a statute requiring proof of
title to a mortgage seems trivial, it is necessary that states
stress the need for proper recordation, given the improper
recording of many asset-backed securities.181
3. Increased Bidder Information
The Ohio legislature did not limit its focus to
problems caused only by the securitization of mortgages.
The new Ohio foreclosure statute gives the officer who
makes the foreclosure sale the option of holding an open
house for the foreclosed property if abandoned. 182 This
statute grants the officer in charge of foreclosure sales the
opportunity to significantly increase the bidding at
foreclosure sales.183  One of the major reasons why
properties are not sold at market value in foreclosure
auctions is lack of information. 184  Lack of information
makes it extremely risky for a one-time bidder to buy at a
foreclosure auction, because a person trying to buy a house
179 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.191 (2008).
'g0 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(b) (2010).
181 See supra Introduction.
182 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2329.272 (2010).
183 See Nelson, supra note 35, at 1422 (discussing the inadequacies of
the present auction-based foreclosure sale procedure).
184 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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for the first time typically cannot afford to buy a lemon.185
However, a repeat player such as a bank or investor can
afford to buy multiple houses at foreclosure auctions,
despite knowing that one or two of them may bring a
negative return. Therefore, increasing information by
allowing all potential bidders to inspect the house increases
the chances that a bidder who wants to live in the house
will bid, which in turn increases the price paid at a
foreclosure auction.
4. Post-Foreclosure Sale Reforms
Not surprisingly, given the significant foreclosure
problem facing the state, California's legislature made
changes affecting foreclosed properties after a sale.
California passed a law authorizing civil fines of $1,000 per
day for failing to maintain a property with fourteen days
notice required to comply with the violation.'86 This law
helps to alleviate the problem of deteriorating vacant
properties.' 87  However, the law also provides a
disincentive to buying foreclosed real estate, because the
fine of $1,000 per day can add up quickly. Also, the
fourteen-day notice seems to be an insufficient amount of
time for a homeowner to fix substantial problems with a
recently bought home that could have been vacant for a
long period of time.
188
Through the same law, California gave tenants sixty
days after the foreclosure sale to vacate a property.
89
Immediate possession provides the successful bidder with
185 Lemon commonly refers to used cars. This author uses the term to
apply to a property that needs significant repairs or needs to be torn
down.
186 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.3(a)(1) (2008).
187 See Cox, supra note 38, at 727 (discussing the problem of vacant
properties).
188 Some activities, such as house painting, cannot be done during
winter months in many states.
189 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.3(2) (2008).
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significant benefits. Such benefits include the assurance
that the property will not further deteriorate, the ability to
move into the house quickly, and the opportunity to make
improvements. However, because this law increases the
amount of time it takes for a purchaser at a foreclosure
auction to gain possession of the property, the law further
dissuades bidders at foreclosure auction.
California was not alone in passing laws associated
with foreclosed property post-sale. Ohio passed a law that
requires the officer who conducted the sale, normally the
sheriff, to record the deed conveying title to the property.'
90
This requirement helps to prevent the deterioration of
abandoned property, because many lenders or investors
who buy foreclosed property may not record their deed in
order to avoid city laws requiring the property to be
maintained. Dilapidated housing lowers the value of all
houses in a neighborhood and creates safety concerns for
the community. 191 However, many city code violations are
served on the new owners of the property the day after a
foreclosed property is bought. 192  The city waiting to
enforce housing-code violations until after the foreclosure
sale places a large cost on an individual wishing to
purchase a foreclosed property. Thus, a city must weight
the benefits of holding people accountable with the costs of
stringent requirements.
5. Policy Analysis of Recent Substantive Changes to
Foreclosure Law
When examining the recent changes to foreclosure
law through the lens of promoting home ownership, one
discovers that many of the changes to foreclosure laws are
beneficial and long overdue. Improving the knowledge of
190 OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 2323.66 (2008).
191 See Cox, supra note 38, at 727.
192 This author has personally seen housing code officials writing down
the names of successful bidders at a foreclosure auction.
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borrowers by making sure that they are privy to the
alternatives to foreclosure provides important benefits.
First, it protects the mortgagor from scams targeting
defaulting borrowers who lack knowledge. 19 3  Second, it
ensures that the mortgagor knows her options to protect
equity in her home. 194 Third, and most importantly, the
buyer knows of the opportunities to engage in negotiations
with the mortgagee in order to find a way to maintain
ownership. 195 Many laws go a step further by giving the
borrower the right to a meeting with the lender, which
increases the likelihood of a workout. 196 The appealing
characteristic of disclosure statutes is the lack of a negative
trade-off. The only cost associated with disclosure is the
time it takes the lender to educate the borrower.
19 7
Another enacted disclosure statute focuses on
educating bidders instead of the homeowner. Many
scholars have attempted to explain why foreclosure sales
are below market prices. 198 One logical explanation for the
low foreclosure price is the lack of information.
199
Allowing potential bidders the opportunity to view the
property through an open-house helps to resolve this
problem.20 0  A potential homeowner would never buy a
home on the market without walking through the home, and
in the foreclosure auction, that is exactly what a potential
bidder needs to do. Therefore, any law that increases the
193 See Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams,
http://www.fraudguides.com/mortgage-foreclosure-rescue-scam.asp.
194 See Jacoby supra note 33, at 2272.
195 A recent study released by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation found that "57 percent of the nation's late-paying
borrowers do not know their lenders may offer alternatives to help them
avoid foreclosure." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 note (e) (2010).
196 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a)(2) (2010).
197 Educating the borrower should be the type of activity lenders
already engage in, but, unfortunately, that is not the case. Id.
198 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1422.
199 Id.
200 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.27.2 (2010).
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information of potential bidders will encourage increased
participation at foreclosure auctions.
Along with disclosure statutes, states have passed
laws explicitly requiring proper foreclosure recording.
20 1
These laws present a difficult problem. Because many
mortgages were improperly recorded, many mortgages
could be held invalid. °2 Although this outcome keeps
many borrowers in their homes, it comes at costs to the
financial industry. Given the fragile state of the financial
sector, invalidating a significant number of mortgages
would have detrimental effects on any state's economy. 
2 03
Hence, giving the borrower a windfall by voiding his
mortgage does not appear to lead to the most efficient
outcome. Instead, states should promote mortgage
modification where the lender still earns returns and the
borrower maintains possession.
The last type of foreclosure law modification affects
the foreclosed property after the sale. These laws aim at
making the buyer of the foreclosed property responsible for
the condition of the property.2 °4 Although the law does not
promote home ownership, these laws benefit the
community by forcing buyers to maintain the property.
20 5
201 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-160 (2010).
202 See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (S.D. Ohio
2008).
203 Since securitized mortgages made up 40 percent of all mortgages
held before the crisis, prohibiting a large part of securitized mortgages
would collapse a state's banking industry. See Rappaport, supra note
30.
204 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929.3(a)(1) (2010).
205 Although one would expect a purchaser at a foreclosure auction to
invest in the property, financial institutions lack the ability to efficiently
maintain the property. Since financial institutions will not maintain the
property, avoiding liability for the property becomes necessary. See
New Laws Provide Protections for Tenants of Foreclosed Properties,
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However, the laws create a disincentive to purchase
properties at foreclosure auction because of the uncertainty
surrounding local building inspector's decisions regarding
property conditions. Despite this drawback, property
owners should be held accountable for the condition of
their property, but state law must be fair by giving buyers
of foreclosed properties time to bring the property up to
code.
206
V. SCHOLARLY REFORMS TO STATE FORECLOSURE
LAW
Many suggestions have been presented on how to
improve state foreclosure law. Hence, an in-depth analysis
of all of the scholarly reforms would be overwhelming.
Nevertheless, two scholarly articles presented particularly
astute observations and recommendations that are worth
examining before one can formulate any recommendations.
One legal scholar, Prentiss Cox, recommended two reforms
to state foreclosure law when examining the law from the
housing policy perspective. 2 7 Furthermore, Grant Nelson
and Dale Whitman have argued for implementing the
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act.
208
A. Prentiss Cox
The two recommendations made by Prentiss Cox
include separating the foreclosure process and increasing
206 For example, many old houses economically cannot be brought up
to current code, and requiring successful bidders to do so will lead to
vacant buildings. See Mary Kane, Lenders, Services Fight Anti-Blight




207 Cox, supra note 38, at 727.
208 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1399.
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the notice requirements to homeowners. 20 9 The foreclosure
process generally treats property owned by homeowners
and property owned by investors as the same. 2 1 However,
the two property owners act in distinct ways. Cox argues
that defaulting investors are in a worse position than any
potential buyer to achieve public benefits; therefore, they
should not be given preferential treatment.211 Conversely,
the defaulting homeowner should be given every
opportunity to retain ownership.212  Those opportunities
include delaying the foreclosure process and creating
reinstatement (cure) rights until the foreclosure sale.
2 13
Although the research is limited, Cox cites a study that
discovered evidence that a longer foreclosure process
promotes homeowner retention.214 In addition, Cox argues
for the benefits of reinstatement rights by explaining how
paying the arrearage due is easier than paying the whole
mortgage amount.
Along with the benefits of promoting homeowner
retention of foreclosed property, Cox refutes the costs
associated with longer foreclosures. 216  However, his
complete dismissal of the costs seems unsupported. Cox
first dismisses a study that found that higher foreclosure
costs decrease loan amounts. 217 Cox dismisses this study
209 Cox, supra note 38, at 727.
210 In the present crisis, most of the foreclosure aid has excluded
investor owned properties. Kathleen Doler, Investors Fight
Foreclosure on Their Own, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 5, 2008, at
A6.
211 Cox, supra note 38, at 729. It appears that policy makers agree that
investor-owned real estate does not provide public benefits. Id.
212 Cox, supra note 38, at 730.
213 Id. at 730-32.
214 See Stark, supra note 100, at 242-43.
215 Cox, supra note 38, at 732.
216 d. at 735-38.
217 Pence, supra note 36, at 177 (finding that defaulter-friendly states
have loan amounts that are 3 percent to 7 percent smaller).
129
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 128
by arguing that lenders will become more careful.
218
However, more careful lenders mean less credit for
potential homeowners. Cox then rejects the waste concern
caused by a lack of incentive for defaulting homeowners to
maintain the property. 2 19  However, waste frequently
occurs in the case of foreclosed properties. 22 0 By
emphasizing the importance of these costs, one can weigh
the benefits and costs associated with longer foreclosure
periods to discover the most efficient solution.
22 1
Cox's second suggestion is to provide better notice
to homeowners disclosing all of their options before
solicitation by individuals seeking to benefit from the
defaulting homeowners predicament. 222  From an earlier
analysis, the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs of
providing that notice. 223  Furthermore, the use of plain
language, as Cox suggests, ensures that the homeowner
understands his options.2 24 Cox also appropriately suggests
that providing a plain language notice before publication of
the foreclosure protects the borrowers from solicitors
seeking to take advantage of them.225  Thus, notice
requirements that provide plain language to the borrower
are necessary in order for the homeowner to make an
informed decision.
218 Cox, supra note 38, at 736.
219 Id. at 737.
220 The kitchen sink, bath tub, furnace motor, and copper pipes were
removed from the Murray Street property, mentioned in Part I, after the
tenant was evicted for non-payment of rent.
221 See supra Part II.
222 See Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams, supra note 193 (listing all
the different types of foreclosure scams).
223 See supra Part II.
224 Cox, supra note 38, at 740.
225 Id.
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B. Grant Nelson and Dale Whiteman
Although the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act
("UNFA") failed to gain large-scale support, the Act
provides many useful suggestions on how to improve state
foreclosure law. The most novel and beneficial aspects of
the Act involve improving the auction sale process and
providing additional alternatives to foreclosed property
disposal.
The first part of the UNFA focuses on improving
the auction sale process.227 The central theme in improving
the current system is improving bidder information. Bidder
information is improved by having access to title
information and general property information,228 and
inspecting the collateral.229 The UNFA requires the lender
to provide title evidence to each bidder who requests it.
23 0
The UNFA also authorizes lenders to make additional
information available to bidders, while exculpating lenders
from any liability for false information. 23 1  These
provisions aim at putting information, which is already
available to lenders, in the hands of bidders as well. Lastly,
the UNFA tries to strike a compromise between allowing
potential bidders to view the premises and "lien theory."
232
It does so by protecting a residential debtor from deficiency
226 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1430.
227 id.
228 Id. at 1434 (general property information includes "appraisals,
environmental assessments, surveys, engineering studies, [and]
inspection reports").229 Id. at 1435.
230 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 302(a) (2002). The
act even requires the person conducting the auction to have copies of
the title evidence at the sale. § 303(c)(7). Since lenders already
possess information on the mortgaged property, forcing them to
provide that information comes is a low burden. Nelson, supra note
35, at 1434.
231 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 302(b)-(c).
232 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1435 ("lien theory" states that the property
belongs to the debtor until the foreclosure sale).
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judgments if he acts in "good faith., 233  One of the
components of good faith requires the debtor to allow
bidders reasonable access to the property. 234 There can be
no substitute for inspecting the premises, and any way in
which a state legislature can provide that option to potential
bidders will increase the chances of a potential homeowner
bidding at the auction.
Along with increasing the amount of disclosure in
the auction sale, the UNFA eliminates the post-foreclosure
statutory right of redemption. 235 This post-foreclosure right
affects the finality of the foreclosure sale.236 By ensuring
that the successful bidder at the auction will in fact own the
property, the law promotes the participation of bidders who
desire to inhabit the residence.
Along with improving the auction sale, the UINFA
proposes two alternatives to property disposal. First, the
UNFA allows foreclosure by negotiated sale.
23 7
Foreclosure by negotiated sale allows the lender to sell the
property through the open market.238 However, the
borrower is empowered to reject any proposed sale.
239
According to Nelson, lenders would use a negotiated sale to
reduce transaction costs. 240 Although avoiding transaction
costs does provide a benefit, it seems unlikely that a lender
would engage in the process of selling the property when
233 d. at 1437.
234 Id.
235 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 209 (cutting off all
forms of redemption rights after the foreclosure sale has been
completed).
236 See supra note 114 (discussing the negative effects of post-
foreclosure sale redemption rights).
237 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1440-42 (discussing the different elements
of the rules regulating negotiated sale in the UNFA).
238 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 403.
239 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOsuRE ACT § 404.
240 Transaction costs are reduced by "complet[ing] the process of
property disposition in a single step, rather than the two-step procedure
usually employed now." Nelson, supra note 35, at 1442.
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that effort could so easily be wasted by the objection of the
borrower.
24'
Second, the Act allows for foreclosure by
appraisal.242 Foreclosure by appraisal allows the lender to
give the borrower an appraisal of the property and offer a
proposed amount for the property in order to take title.
243
This law allows the lender to streamline the process by
taking possession quickly. In many instances, it would be
profitable for the lender to pay the borrower to get
immediate possession to the premises. For example, if a
homeowner plans to simply delay the foreclosure sale in
order to get free rent, the property will deteriorate in value.
It is likely that the lender will acquire the property at
foreclosure sale, and since the lender is incapable of
repairing the property efficiently, the lender will be forced
to sell the property at a large discount to an investor. This
discount is the price that the bank is willing to offer the
borrower to get immediate possession. Although this law
does not directly promote home ownership, the law allows
lenders to preserve the quality of the house, thereby making
it easier for a potential homeowner to purchase the
property.244
VI. BENEFICIAL STATE FORECLOSURE LAW REFORMS
With a solid understanding of the different elements
of state foreclosure law, recent changes in state foreclosure
law, and scholarly perspectives of foreclosure law, one can
241 Given the present state of the housing industry, negotiated sales
would not be feasible. There is simply too much housing inventory on
the market.
242 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1444.
243 Id.
244 Although this law does not show up in statute, contract law allows
two parties to make such an agreement through use of a "deed in lieu."
Ron Lieber, Thoughts on Walking Away from Your Home Loan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at B1.
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begin to piece together the most beneficial aspects of each.
To determine which laws are beneficial, this article gives
preference to the goals of promoting homeownership
before and after the foreclosure sale. With all this in mind,
foreclosure reforms are necessary with two basic changes.
First, foreclosure law should not treat everyone equally.
Second, foreclosure law must be structured in such a way
to bring potential resident bidders into foreclosure auctions.
A. Foreclosures under the Dual System of Judicial and
Non-Judicial Foreclosures
The basic state foreclosure law debate of judicial
versus non-judicial foreclosure shows that there are
benefits to both systems. Thus, a system that allows for
both would be the most effective. 24 5  Power of sale
foreclosure should proceed unless the borrower complies
with a simple requirement, such as filing a request for a
judicial foreclosure with the clerk of courts. By mandating
that the lender provide the borrower sufficient notice of his
right to a judicial foreclosure and by making it easy for the
borrower to make such a request, the legislature can ensure
that judicial foreclosures will take place whenever the
homeowner has the slightest interest in maintaining
ownership. This small requirement for the homeowner to
receive a judicial foreclosure would easily distinguish those
interested in maintaining their homes from those who do
not, because those interested in maintaining ownership
would be willing to comply with the requirement.
2 6
Conversely, those with no interest in maintaining
ownership deserve no special treatment, and the foreclosure
245 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 43 (West 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
21-48-9 (1993).
246 A requirement such as a filing with the court or a letter to the
mortgagee would be performed by anyone slightly interested in saving
his home.
134
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 133
process should proceed under power of sale.247 In addition,
investors would be unlikely to comply with the
provision.24 8 A defaulting investor lacks the incentive to
save the property and would not go through the expense of
fighting the foreclosure in court.
Although there are many options for implementing
a law that requires the borrower to request a judicial
foreclosure, some details of how such a law would look
could be beneficial. First, the law must provide clear notice
of the requirements to receive a judicial foreclosure. The
law should require the lender to provide the borrower with
the form to file with the clerk of the court. Along with
making the requirements simple, the notice should provide
for a sufficient length of time. The borrower should be
given at least one month to follow the steps necessary to
get a judicial foreclosure. 249 In addition to notice of the
judicial foreclosure, notice should be provided detailing all
of the borrower's options.250  After that period, the law
bifurcates into the requirements of judicial foreclosure and
non-judicial foreclosure.
If the borrower does not fulfill the requirement to
receive a judicial foreclosure, a non-judicial foreclosure
shall proceed. Non-judicial foreclosure should still allow
the borrower the opportunity to work out or redeem the
247 Under the economic analysis presented in Part I, the costs of a
borrower not interested in maintaining ownership far exceed the costs.
The probability of deterioration of the property is high while the
probability of the homeowner avoiding foreclosure is almost zero.
Therefore, public policy favors quickly moving on from one
homeowner to another homeowner with more incentive to invest time
and money into the property.
248 See Cox, supra note 38, at 729.
249 Picking an exact length of time is difficult, but legislatures should
ensure that the borrower has at least enough time to comply with the
requirement. For example, if the foreclosed party was a truck driver
that travels across country, he may not receive the notice until many
weeks after it is sent.
250 See Cox, supra note 38, at 740.
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mortgage; however, that period should be limited to curb
property waste. A period of one to two months seems
sufficient.25 1 This period should be further accelerated in
the case of a vacant or dilapidated building with the
decision of what constitutes vacant or dilapidated being
made by the code enforcement official or equivalent
office. 252 Then, publication of the foreclosure sale should
take place for a period of two to four weeks with the sale
taking place after that period. A period of two to four
weeks provides sufficient notice to potential bidders.
If the borrower does comply with the requirement,
judicial foreclosure shall proceed. Going through the
judicial process provides much of the time delay necessary
for the borrower to explore his options, but any law must
provide the borrower the opportunity to meet with the
lender. Given the difficulty of locating the individual with
the ability to modify the mortgage, mediation needs to be
encouraged or even required between the borrower and
lender.253 Either the judge or the borrower should have the
ability to require a meeting with a party capable of
254modifying the mortgage. When such a meeting is
requested, an immediate stay of foreclosure proceedings
should last until the meeting takes place.255 With mediation
and the delay caused by judicial process, the borrower will
be given ample opportunity to find a way to remain in her
home. However, as in non-judicial foreclosure, a ruling by
251 Again, picking an exact time is difficult; however, the period should
be relatively short because the chance for property deterioration is high
and the chance for avoiding foreclosure is low for a borrower not
willing to request a judicial foreclosure.
252 The costs of such assessment should be paid by the lender to ensure
that any claim of property deterioration or vacancy is legitimate.
253 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2326.06 (LexisNexis 2008).
254 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (West 2008) (giving the borrower the
ability to request a meeting); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2326.06
(LexisNexis 2008) (giving the judge the ability to require mediation).
255 See Residential Mortgage Lending, supra note 128.
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a housing official declaring the building vacant or
dilapidated should accelerate the process in judicial
foreclosure.
In addition, the type of redemption right authorized
should be a cure right up until the foreclosure sale, which
provides the borrower with the greatest likelihood of
redemption. 2 56 The cure rights should consist of all past
due payments, any court fees, and attorney's fees.
2 57
However, attorney's fees should be limited to an amount,
such as $500, to avoid any excessive expenses.258
The benefits of this divergent treatment come from
the economic analysis provided at the beginning of this
article. 9 If a homeowner desires to stay in her home, the
increased likelihood that the homeowner will in fact stave
off foreclosure sale coupled with the benefits of a
homeowner maintaining possession lends support to giving
the homeowner significant time to explore her options.
260
On the other hand, if a homeowner does not desire to go
through the steps necessary to save her home, the decreased
likelihood that the homeowner will avoid foreclosure
combined with the benefits of home ownership are
outweighed by the increased likelihood that the property
will not be maintained combined with the costs associated
with the waste and deterioration of the property.2 61  Since
the costs associated with a longer foreclosure period are
256 See supra Part III.B.
257 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (2008) (example of a
foreclosure statute that allows for the right to cure the mortgage without
any acceleration of the amount due on the mortgage).
258 Since attorney fees are only recoverable when the mortgagor
reinstates, lenders have the incentive to disproportionately allocate
attorney fees to foreclosures that are reinstated. See Keith Arnold,
Attorney Fees Can be Included in Costs of Mortgage Reinstatement,
THE DAILY REPORTER (Franklin County, Ohio) Feb. 5, 2009, at Al.




7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 136
higher with this group of homeowner, 262 these homeowners
should be given a shorter foreclosure period.
B. Increased Potential Homeowner Participation at
Foreclosure Auctions
In order to entice a greater number of potential
residents into the foreclosure bidding process, four things
are necessary. First, the potential homeowner must be
given a chance to examine the premises. Without actually
walking through the home, a potential resident will be
reluctant to bid at a foreclosure auction. Second, a
potential homeowner must be assured that if he or she is the
successful bidder that there are no disputes over the
ownership. Disputes over ownership would be caused by
faulty title or redemption rights granted to the original
borrower. Third, possession of the property must be
obtained quickly. Quick possession allows the successful
bidder to move into his or her new home and prevents
waste that is likely to occur from a former homeowner who
just lost ownership through the foreclosure process.
Fourth, there must be some assurance that the successful
bidder will not be immediately charged with multiple
violations from the code enforcement office. Although a
new homeowner will likely buy the property with the
intention of improving the property, a home that just went
through the foreclosure process may take time to
improve. 263  Hence, someone buying a property out of
foreclosure needs to be given ample time to improve the
premises.
With these qualifications to bringing potential
residents to the foreclosure bidding process, state
legislatures must change many aspects of foreclosure law.
There are two options to increasing access to the home for
262 Id.
263 Some improvements, such as painting, cannot take place during
some months of the year.
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potential bidders. First, state legislatures can abolish the
whole foreclosure idea of "lien theory." 264 Although such a
change may be unfair to the borrower, the state could enact
a law in such a way as to protect the borrower and allow for
potential bidders to inspect the home.265 For example,
legislation could be enacted to still preserve the borrower's
ownership of the property until a week before the sale, and
then require the borrower to vacate the premises to allow
for an open house of the property the day before the
auction. If a state legislature still finds those terms unfair,
the law could allow the borrower to trade the right to
possess the home before foreclosure sale for an extended
period, thereby giving the borrower an increased chance of
avoiding foreclosure while also providing potential resident
bidders the much needed access to the property before the
auction.
This scenario creates a state of limbo as to who
owns the property and who is responsible for the property
during the days between forcing the borrower to vacate and
the foreclosure sale. Although this question creates a legal
theory problem, the practical implication of this limbo
period is nonexistent. In the present law, the defaulting
borrower cannot be held accountable for the property
because the loans are uncollectable. For example, when
there is a housing code violation, the code enforcement
officials will wait to cite the new owner, knowing that the
defaulting borrower will not comply and has no reason to
comply with the housing code. So for all practical
purposes, the property is already in a state of limbo with no
one responsible for maintaining the property.
The second way a state legislature can allow
potential bidders to view the foreclosed house is by finding
ways to work within the present legal system. The UNFA
suggests allowing borrowers to exchange avoiding liability
264 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1435.
265 Id.
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through a deficiency judgment for showing the property in
foreclosure. 266 For this law to have any effect, deficiency
judgments must be allowed against homeowners.
26 7
However, because deficiency judgments are rarely
pursued,268 this exchange may not incentivize borrowers to
let potential bidders inspect their home. Another way to
improve bidder access to the home is by allowing a county
official to hold an open house for all vacant buildings.
Although this law does increase bidder access to a few
homes, the majority of homes that are not vacated before
the foreclosure sale will still not be viewed by potential
bidders. Both these suggestions will increase bidder access
to the foreclosed home, but neither will allow potential
bidders full access to all foreclosed homes.
In addition to improving access to the home for
potential bidders, state foreclosure law needs to ensure that
when buying at foreclosure auction the successful bidder
receives marketable title. The UNFA suggests that
evidence of title should be provided by the lender. 270 Yet,
271
the law allows for evidence of an attorney's opinion.
This note suggests requiring the lender to provide title
insurance at the lender's expense. Forcing all potential
bidders to pay for title insurance, given the fact that many
foreclosure sales are cancelled a few days before the sale, is
wasteful. Therefore, placing the burden on the lender
greatly reduces overall costs. With this title insurance, all
doubts about marketable title would be laid to rest before
the bidding takes place.
266/d. at 1437.
267 See supra Part III.D.
268 Jason Opland, Short Sale/Foreclosure Deficiency Judgments - Do
Banks Really Sue Homeowners?, RealTown, available at
http://www.realtown.com/jasonopland/blog/short-sale-foreclosure-
deficiency-j udgments-do-thebanks-really-sue-homeowners.
269 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.272 (LexisNexis 2008).
270 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1433.
271 Id.
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Along with marketable title, potential homeowners
need assurance that the property will not be taken away
from them through the use of post-foreclosure statutory
redemption. As discussed earlier, the post-sale redemption
rights provide no real benefit to the borrower and could be
a substantial deterrent for a potential homeowner at the
foreclosure sale. 272  Hence, post-foreclosure redemption
rights must be abolished to lure potential residents into the
bidding process.
Lastly, state foreclosure law needs to be more
accommodating to a successful bidder's situation by
providing for fast possession and giving the new buyer a
moratorium of the housing code violations. When the
property is vacant, there should be no delay in giving the
successful bidder possession. When the property is not
vacant, the law should provide for quick eviction of the
homeowner, tenant, or trespasser. Although this may seem
harsh, the homeowner, tenant, or trespasser is likely to have
had free rent for a long period of time. On the other hand,
the successful bidder will want to gain possession of the
property and take measures to maintain and improve the
premises. To that end of improving the premises, a
successful bidder must be given time. Laws that penalize
purchasers at foreclosure auction do not take into account
the time necessary to make improvements.273 Therefore, a
moratorium of at least three months from building code
violations should be provided.
VII. CONCLUSION
The inefficiencies of state foreclosure procedures
have been hidden by the success of the banking industry
272 See supra Part III.B.
273 As previously discussed, laws that require the property to be fixed
within a couple of weeks, in some instances, cannot be achieved. See
supra Part VI.B.
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throughout the last half century. Because foreclosure rates
have historically been a small percentage of total assets,
lenders were happy to get possession of properties through
uncontested foreclosure auctions. Lenders then sold those
properties on the open market for a gain or slight loss.
However, the present crisis has illuminated the problems of
state foreclosure law. Simply put, lenders can no longer
afford to take control of more foreclosed properties. Not
only are lenders losing money, but housing values cannot
be cured until foreclosed properties work their way into the
hands of homeowners. Therefore, foreclosure reforms
must be made.
These reforms must focus on improving the
foreclosure process through the lens of promoting home
ownership. This note suggests modifying the foreclosure
process in ways that increase bidder participation and the
passage of new laws that incorporate the best aspects of
both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure. Together, these
changes first will help prevent foreclosure sales, and
second, streamline the process of getting new homeowners
to buy foreclosed properties. The recommendations
presented only begin to scratch the surface of possible
changes to state foreclosure law, and it is this author's hope
that legal scholars will begin to examine state foreclosure
laws with the overall economic environment in mind.
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YOU'RE SENDING THE WRONG MESSAGE: SEXUAL
FAVORITISM AND THE WORKPLACE
Paige I. Bernick'
On October 1, 2009, late-night host, David
Letterman, admitted on the Late Night with David
Letterman Show ("Late Night"), "I have had sex with
women who work for me on this show." 2 Although the
employees who engaged in the sexual affairs affirmed that
the relationships were consensual, other Late Night staff
members sustained indirect harm by their actions.
A former female writer for the show, Nell Scovell,
published an opinion piece about Letterman's sexual
relationships for Vanity Fair entitled "Letterman and Me."
3
In 1990, Scovell joined the writing staff as the second
female ever hired by Late Night.4 It was her dream job--
she moved across the country from Los Angeles to New
York to be a part of the team.5 However, she eventually
perceived her working environment as intimidating for a
female writer. As Scovell explained:
Did Dave hit on me? No. Did he pay me
enough extra attention that it was noted by
J.D. Candidate, University of Tennessee College of Law, 2011. A.B.,
History, Princeton University, 2008. Thank you to Professor Jeffrey
Hirsch for his advice and guidance as well as the Tennessee Journal of
Law and Policy Board and Staff for their time and energy editing this
Policy Note. I would also like to thank my parents for all of their
support and encouragement.
2 Bill Carter, Letterman Extortion Raises Questions for CBS, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at Al; see also Bill Carter, Letterman Reveal
Extortion Attempt Over His Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B4.
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another writer? Yes. Was I aware of
rumors that Dave was having sexual
relationships with female staffers? Yes.
Was I aware that other high-level male
employees were having sexual relationships
with female staffers? Yes. Did these female
staffers have access to information and
wield power disproportionate to their job
titles? Yes. Did that create a hostile work
environment? Yes. Did I believe these
female staffers were benefiting
professionally from their personal
relationships? Yes. Did that make me feel
demeaned? Completely.
6
Ultimately, Scovell walked away from her dream job
within a few months of starting.
7
Scovell's account is a prime example of sexual
favoritism and why it is relevant in today's workplace.
Sexual favoritism describes a situation where a supervisor
bestows benefits, promotions, or disproportional r ower to
an employee, who he or she is sexually involved. Sexual
favoritism primarily affects women in the workplace and
places an obstacle for women to obtain respect at their jobs.
This Note will address the past and future of sexual
favoritism law as well as potential improvements in the law
to protect more employees in the workplace. Part I will
cover the background of sexual favoritism law; Part II will
discuss sexual favoritism law at its current state; and Part
III will forecast the future of sexual favoritism law and how
it can improve. Ultimately, sexual favoritism law does not
6id.
7id.
8 See generally Mary Kate Sheridan, Just Because It's Sex Doesn't
Mean It's Because of Sex: The Need for New Legislation to Target
Sexual Favoritism, 40 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 379, 383-85 (2007).
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provide sufficient protection to employees and should
expand in order to fulfill its purpose.
I. Background
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
sex discrimination concerning terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.9  Sex discrimination occurs
when an employer differentiates on the basis of sex in
making employment decisions, where sex is not a pre-
requisite for the job.10 Sexual harassment is currently a
violation of §703 in Title VII, sex discrimination."
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, set forth
guidelines for determining sexual harassment, including
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitutes sexual harassment when submission to or
rejection of this conduct explicitly or implicitly affects an
individual's employment, unreasonably interferes with an
individual's work performance or creates an intimidating,
hostile or offensive work environment.
12
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); see also Toscano v. Nimmo,
570 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 (D.C. Del. 1983). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
states that: "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's..
• sex .....
10 See Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1199.
" 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (2009).
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). The exact language of the code is as
follows:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of
section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1)
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Under the EEOC guidelines, a sexual harassment claim
may present either as quid pro quo or a hostile work
environment. 13 Quid pro quo discrimination occurs in two
possible situations. First, harassment can occur when a
person is subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and/or other verbal or physical sexual
conduct.1 4  Second, it can also occur if an employee's
submission to sexual conduct is explicitly or implicitly
required in an employer's employment decision-making
process.
1 5
A hostile work environment claim comes from
judicial decisions and EEOC policies in the past that hold
that an employee retains the right to work in an atmosphere
free from discrimination based on intimidation, ridicule, or
insult.16  The sexual harassment must be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working
submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
13 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a).
14 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a); see generally Stephen Dacus, Note, Miller v.
Department of Corrections: The Application of Title VII to
Consensual, Indirect Employer Conduct, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 833, 835
(2006).
15 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
16 See Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as Amended; Adoption of Final Interpretive
Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (Nov. 10, 1980) (to be codified 29
C.F.R. pt. 1604.11); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
65 (1985).
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environment." 17 When determining the degree of sexual
harassment needed to create an abusive working
environment, a totality of the circumstances test is
utilized. 8
Sexual favoritism emerges as a subset of sexual
harassment law. Instead of a first-person sexual
harassment claim, a supervisor favors one employee or
some employees sexually and discriminating against others
through that preference, thus creating a third-person claim.
The EEOC guidelines provide a cause of action based on
sexual favoritism: "Where employment opportunities or
benefits are granted because of an individual's submission
to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual
favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex
discrimination against other persons who were qualified for
but denied that employment opportunity or benefit."'
9
1. Divergent Views on Sexual Favoritism
In the mid 1980s, two federal cases, King v.
Palmer2° and DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical
Center2 , reached different conclusions on sexual
favoritism claims.
In King, a female nurse, Mabel King was employed
at the District of Columbia Department of Corrections.
22
When King applied for a promotion, her request was
rejected because another candidate had already been
preselected.23 The preselected employee was romantically
involved with their supervisor, the Chief Medical Officer.
24
17 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
" Id. at 69.
19 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (g).
20 King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2 1 DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1986).
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King sued the employer for unlawfully denying a
promotion and for creating a discriminatory work
environment.25 The District of Columbia Circuit court held
"unlawful sex discrimination occurs whenever sex is for no
legitimate reason a substantial factor in the
discrimination." 26  The court found that King's
circumstantial evidence of the employee and supervisor
sexual relationship (including long lunches, preferential
treatment and physical contact at work2 7) met the burden of
persuasion for a Title VII sexual discrimination claim.
28
However, a few months later, the Second Circuit
determined in DeCintio "that sexual relationships between
coworkers should not be subject to Title VII scrutiny, so
long as they are personal, social relationships. ' 29  In
DeCintio, seven physical therapists brought a claim against
their employer for being disqualified for a promotion to an
Assistant Chief position.30  The supervisor made a
requirement that the promoted individual must be
registered by the National Board of Respiratory
Therapists.31 However, the only therapist considered for
the position with the requisite registration was the
supervisor's girlfriend, Jean Guagenti, and she ultimately
secured the job.32
The dispositive issue in this case examined whether
"'discrimination on the basis of sex' encompasses disparate
treatment premised not on one's gender, but rather on a
romantic relationship between an employer and a person
preferentially hired., 33 The court refused to expand the
25 Id. at 878-79.
16 Id. at 880.
27 Id. at 879.
28d. at 882-83.
29 DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.




33 Id. at 306 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1982)).
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meaning of "sex" for Title VII purposes to include sexual
liaisons and sexual attractions after determining that this
definition was "overbroad" and "wholly unwarranted.,
34
Thus, a split emerged among district courts on
whether to include sexual favoritism claims under Title
VII.
2. EEOC Policy Guidance Memo Reconciles Divergent
Views
On January 12, 1990, the EEOC issued a policy
memo concerning its stance on employer liability for sexual
favoritism in the workplace. 35 Although the policy memo
is non-binding on judicial decisions, it provides a
persuasive framework for how to look at sexual favoritism
claims in the context of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(g). 36 In the
policy memo, the EEOC has described three situations of
sexual favoritism and what forms are actionable.
37
First, isolated instances of sexual favoritism are not
actionable under Title VII.38 As the policy memo explains,
although a single episode of sexual favoritism toward an
employee is unfair, it equally discriminates against men
and women because both parties are disadvantaged
equally. 39  Isolated sexual favoritism is exemplified in
DeCintio, where the supervisor's preference for his one
girlfriend results in her promotion.
40
34 DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306.
35 EEOC, N-915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY
UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (Jan. 12, 1990), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (hereinafter
"EEOC Policy Guidance"]. The policy memorandum was approved by
present day Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, while he was
chairperson of the EEOC.
36 Dacus, supra note 14 at 842.
37 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 DeCintio. 807 F.2d at 308.
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Second, sexual favoritism based on an implicit quid
pro quo claim may be actionable under Title VII. In this
situation, female employees with appropriate qualifications
may be overlooked or discriminated against because they
do not submit to sexual harassment actions.4' However, in
many situations, employees lack verifiable proof that
sexual conduct was a condition for an employment benefit
or promotion.42 For example an employer or supervisor
may only express interest in one employee, and only coerce
that employee for sexual activity. 43 In that situation, "both
women and men who were qualified for but were denied
the benefit would have standing to challenge the favoritism
on the basis that they were injured as a result of the
discrimination leveled against the employee who was
coerced.44
The EEOC explained the coerced single employee
position through Toscano v. Nimmo.4 5 In Toscano, the
court found a Title VII claim where sexual favors were a
condition for receiving a promotion.46 Although the
employee receiving preferential treatment engaged in a
consensual relationship with the supervisor, the fact that the
supervisor solicited female employees on the phone,
bragged about his sexual relations with subordinates and
engaged in sexually suggestive behavior at work provided
enough circumstantial evidence that sexual favors were a
condition for benefits at the place of employment.47
Third, widespread sexual favoritism may create a
cause of action for hostile environment harassment. 4 8 If
sexual favoritism extensively pervades in the place of




4' Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1199-01.
46Id. at 1200.
47 Id. at 1200-01.
48 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
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employment, "both male and female colleagues who do not
welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII regardless of whether
any objectionable conduct is directed at them and
regardless of whether those who were granted favorable
treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors. ' 49  The
policy behind the action is to eradicate the implicit message
that women are "sexual playthings" and the only way to get
ahead in the workplace requires engaging in sexual
conduct.
50
The EEOC presented Broderick v. Ruder5 1 as the
prototype widespread sexual favoritism case.52  In
Broderick, a female attorney at the Securities and Exchange
Commission brought a sexual discrimination action against
her employer.53 She alleged that two of her supervisors
engaged in sexual relationships with their secretaries, who
received cash rewards, promotions and other job benefits.
54
In addition, another female staff attorney received a
promotion because a supervisor was attracted to her.
55
Finally, during an office party, a drunk supervisor untied
her sweater and kissed her as well as another female
56employee. The court found that the plaintiff had
"established a prima facie case of sexual harassment
because of having to work in a hostile work
environment." 57  The court noted that by bestowing
preferential treatment upon those who submitted to their
sexual advances, the supervisors "undermined plaintiffs
motivation and work performance and deprived plaintiff,
49 id.
50 Id.
5' 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
52 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
53 Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1270.
54 d. at 1274.
55 id.
56 Id. at 1273.
57 Id. at 1278.
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and other WRO female employees, of promotions and job
opportunities."58 Although the court in Broderick found a
hostile work atmosphere, the EEOC recognized this case as
an example of an implicit quid pro quo case because the
sexual favors also represent conditions for promotions.
59
II. Current State of Sexual Favoritism Law
Although the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case
concerning sexual favoritism, federal courts as well as state
courts addressed sexual favoritism since the EEOC Policy
Guidance issued in 1990. In a 2005 California Supreme
Court case, Miller v. Department of Corrections, two
female employees, Edna Miller and Frances Mackey, filed
a California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")
discrimination suit against their employer based on a sexual
favoritism theory. The plaintiffs allege that the
Department of Corrections chief deputy warden engaged in
sexual relationships with three other subordinate
coworkers. 62  These subordinate coworkers received
benefits from their relationship with the warden, including
one employee's promotion determined by her affair with
the warden instead of her qualifications.6 Plaintiff Miller
addressed one of the paramours about her relationship with
the warden, and the Rparamour locked Miller in her office
for a couple of hours.
The court found that the plaintiffs presented an
actionable claim under FEHA, and concluded that,
[A]lthough an isolated instance of favoritism
58 id.
'9 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
60 Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
61 Id. at 80.
62 Id. at 83.
63 Id. at 81.
64 Id. at 83-84.
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on the part of a supervisor toward a female
employee with whom the supervisor is
conducting a consensual sexual affair
ordinarily would not constitute sexual
harassment, when such sexual favoritism in
a workplace is sufficiently widespread it
may create an actionable hostile work
environment in which the demeaning
message is conveyed to female employees
that they are viewed by management as
''sexual playthings" or that the way required
for women to get ahead in the workplace is
to engage in sexual conduct with their
supervisors or the management.
65
The court upheld the EEOC policies on sexual favoritism,
separating a claim for "widespread" sexual favoritism from
"isolated" sexual favoritism.
Another 2005 case, Wilson v. Delta State
University, also addressed sexual favoritism in the
workplace.66 A former male university employee filed suit
against the university on a theory of preferential treatment
of a paramour.67 The paramour was promoted to a job that
was not publicized to the rest of the community.
68
However, the Fifth Circuit found that "paramour
favoritism" is not an unlawful employment practice under
Title VII. 69  Unlike Miller, this was a case of isolated
favoritism, and thus did not rise to the level of
"widespread" under the EEOC Policy Guidance.
61 Id. at 80.
66 Wilson v. Delta State Univ., 143 Fed. Appx. 611 (5th Cir. 2005).
671d. at 612.
681 Id. at 611.
69 M. at 614.
153
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 152
III. The Future of Sexual Favoritism Law and How to
Improve It
1. The Future of Sexual Favoritism Law
The two latest significant sexual favoritism cases,
Miller and Wilson, who have adopted EEOC Policy
Guidance, demonstrate that the EEOC recommendations
are most likely here to stay.
70
A line between isolated favoritism and widespread
favoritism will remain, because sexual favoritism is based
upon sex discrimination. 71  The EEOC Policy Guidance
recommends that "[a]n isolated instance of favoritism
toward a "paramour" (or a spouse, or a friend) may be
unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men
in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for
reasons other than their genders (emphasis added). 72 In
other words, isolated instances of sexual favoritism are
based on a preference for a particular person, and therefore
the sexes are discriminated against equally. Moreover,
current federal case law suggests that isolated instances of
sexual favoritism do not give rise to a claim. 73 Thus, the
70 See generally Maureen S. Binetti, Romance in the Workplace: When
"Love" Becomes Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 153, 157-
163 (2007).
71 But see Susan J. Best, Comment, Sexual Favoritism: A Cause of
Action Under a "Sex-Plus" Theory, 30 N. I11. U. L. Rev. 211, 231-32
(2009) (discussing the possibility of a sex-plus theory analysis in place
of a separation between isolated and widespread sexual favoritism).
72 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
73 See Schobert v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding that if favoritism has the same impact on male and
female employees at work, then the claims were not cognizable under
Title VII); Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that that a single instance of preferential treatment based on a
consensual relationship between a supervisor and an employee was not
within the scope of Title VII's protections); Taken v. Okla. Corp.
Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
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EEOC Policy Guidance and current law are set in not
extending a cause of action to only an isolated instance of
sexual favoritism.
Additionally, most courts continue to apply the
EEOC Policy Guidance in determining "widespread"
sexual favoritism claims. For example, Miller reflects the
trend of keeping with the EEOC Policy Guidance by
advocating that a hostile work environment occurs when
the sexual favoritism is widespread, even though the policy
was fifteen years old at the time.
74
However, it remains unclear how many instances of
sexual favoritism constitute "widespread." In Miller, one
supervisor engaged in three affairs with subordinates. 75 In
Broderick, multiple supervisors were involved in affairs
with subordinates.76 The EEOC Policy Guidance states
that one affair is not actionable. Could widespread occur at
two supervisors and one employee? Could widespread
occur at one supervisor and two employees? The current
law's use of "widespread" connotes a large quantity of
sexual favors, but offers limited guidance beyond multiple
occurrences.
2. How to Improve Sexual Favoritism Law
New legislation may identify objective criteria for a
sexual favoritism claim. Title VII protects against
discrimination "because of' sex as in gender and not sexual
conduct.77 Under the current sexual favoritism analysis set
out by the EEOC Policy Guidance and followed by courts,
a third-party employee must prove that the sexual
favoritism in a workplace amounted to an implicit quidpro
consensual romantic relationships do not qualify for relief under Title
VII because they are not based on any gender differences).74 Miller, 115 P.3d at 80.
75 Id. at 83.
76 Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1273.
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
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quo claim and/or a hostile work environment claim.78 The
current law leaves out isolated instances of sexual
favoritism because the favoritism involved discriminates
equally between the genders-favoritism based on a
consensual romantic relationship. However, circumstances
arise creating an isolated instance severe enough to affect
the conditions of a workplace. Currently, the law focuses
on the quantity of the sexual favoritism rather than the
quality. Thus, new legislation, not under the traditional
context of Title VII "because of. . . sex" 79 language, would
better promote the EEOC's intent to stop adverse affects on
employment opportunity based on sexual conduct.
80
A claim for sexual favoritism should be available to
widespread or isolated, coerced or non-coerced conduct.
Current sexual favoritism law fails to cover a consensual
relationship that may be so outrageous-the paramour
receives a promotion, undue responsibilities, preferential
treatment, advantages, and the like beyond the paramour's
skill, experience or merit-that it may alter the conditions
of a coworker's environment.
For example, a secretary of an accounting executive
begins an intimate relationship with her boss. The
secretary completed a two-year associate's degree, and she
entered work force one year ago while employed at her
current position for one month. The executive, while
engaged in the intimate relationship, appoints the secretary
to an entry-level accountant's position, provides her an
office, and quadruples her salary. An entry-level
accountant position usually requires an individual complete
a four-year bachelor's degree program from an accredited
university or college and some internship/work experience.
The position typically pays only double what the secretaries
make. The paramour later receives a promotion to an
78 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
80 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
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executive position within six months. Coworkers perceive
the message that an employee must be involved in an
intimate relationship with the boss to receive benefits and
promotions. The mere existence of one consensual
relationship between a supervisor and employee can create
hostility in the workplace. 8 1  Yet under Title VII, a
coworker of the paramour cannot recover because the
intimate relationship is consensual and not because of
gender.
New legislation should focus on qualifying sexual
favoritism rather than quantifying instances of favoritism.
Designating an extreme isolated instance of sexual
favoritism as merely unfair and only three instances of
sexual favoritism as widespread is inconsistent with
reducing sexual favoritism in the workplace, which
adversely affects the employment opportunities of third
parties.
A model sexual favoritism law requires legislators
to develop a separate statute including the following
elements: (1) a cause of action not under Title VII, (2)
supervisor favoring a subordinate, (3) because of sexual
conduct, (4) which is severe or persuasive as to alter the
condition of the employee's employment and create a
hostile and/or abusive working environment.
First, the sexual favoritism claim would be
independent of Title VII. Although current sexual
favoritism law remains subset of sexual harassment under
Title VII, sexual harassment limits what conduct amounts
to sexual favoritism by excluding isolated instances and not
defining widespread. A new law would allow a finder of
fact to assess the quality of the sexual favoritism to
determine its severity. Additionally, lawmakers should
consider making sexual favoritism claim actionable by the
81 See Jennifer Bercovici, Note, The Workplace Romance and Sexual
Favoritism: Creating a Dialogue Between Social Science and the Law
of Sexual Harassment, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 183, 210 (2006).
157
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 156
EEOC, similar to Title VII, which would help filter cases.
Second, the action must involve a supervisor and a
subordinate. The thrust of the sexual favoritism law
attempts removal of adverse employment opportunities
caused by sexual favoritism in the workplace. Actions such
as promotion, benefits, and other intangible rewards are
generally presented to employees by supervisors. The
claim does not apply to employees at the same level or
supervisors who do not give promotions, benefits and the
like to paramours.
Third, the claim must include favoritism because of
sexual conduct. The finder of fact will not look to see
employee discrimination because of their gender, but rather
if the employee is being discriminated against because of
the sexual conduct between the supervisor and employee.
Sexual conduct differentiates favoritism claim from a
sexual harassment claim.
Fourth, a claim must establish that the favoritism
reaches a severe or persuasive level as to alter the condition
of the employee's employment and create a hostile and/or
abusive working environment. This language derives from
the EEOC Policy Guidance concerning a hostile work
environment claim. The fact finder would evaluate the
severity of a claim. This can be done through objective and
subjective tests similarly used in current sexual harassment
analysis.
82
A reasonable person standard provides an objective
test to determine the severity of the favoritism. Thus, an
employee must first prove that a reasonable person, in the
employee's situation, would perceive the conduct as severe
or pervasive as to alter the condition of the employee's
employment and create a hostile and/or abusive working
environment. The factors for proving severity would
include the components from a sexual harassment claim
and the EEOC Policy Guidance: implicit message by
82 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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actions of a supervisor, psychological harm, interfering
with work, frequency, and behavior. The touchstone factor
would be the implicit message that the supervisor's actions
convey onto the workplace.
Finally, the fact finder applies the subjective test:
whether the employee proved they perceive the conduct as
severe or pervasive as to alter the condition of the
employee's employment and create a hostile and/or abusive
working environment. The employee perception element
would use the same factors for considering severity of the
sexual favoritism as the reasonable person standard.
However, the reality is that new legislation may not
be feasible. In today's society, a majority of the population
spends a significant portion of the week at work. The
workplace is natural meeting place for potential mates.
Romances between colleagues occur and most likely
happen at a high rate. Moreover, courts remain reluctant
engage in the policing of intimate relationships. 83 Sexual
favoritism law may continue as a subset of sexual
harassment under Title VII in order to separate out weak
claims and reduce the number of claims. Yet, new sexual
harassment legislation provides the best option for
addressing the genuine issue at stake in a sexual favoritism
claim, discrimination based on sexual conduct.
IV. Conclusion
Ideally, the sexual favoritism law requires change in
order to give employees who witness severe sexual
favoritism in the workplace, either in isolated or
widespread scenarios, a claim against the employer. Sexual
favoritism law should not function as a subset of sexual
harassment under Title VII, because it has more to do with
sexual conduct rather than gender. However, the current
law may continue unaltered, considering the trend of cases
83 DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
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applying the EEOC Policy Guidance.
Nell Scovell's Late Night scenario creates a
challenge to concentrate on the severity of sexual
favoritism when determining if a plaintiff sustained a
legitimate claim. She struggled as a female writer in a male
dominated division who witnessed subordinates exercise
disproportional power, making her feel uncomfortable and
eventually forcing her to leave her dream job. A sole act of
favoritism may trigger an actionable response, because if
the sexual favoritism is severe, the inappropriate behavior
still delivers the wrong message to employees. Women, as
well as men, should not be subjected to such severe sexual
favoritism at work-a place where merit should determine
your success instead of sexual appeal.
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